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1 Problemstellung und Stand der gegenwärtigen 
Forschung
Die private Geldanlage hat in den letzten Jahren stark an Bedeutung gewonnen. So hat sich 
das Geldvermögen privater Haushalte seit 1993 von 2,3 Billionen Euro auf 4,4 Billionen Euro 
im Jahr 2008 beinahe verdoppelt (vgl. Bundesbank (2009)). Dieses Thema wird auch in den 
nächsten  Jahren  immer  wichtiger  werden,  da  die  gesetzliche  Rente  zukünftig  vermehrt 
durch private Rücklagen ergänzt werden muss, um den im Alter benötigten Geldbedarf zu 
decken.
Von den verschiedenen Möglichkeiten der Geldanlage hat insbesondere die Anlageklasse 
der  Investmentfonds  an  Bedeutung  gewonnen: Wurden  1993  nur  5,9%  des  gesamten 
privaten  Geldvermögens  in  Investmentfonds  angelegt, so  waren  es  im  Jahr  2008  bereits 
11,3%. Dies entspricht einem Wachstum um 9,0% p.a., von 136 Milliarden Euro (1993) auf 
497  Milliarden  Euro  (2008).  Damit  sind  Investmentfonds  die  mit  Abstand  am  stärksten 
wachsende Anlageklasse im Vergleich zu Anlagen in Versicherungen (6,7% p.a.), Anlagen 
aus Pensionsrückstellungen (3,9% p.a.), Anlagen bei Banken (3,2% p.a.) und direkte Anlagen 
in Wertpapieren (2,7% p.a.)1.
Bereits  seit  den  50er  Jahren  des  letzten  Jahrhunderts  beschäftigt  sich  wissenschaftliche 
Literatur mit  der  Fragestellung, wie  Investoren  optimal  Ihr  Geld  anlegen sollten. 
Ausgehend  von  Markowitz  (1952) gibt  die  moderne  Portfoliotheorie  Leitsätze vor, wie 
private  Investoren  ihr  Portfolio  strukturieren  sollten,  um  ein  optimales  Verhältnis  von 
erwarteter Rendite und Risiko zu erhalten. Allerdings verhalten sich private Investoren in 
der Realität nicht rational und legen ihr Geld nicht gemäß der Portfoliotheorie an. Hieraus 
hat  sich  in  den  letzten  Jahren  ein  eigener  Forschungsstrang entwickelt,  der  auch  als 
Behavioral Finance bezeichnet wird. Wissenschaftler stellen hierbei eine Grundannahme der 
Portfoliotheorie in Frage: Das rationale Handeln der Investoren.
So  gibt  es  eine  ganze  Reihe  von  wissenschaftlichen  Beiträgen,  die  irrationale 
Verhaltensmuster bei Investoren aufdecken. Zum Beispiel untersuchen Shefrin und Statman 
(1985) den  Dispositionseffekt,  d.h., die  Tatsache,  dass  Investoren  gewinnbringende 
Wertpapiere zu  früh  verkaufen  und  verlustbringende  Wertpapiere zu  lange  halten.  Ein 
weiteres  Beispiel  ist  der  sogenannte  „Home-Bias“ (vgl.  u.a.  Lewis  (1999)):  Investoren 
übergewichten  in  ihren  Portfolios  einheimische  Wertpapiere  und  versäumen  somit, das 
                                                  
1 Alle Zahlen aus: Bundesbank, Deutsche, 2009, "Geldvermögen und Verbindlichkeiten der Privaten 
Haushalte 1991 - 2008".8
Risiko  international  zu  diversifizieren.  Coval  und Moskowitz  (1999) zeigen  sogar,  dass 
Investoren auch innerhalb der einheimischen Wertpapiere Papiere von Unternehmen, die in 
der Nähe ihres Wohnortes ihren Firmensitz haben, übergewichten. Barber und Odean (2000)
belegen,  dass  übermäßig  häufiges Handeln zu  einer  unterdurchschnittlichen 
Portfoliorendite  führt.  Sie  erklären  diesen  Zusammenhang  damit,  dass  Investoren,  die 
übermäßig  viel  handeln, in  der  Regel  ihre  eigenen  Fähigkeiten  überschätzen.  In  einer 
weiteren  Arbeit  finden  Barber  und Odean  (2001) heraus,  dass  insbesondere  Männer  zu 
übermäßigem  Trading  und  somit  zu  Selbstüberschätzung neigen.  Mit  allgemeinen 
Aspekten fehlender bzw. mangelhafter Portfolio Diversifikation beschäftigen sich Bernatzi 
und Thaler  (2001).  Sie  finden  heraus,  dass  viele  Investoren  Wertpapiere  in  ihren 
Pensionsrücklagen einfach mit der Heuristik 1/n gewichten - ungeachtet von Überlegungen 
hinsichtlich einer optimalen Asset Allocation. Bezüglich der Anlagen in Investmentfonds 
stellt Gruber  (1996) die  Frage, warum  Investoren  in  aktiv  gemanagte Fonds  investieren, 
obwohl diese sich im Durchschnitt schlechter als der Markt entwickeln.
Vor dem Hintergrund von massiven Investmentfehlern privater Investoren hat vor kurzem
Campbell  (2006) ein  neues  Forschungsgebiet  abgegrenzt,  das er  mit  Household  Finance
bezeichnet.  Dabei fordert  er  Wissenschaftler  dazu  auf,  ein  besseres  Verständnis  dieser
Investmentfehler zu gewinnen, um somit die daraus resultierenden Verluste zu begrenzen.
Als  weit  verbreitete  Investmentfehler  identifiziert  er  insbesondere  die  Unterlassung, in 
riskante  Anlageklassen  zu  investieren,  mangelhafte  Diversifikation  riskanter  Portfolios 
sowie das Versäumnis Optionen zum Refinanzieren von Hypotheken auszuüben.
Die vorliegende Dissertation greift diesen Punkt auf und hat zum Ziel, Investmentfehler 
privater Investoren im Bereich von Investmentfonds aufzudecken, ihre Implikationen zu 
untersuchen sowie die Frage zu beantworten, ob Finanzberater privaten Investoren dabei 
helfen, diese Fehler zu vermeiden.
Parallel zu der starken Verbreitung von Investmentfonds hat sich auch eine große Anzahl 
an  Literatur entwickelt, die  sich  mit  Investmentfonds  beschäftigt.  Im  Folgenden  wird,
ausgehend  von  Anderson  und Schnusenberg  (2005), ein Überblick  über  diese  Literatur
gegeben. Dabei wird sich auf diejenigen Arbeiten fokussiert, die Bezug zu der vorliegenden 
Dissertation  haben.  Für  einen  breiteren  Überblick  über  Literatur  zum  Thema 
Investmentfonds sei der Leser auf Anderson und Schnusenberg (2005) verwiesen. Diesen 
beiden  Autoren  folgend  wird die  existierende  Literatur  in  drei  Teilgebiete unterteilt, 9
nämlich (i) Performance von Investmentfonds, (ii) Market-Timing, d.h. die Fähigkeit des 
Fonds, Marktphasen zu antizipieren, und (iii) Persistenz von Investmentfonds.
Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zum Teilgebiet Performance von Investmentfonds gibt es seit 
den  60er-Jahren  des  letzten  Jahrhunderts.  Zuvor wurde  die  Wertentwicklung  von 
Investmentfonds durch  Vergleich  der  jeweiligen  einfachen  Rendite  mit den  Renditen 
anderer Fonds bewertet. Dabei wurde das Risiko, das der Fond eingeht, um die Rendite zu 
erwirtschaften, nicht in Betracht gezogen. Dies hat sich erst durch den Einzug der modernen 
Portfoliotheorie geändert (vgl. z.B. Treynor (1965) oder Sharpe (1966)). Das auch heute noch 
gebräuchlichste risiko-adjustierte Performance-Maß  ist  Jensens  Alpha  (Jensen  (1968)). 
Hierbei wird  die  Performance  eines  Investmentfonds,  das  sogenannte  Alpha,  relativ  zu 
seinem Benchmark-Index gemessen. Ist das Alpha positiv, so ist dies ein Zeichen für eine 
überdurchschnittliche  Wertpapierauswahl  des  Fonds.  Ein  negatives  Alpha  hingegen 
bedeutet entweder eine unterdurchschnittliche Wertpapierauswahl oder hohe Kosten.
In  den  darauf  folgenden  Jahren  beschäftigt  sich  die  Literatur  hauptsächlich  mit 
Fragestellungen, wie  sich  die  Wertentwicklung  unterschiedlicher  Fondstypen  und 
Anlageschwerpunkte unterscheidet  (z.B.  Carlson  (1970) und  McDonald  (1974))  bzw.,
inwieweit  sich  die  konkrete  Auswahl  des  Benchmark-Index  auf  die  Wertentwicklung 
auswirkt  (z.B.  Lehmann  und Modest  (1987)). Seit  Ende  der  80er  Jahre  hält  dann  die 
Berücksichtigung der Fondskosten vermehrt Einzug in die Literatur: So identifizieren zum 
Beispiel  Grinblatt  und Titman  (1989) eine  überdurchschnittliche  Performance  bei 
Wachstumsfonds und bei kleineren Fonds. Sobald sie jedoch die Kosten in ihre Betrachtung 
mit  einbeziehen,  verschwinden  diese  abnormalen  Renditen.  In  einer  weiteren  Arbeit 
analysiert Malkiel (1995) Aktienfonds im Zeitraum 1971 bis 1991. Er erhält im Durchschnitt 
positive Alphas vor der Betrachtung von Kosten und negative Alphas nach der Betrachtung 
von Kosten. Allerdings sind alle Alphas nicht statistisch signifikant verschieden von Null.
Eine zentrale Forschungsarbeit hinsichtlich der Performance von Investmentfonds ist die 
Arbeit von Gruber (1996). Der Autor zeigt, dass aktiv gemanagte Investmentfonds sich im 
Durchschnitt  um  1,94%  p.a.  schlechter  entwickeln  als  der  Markt.  Diese  negative 
Wertentwicklung  hat  Bestand, auch  wenn  andere  Performancemaße  verwendet werden. 
Wermers und Moskowitz (2000) zerlegen die Rendite von Investmentfonds in drei Faktoren, 
nämlich in die gehaltenen Aktien, die anteiligen Kosten sowie die Transaktionskosten. Die 
Autoren  zeigen,  dass  die  Aktien,  welche der durchschnittliche Fond  hält,  zwar 
überdurchschnittliche  Renditen  erwirtschaften,  die  Nettorendite  des  gesamten  Fonds 10
hingegen  1%  niedriger  als  der  entsprechende  Benchmark-Index ist.  Dieser 
Renditeunterschied lässt sich zum einen durch die Kosten und zum anderen durch den 
Anteil des Fondsvermögens, der nicht in Aktien investiert ist, erklären.
Neuere  Literatur  beschäftigt  sich  hauptsächlich  mit  alternativen  Ansätzen,  um  die 
Performance  von  Investmentfonds  zu messen  (z.B.  schlagen  Baks,  Metrick  und Wachter 
(2001) ein  Bayes’sches  Maß  vor),  sowie mit  dem  optimalen  Incentive-Modell  für 
Fondsmanager (z.B. Elton, Gruber und Blake (2003)).
Zusammenfassend  lässt  sich  also  sagen,  dass  die  Forschung in  den  letzten  50  Jahren 
umfassende Modelle erarbeitet hat, Fondsrenditen unter Berücksichtung des eingegangenen 
Risikos zu messen. Allerdings entwickeln sich die meisten Fonds schlechter als der jeweilige 
Vergleichs-Index.
Frühe Arbeiten zum Teilbereich Market-Timing präsentieren statistische Modelle, mit denen 
die Fähigkeit von Fonds bzw. der Fondsmanager gemessen werden soll, Marktbewegungen 
zu antizipieren (z.B. Treynor und Mazuy (1966) und Hendrickson und Merton (1981)). In 
den  folgenden  Jahren untersuchen  Wissenschaftler  hauptsächlich  die  Fragestellung, ob 
Fondsmanager  besser  darin  sind, die  richtigen  Wertpapiere  zu  identifizieren  oder 
Marktphasen  richtig  zu  antizipieren.  Als  Beispiel  hierfür  sei  die  Arbeit  von  Kon  (1983)
genannt,  welcher zeigt,  dass  in  seinem  Datensatz  Investmentfonds  bessere  Ergebnisse
hinsichtlich der Auswahl der Wertpapiere als hinsichtlich des Market-Timings erzielen.
Jagannathan und Korajczyk (1986) zeigen, dass Investmentfonds, die signifikante Timing-
Charakteristika aufweisen, sich häufiger unter- als überdurchschnittlich entwickeln. Eine 
wichtige  Arbeit  haben  Ferson  und Schadt  (1996) zur  Diskussion  beigesteuert.  Sie 
modifizieren  das  Alpha-Maß  von  Jensen  (1968) sowie  die  Market-Timing-Modelle  von 
Treynor  und Mazuy  (1966) und  Hendrickson  und Merton  (1981) dergestalt,  dass sie
„bedingte  Informationen“  berücksichtigen,  d.h., sie  betrachten  zeit-abhängige  Betas.  Mit 
diesem Modell finden sie heraus, dass Investmentfonds in der Tat bedingte Informationen 
über  Marktbewegungen  nutzen.  Weitere  zeitbedingte  Modelle  entwickeln anschließend 
Ferson und Warther (1996) und Becker, Ferson, Myers und Schill (1999). Schließlich schlägt
Jiang  (2003) ein  neues, nicht-parametrisches Maß  für  die  Fähigkeit vor, Marktphasen  zu 
antizipieren.  Mit  diesem  Maß  zeigt der  Autor,  dass  die  Wahrscheinlichkeit,  dass  ein 
Fondsmanager die Marktphase falsch antizipiert, höher ist als die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass 
er die Marktphase richtig antizipiert.11
Insgesamt hat die Literatur zum Teilgebiet Market-Timing also Modelle entwickelt, die die 
Fähigkeit messen, Marktphasen  zu  antizipieren.  Mit  diesen  Modellen  lassen  sich zwar
Anzeichen finden, dass Fonds diese Antizipations-Fähigkeiten besitzen; allerdings ist die 
Wertentwicklung dieser Fonds trotzdem unterdurchschnittlich.
Der  dritte  Teilbereich  der  Literatur  bezüglich  Investmentfonds beschäftigt  sich  mit  der 
Frage, ob Investmentfonds persistent sind, d.h. ob Fonds, welche sich in der Vergangenheit 
überdurchschnittlich  entwickelt  haben,  sich  auch  in  Zukunft  überdurchschnittlich 
entwickeln werden. Erste empirische Studien von Sharpe (1966) sowie Grinblatt und Titman 
(1992) zeigen, dass Unterschiede in der Wertentwicklung von Investmentfonds im Laufe der 
Zeit bestehen bleiben. Elton, Gruber und Blake (1996) bekräftigen diese Ergebnisse, indem 
sie  risiko-adjustierte  Performance-Maße  anwenden. Auch, wenn  es  zwischenzeitlich 
kontroverse Diskussionen gab (z.B. zwischen Hendricks, Patel und Zeckhauser (1993) und 
Carhart  (1997)), zeigen  darauffolgende  Studien  wiederum  die  Existenz  der  Performance 
Persistenz  bei  Investmentfonds  (z.B.  Hsiu-Lang,  Jegadeesh  und Wermers  (2000) sowie
Wermers  und Moskowitz  (2000)).  Chevalier  und Ellison  (1999) können  belegen,  dass 
hauptsächlich  die  Fondsmanager  und  nicht  die  Fonds  selbst  für  herausragende  Fonds-
Performance  verantwortlich  sind.  In  einer  aktuelleren  Arbeit  nutzen  Kosowski, 
Timmermann,  Wermers  und White  (2006) eine  spezielle  Bootstrap-Analyse  und  finden 
heraus,  dass  die  Fondsmanager,  die  überdurchschnittliche  Alpha-Performance  mit  ihren 
Fonds erzeugen, in der Tat besondere Fähigkeiten besitzen und nicht einfach nur Glück 
haben.
Zusammenfassend kann man also sagen, dass, obwohl das Thema in den letzten Jahren 
kontrovers diskutiert worden ist, Persistenz in der Wertentwicklung von Investmentfonds 
zu existieren scheint.
2 Vorgehensweise und Einordnung in die bestehende 
Literatur
Diese  Dissertation  besteht  insgesamt  aus  drei  Forschungsarbeiten.  Die  erste  Arbeit 
beschäftigt sich mit der Fragestellung, welche Kriterien Privatinvestoren nutzen, wenn sie 
Investmentfonds  kaufen.  Neben  der  Analyse  einzelner  möglicher  Kaufkriterien  wird 
außerdem untersucht, welches dieser Kriterien bei der Kaufentscheidung das dominierende 
ist.  Der  zweite  Forschungsbeitrag  untersucht  insbesondere,  welche  Auswirkungen  die 
Fähigkeit, Investmentfonds mit Hilfe historischer Wertentwicklungen auszuwählen, auf den 
gesamten  Anlageerfolg  hat.  Die  dritte  Forschungsarbeit  untersucht schließlich  die 12
Fragestellung,  inwieweit  Finanzberater  ihren  Kunden  helfen, bessere  Investmentfonds 
auszuwählen  und  somit  ihre  „Investmentsophistikation“2 zu  verbessern. Dabei  werden 
auch potentielle Endogenitätsprobleme adressiert.
Alle  drei  Fragestellungen  bauen  auf  derselben  Datengrundlage  auf,  die von  einem 
deutschen  Online-Broker  zur  Verfügung  gestellt  wurde.  Dieser  Datensatz  umfasst 
soziodemographische,  Portfolio- und  Transaktionsdaten.  Soziodemographische  Daten 
beinhalten  investorspezifische  Informationen  wie  z.B.  Alter,  Geschlecht,  Familienstand, 
Risikoeinschätzung  sowie  die  Information, ob  der  Kunde  beraten  wird.  Monatliche 
Portfoliodaten liegen von Januar 2000 bis Juli 2007 vor, während Transaktionsdaten den 
Zeitraum  von  Januar  1999  bis  Juli  2007  umfassen.  Insgesamt  beinhalten die 
Transaktionsdaten mehr als 19 Millionen Transaktionen von ca. 71.000 Investoren. Dieser 
detaillierte Datensatz ermöglicht es, mit Analysen auf Investoren- bzw. Transaktionsebene
einen  Beitrag  zur bestehenden Literatur  bezüglich  Investmentfonds,  smarten 
Investmententscheidungen, Household Finance sowie Finanzberatung zu leisten.
Die Tatsache, dass die Daten auf Transaktionsebene vorliegen, hat im Vergleich zu vielen 
bestehenden  Studien,  die mit  monatlichen  Mittelzuflüssen  arbeiten,  mehrere  Vorteile:
Erstens kann  so zwischen  Käufen  und  Verkäufen  unterschieden werden.  Mittelzuflüsse 
hingegen sind immer die Differenz von aggregierten Kaufstransaktionen und aggregierten 
Verkaufstransaktionen.  Da für  Kaufentscheidungen  zum  einen  nur  eine eingeschränkte 
Menge an Investmentfonds zur Verfügung steht (nämlich diejenigen Fonds, die der Anleger 
zum Verkaufszeitpunkt im Portfolio hält) und zum anderen die Verkaufsentscheidung von 
anderen  Motiven als  der  smarten Entscheidungsfindung  beeinflusst  werden  kann  (z.B. 
Liquiditätsengpässe,  Steueroptimierung), fokussiert  die  vorliegende  Arbeit  sich auf 
Kaufentscheidungen.  Studien,  die  auf  Mittelzuflüssen  beruhen, sind  hingegen  immer 
verzerrt  durch  die  Fonds-Verkäufe.  Zweitens ist  es  ein Vorteil  des  vorliegenden 
Datensatzes, dass sich auf Kaufentscheidungen von privaten Investoren beschränkt werden
kann.  Lediglich  aus  Mittelzuflüssen hingegen  lässt  sich  nicht  erkennen, ob  es  sich  um 
private oder institutionelle Anleger handelt. Drittens besteht die Möglichkeit, die Daten auf 
einer  wöchentlichen  Basis zu  analysieren,  wohingegen  Zuflüsse  im  Allgemeinen  nur 
monatlich oder per Quartal berichtet werden.
                                                  
2 Unter einem „sophistizierten“ Investor verstehe ich Anleger, die zum einen hinreichend informiert 
und  zum  anderen  hinreichend  erfahren  sind,  und  somit  für  sich  passgenaue 
Investmententscheidungen treffen.13
Um das Kaufverhalten bei Investmentfonds von Privatinvestoren zu studieren, muss der 
Datensatz  natürlich  noch  mit  weiteren  Informationen  über  die  Investmentfonds 
angereichert  werden.  Hierfür werden die  Datenbanken von  Morningstar  sowie  dem 
deutschen Anbieter  VWD genutzt. Wöchentliche  Performancedaten  der  Investmentfonds 
stammen von  Thomson  Financial  Datastream.  Letztendlich  wird  für  die  Analysen  ein 
Datensatz konstruiert, der mehr als 2,8 Millionen Fonds-Transaktionen von ungefähr 49.000 
unterschiedlichen Investoren beinhaltet.
Im  verbleibenden  Teil  der  Einleitung  soll  dargestellt  werden, wie  jede  der  drei 
Forschungsarbeiten  in  die  aktuelle  Literatur  eingebettet  ist.  Außerdem  werden  die
Kernergebnisse und Implikationen der Arbeiten zusammengefasst.
Wie  im  ersten  Kapitel  dieser  Einleitung  beschrieben, scheint  Persistenz  bezüglich  der 
Wertentwicklung  von Investmentfonds  zu  existieren.  Auch  wenn  dies  ein  kontrovers 
diskutiertes  Thema  ist,  so  lässt  sich  auf  jeden  Fall  sagen,  dass  Investoren,  die  aktiv 
gemanagte Fonds kaufen, daran glauben müssen, dass diese Fonds überdurchschnittliche 
Renditen abwerfen. Im anderen Fall wäre es für sie eine dominante Strategie, einfach den 
Marktindex  zu  kaufen. Da  es  aber  auch  keine  anderen  Messgrößen  für  zukünftige 
überdurchschnittliche Fondsrenditen gibt, müssen diese Investoren schlussendlich an die 
Persistenz glauben. Investoren, die Investmentfonds nicht anhand historischer Performance 
auswählen, machen also kostspielige Investmentfehler.
Allerdings  hat  die  bestehende  Literatur,  die  den  Zusammenhang  von  historischer 
Wertentwicklung und Mittelzuflüssen in Investmentfonds untersucht (z.B. Gruber (1996), 
Sirri  und Tufano  (1998) oder  Ber,  Kempf  und Ruenzi  (2008) für  den  deutschen  Markt), 
gezeigt,  dass  Fonds,  die  sich  unterdurchschnittlich  entwickeln,  nach  wie  vor  Zuflüsse 
verzeichnen. Gruber (1996) gibt für dieses „Puzzle“ zwei mögliche Erklärungen: Zum einen 
vermutet  er,  dass  institutionelle  Schranken3 Investoren  davon  abhalten  könnten, bessere 
Fonds zu kaufen. Die andere Erklärung ist, dass Investoren schlicht „unsophistiziert“ sind.
In der ersten Forschungsarbeit mit dem Titel „The Determinants of Mutual Fund Inflows –
Evidence from Private Investor Transactions“ wird auf diese Fragestellung eingegangen. Es 
wird  gezeigt,  dass  die  Investoren  in  diesem Datensatz,  die  aus  dem  vollständigen 
Investmentfonds-Universum auswählen können und daher institutionell unbeschränkt sind, 
                                                  
3 Institutionelle Schranken bedeuten, dass Investoren nicht Fonds aus dem gesamten Investmentfond-
Universum auswählen können, sondern beim Fondskauf nur auf eine beschränkte Menge von Fonds, 
die von Ihrer Bank angeboten werden, zurückgreifen können.14
nach  wie  vor  den  Fehler  machen,  Investmentfonds  nicht  aufgrund  ihrer  historischen 
Wertentwicklung auszuwählen.
Wenn  der  Großteil  der  Anleger  Investmentfonds  nicht  aufgrund  ihrer historischen 
Performance  kauft,  muss  es  offensichtlich  andere  Kaufkriterien  geben,  welche diese 
Investoren nutzen. Es gibt zwar einige Veröffentlichungen, die sich mit einzelnen möglichen 
Kaufkriterien beschäftigen. Zum Beispiel analysieren Barber, Odean und Zheng (2005) den 
Zusammenhang von Kostenquoten und Mittelzuflüssen, und Sirri und Tufano (1998) finden 
heraus, dass die Berichterstattung in den Medien einen Einfluss auf das Fondsvolumen hat. 
Nach meiner Kenntnis gibt es aber keine Arbeit, die vollständig das Thema „Kriterien bei 
Kaufentscheidungen von Investmentfonds“ behandelt. In der ersten Forschungsarbeit wird 
gezeigt,  dass  die  Fondsgröße  (gemessen  in  Nettovermögen)  das  dominierende 
Kaufkriterium  ist.  Außerdem  kaufen  Privatinvestoren  vermehrt  Fonds, die  zu  einer  der 
Top-Marken-Fondsfamilien  gehören, wohingegen  geringe  Ausgabeaufschläge  kein 
Kaufkriterium sind.
Die zweite Forschungsarbeit dieser Dissertation trägt den Titel „Whose Money is Smart? 
Smart Decision Making Measured by Investors’ Ability to Select Mutual Funds“. In ihr 
wird zunächst noch  einmal  der Punkt  Performance  Persistenz  von Investmentfonds 
aufgegriffen. Innerhalb  des  genutzten  Datensatzes  kann  die Persistenz sowohl  innerhalb 
aller erhältlichen Fonds als auch innerhalb der Fonds, die die privaten Investoren gekauft 
haben, nachgewiesen werden. Des Weiteren baut diese Arbeit direkt auf einer aktuellen 
Veröffentlichung  von  Keswani  und Stolin  (2008) auf.  Die  Autoren  finden  dort  einen 
robusten „Smart-Money“ Effekt sowohl für private als auch für institutionelle Investoren. 
Der „Smart-Money“ Effekt besagt, dass die Mehrheit des Geldes, das  Anleger investieren, 
in Investmentfonds fließt, die sich zukünftig überdurchschnittlich entwickeln werden. Auf 
der  anderen  Seite  zeigen  viele  Studien – wie  schon  oben  beschrieben  -, dass  auch  sich 
unterdurchschnittlich entwickelnde Fonds nach wie vor Mittelzuflüsse erhalten. Ausgehend 
von  diesem Punkt  erlaubt der  vorliegende Investor-spezifischer  Datensatz, die  Frage  zu 
stellen „Whose Money is Smart?“, d.h., es wird untersucht, welche einzelnen Investoren 
Fonds  mit  Hilfe  historischer  Wertentwicklung  kaufen  und  somit  smarte 
Kaufentscheidungen treffen und welche Investoren dies nicht tun. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass  Investoren,  die  smarte  Fondsauswahlentscheidungen  treffen,  älter,  erfahrener und
wohlhabender sind sowie weniger stark zur Selbstüberschätzung neigen.15
Schließlich diskutiert diese Arbeit im zweiten Teil die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der 
smarten Fondsauswahlentscheidungen. Konkret zeigt sich, dass Investoren, die sich smart 
verhalten  und  Investmentfonds  aufgrund  ihrer  historischen  Performance  auswählen, 
insgesamt  mehr  Investmenterfolg  haben.  Investmenterfolg  wird sowohl  mit  einfachen 
Portfolio-Renditen als auch mit der Sharpe Ratio des Portfolios gemessen, um so auch dem 
Portfoliorisiko  Rechnung  zu  tragen.  Dies  ist  das  zentrale  und  wichtigste  Ergebnis  der
zweiten  Forschungsarbeit. Dadurch,  dass  nachgewiesen  wird, dass  die  Fähigkeit, smarte 
Entscheidungen  bezüglich  der  Auswahl  von  Investmentfonds  zu  fällen, einen  direkten 
Einfluss  auf  die  Portfolioperformance  hat,  ist ein Ex-Ante  Maß  für  Investmenterfolg 
gefunden.  Im  Gegensatz  zur  Portfoliorendite  selbst  hat  dieses  Ex-Ante  Maß  den großen 
Vorteil,  dass  es  nicht  potentiell zufälligen  Schwankungen  des  Aktienmarktes  unterliegt. 
Dieses Ex-ante Maß lässt sich vielfältig bei unterschiedlichsten Fragestellungen einsetzen, 
bei denen Investmenterfolg privater Investoren gemessen werden muss.
Die dritte Forschungsarbeit in dieser Dissertation hat den Titel „Do Advisors Help Investors 
to Make Better Investments? Evidence from Investors’ Mutual Fund Purchase Decisions“
und beschäftigt sich mit der Fragestellung, inwieweit Finanzberater Privatkunden helfen,
bessere  Investmententscheidungen  zu  treffen. Die  Arbeit  baut  direkt  auf  einer aktuellen 
Veröffentlichung  von  Bergstresser,  Chalmers  und Tufano  (2009) auf.  Hierin  zeigen die 
Autoren, dass Investmentfonds, welche durch einen Broker verkauft werden, sich schlechter 
entwickeln als Fonds, die durch einen direkten Vertriebskanal (also ohne Finanzberatung) 
verkauft werden.
Hier tritt ein weiterer Vorteil des genutzten Datensatzes in Erscheinung. Im Gegensatz zur 
existierenden Literatur (wie z.B. Bergstresser, Chalmers und Tufano (2009)) können genau 
diejenigen  Einzelinvestoren  identifizieren werden,  die  Finanzberatung  in  Anspruch 
nehmen. Somit kann das Investmentverhalten dieser Anleger mit dem Investmentverhalten 
derjenigen  Anleger,  die  keine  Beratung  in  Anspruch  nehmen und  damit  Ihre 
Investitionsentscheidung  eigenständig  fällen, verglichen  werden.  Der  Onlinebroker, von 
dem  der  Datensatz  stammt, hat  das  Beratungsmodell  erst  im  Laufe  des  Jahres  2004 
eingeführt.  Daher  kann sogar  zusätzlich das  Verhalten  identischer  Anleger  zu  dem 
Zeitpunkt vor der Beratung und zu dem Zeitpunkt nach der Beratung verglichen werden.
Um  die  Qualität  der  Finanzberatung  zu  bewerten,  muss  in  irgendeiner  Weise  deren 
Auswirkung auf den Investmenterfolg der Privatanleger bewertet werden. Für die Messung 
des Investmenterfolges nutzt die dritte Forschungsarbeit das Ex-Ante Maß, welches in dem16
zweiten  Forschungsbeitrag  entwickelt  worden  ist (s.o.).  Dies  ist  ein  weiterer  Vorteil 
gegenüber existierender Literatur zum Thema Finanzberatung (z.B. Bergstresser, Chalmers 
und Tufano (2009), aber auch Hackethal, Haliassos und Jappelli (2008)), die jeweils Ex-Post 
Portfoliorenditen nutzen, die zufälligen Schwankungen unterliegen.
Mit dieser Methodik wird zunächst gezeigt, dass vermehrt „unsophistizierte“ Investoren 
Finanzberatung in Anspruch nehmen. Danach wird die eigentliche Fragestellung diskutiert, 
nämlich ob Finanzberater diesen Investoren helfen, bessere Investmententscheidungen zu 
fällen und somit ihren Grad an „Sophistikation“ zu erhöhen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Finanzberater  ihren  Kunden  nicht  helfen, vermehrt  Investmentfonds  auf  Basis  der 
historischen Wertentwicklung zu kaufen. Folgerichtig erhöhen Berater nicht den Grad der 
„Investmentsophistikation“ ihrer Kunden. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall: Kunden, die beraten 
wurden, weisen ein geringeres Niveau an „Investmentsophistikation“ auf.
Studien, die  Unterschiede  im  Anlageverhalten  von  beratenen  und  nicht-beratenen 
Investoren untersuchen, haben immer das Problem, dass potentiell andere Faktoren als die 
Beratung  selbst  die  Ergebnisse  beeinflussen  können. Um  diese  möglichen 
Endogenitätseinflüsse zu adressieren, werden zwei weitere Analysen als Robustheitstests 
durchgeführt. Dabei handelt es sich zum einen um den sogenannten „Propensity-Score“ 
Ansatz, bei  dem  zu  jedem  beratenden  Investor  ein  statistischer  Zwilling  gesucht  und 
Unterschiede  im  Anlageverhalten  dieser  beiden  Investoren  untersucht  werden.  Zum 
anderen handelt es sich um eine „Ereignisstudie“, in der Unterschiede im Anlageverhalten 
identischer Investoren, bevor und nachdem sie beraten wurden, untersucht werden. Beide 
Analysen führen zu keinen veränderten Ergebnissen und bestärken die Erkenntnis, dass 
Finanzberater nicht den Grad der „Investmentsophistikation“ ihrer Kunden erhöhen.
Offensichtlich  nutzen  Finanzberater  also  nicht  die  historische  Fondsrendite  als 
Verkaufsargument.  Um  besser  zu  verstehen, welche  Verkaufsargumente  die  Berater 
stattdessen  benutzen,  um  ihre  Kunden  zu  überzeugen,  analysiert  die  dritte 
Forschungsarbeit noch weitere mögliche Kaufkriterien für Investmentfonds, die bereits im 
ersten Forschungsbeitrag dieser Dissertation untersucht worden sind. Es zeigt sich, dass 
Finanzberater insbesondere Fonds mit einem hohen Fondsvolumen und solche, die zu einer 
der Top-Marken gehören, verkaufen. Immerhin helfen die Berater ihren Kunden Geld zu 
sparen,  da  sie  reduzierte  Ausgabeaufschläge  als  weiteres  Verkaufsargument nutzen. 
Folgerichtig machen Finanzberater offenbar dieselben Investmentfehler wie ihre Kunden: 
Sie  empfehlen  große  Fonds  von  bekannten  Marken, anstatt  sich  die  historische 17
Wertentwicklung  anzuschauen. Folglich  sind Finanzberater  daher  eher  Verkäufer  als 
Berater.
Die Arbeit an dieser Dissertation – sowohl die Durchsicht existierender Literatur als auch 
meine eigenen empirischen Analysen - hat mich zu der Erkenntnis gebracht, dass der Grad 
der Aufklärung hinsichtlich Fragestellungen der Geldanlage in der Bevölkerung nach wie 
vor  stark  verbesserungswürdig  ist.  Auch  auf  dem  Gebiet  der  Investmentfonds machen 
private Anleger Investmentfehler, wenn sie einen Fonds zum Kauf auswählen, und diese 
Fehler wirken sich auch auf die gesamte Portfoliorendite aus.
In Zeiten, in denen aufgrund sinkender gesetzlicher Renten die private Geldanlage für die 
Altersvorsorge  immer  mehr  an  Bedeutung  gewinnt  und  dies  von  der  Politik  ja  auch 
gefordert  wird,  ist  es  aus meiner  Sicht  dringend  notwendig, das  Bewusstsein  für  dieses 
Thema in der Bevölkerung zu schärfen. Viele Anleger erkennen ihren Informationsbedarf 
und verlassen sich in Fragen der Geldanlage auf externe Berater. Allerdings scheinen auch 
Finanzberater  ihren  Kunden  nicht  zu  helfen, bessere  Anlageentscheidungen  zu  fällen. 
Folglich ist hier die Politik gefordert, Rahmenbedingungen zu setzten, die dazu führen, dass
die Qualität der Finanzberatung verbessert wird.18
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The Determinants of Mutual Fund Inflows –
Evidence from Private Investor Transactions
Fabian Niebling1
Abstract: 
This paper  contributes to literature  on mutual fund purchasing decisions. In contrast to 
existing  studies  which  use  aggregated  net  fund  flow  data  (e.g.  Gruber  (1996), Sirri  and 
Tufano  (1998)),  I use  an  administrative data  set allowing  for  an  empirical  analysis  on 
transaction- and  fund-specific  level.  I show that  lacking  investor  sophistication and  not 
institutional  boundaries  is the  dominant  driver  preventing self-directed investors  from 
chasing historical performance. Additionally, I find that investors primarily purchase mutual 
funds with high fund volume which predominantly belong to a top-brand fund family and 
that reduced (smaller than 5%) initial charges are no purchase criterion. Moreover, I rank all 
considered purchase criteria and provide evidence, that indeed the volume is the dominating 
decision  criterion  for  private  investors  when  choosing  among  mutual  funds, whereas
historical  performance  is  only  of  minor  importance. As  there  exists  empirical  evidence 
pointing  out  that chasing historical  performance  is  beneficial  when  investing  in  actively 
managed mutual funds, I conclude that the majority of investors makes serious and costly 
investment mistakes.
Keywords: Mutual  funds,  Fund  selection  criterion, Fund  performance, Household 
finance
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1 Introduction
In  the  light  of  the  increasing  participation  of  households  in  equity  markets  (e.g.  Guiso, 
Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2008)), researchers  are  urged  to  form  scientific  opinions  on  the 
investment behavior of households (Metrick (1999)). Moreover, the decreasing generosity of 
public  pension  schemes  increases  the  importance  of private  investor  decision  making 
(OECD  (2005)).  However,  in  contrast  to  recommended  actions derived  from  normative 
theory, extensive research has documented that households do not seem to be well prepared 
to  meet  these  challenges  as  they  make  serious  investment  mistakes  (see  e.g.  Campbell 
(2006)).
With respect to mutual fund investments, research so far has shown that a large number of 
investors  invest  their  money  through  actively  managed  mutual  funds  that  do  not 
outperform  their  respective  benchmark  indices  (see  Malkiel  (2003)).  Although  heavily
discussed whether there exists persistence among mutual funds (e.g., Gruber (1996), Carhart 
(1997), Zheng (1999) and Keswani and Stolin (2008)), those investors investing into mutual 
funds need to believe in skilled fund managers. Fund managers’ skill is revealed by past 
performance if at all (according to Jensen (1968)). Therefore, for investors a smart strategy is 
to  use  historical  performance  as  purchasing  criterion. However,  research  analyzing  the 
relationship between mutual fund performance and net cash inflows (e.g. Gruber (1996), 
Sirri and Tufano (1998)) finds that funds with an inferior historical performance still receive 
net cash inflows. As potential explanations Gruber (1996) points out that investors might 
suffer from institutional boundaries or are simply unsophisticated.
Apparently, private investors use other decision criteria than historical performance when 
selecting mutual funds. Some academic work using net monthly mutual fund flow data has 
been conducted concerning single purchase criteria, e.g. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005)
who analyze the relationship between the mutual fund fee structure and the funds cash 
inflow and Sirri and Tufano (1998) who find that increased media coverage has a positive 
influence on the fund volume growth. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
paper that aims at comprehensively analyzing which particular purchase criteria apart from
historical performance investors use when choosing among mutual funds.
In  contrast  to  existing  studies  working  with  monthly  mutual  fund  flows, I use  a
comprehensive data set that allows me to analyze single mutual fund purchase transactions 25
of private investors. This methodology has three major advantages compared to analyses 
based on fund flows. First, it enables me to focus on purchase decisions of private investors, 
whereas  someone  using  fund  flow  data  can hardly distinguish  between  private  and 
institutional investors. Second, I am thus able to work on a weekly basis whereas fund flows 
are obtained only monthly. Third and most importantly, I can distinguish clearly between 
purchases and sells, whereas fund flow analyses are usually based on net inflows which are 
the difference of aggregated purchases and aggregated sells. Hence, when using net fund 
flows in order to analyze investors’ purchase decisions, results are always biased by sell 
transactions. In contrast, I exclusively focus on purchase transactions as for sell transactions, 
the choice set of an individual investor is limited to the funds he previously purchased and 
the actual transactions date might be determined by other factors such as liquidity needs or 
tax optimization.
Besides the methodological advantage my paper has two major contributions separating it 
from existing literature on mutual fund purchase decisions. First, the investor-specific level 
of my data set allows me to single out investors and transactions that are not subject to any 
institutional boundary like saving (pension) plans for example. Thus, these investors can 
choose  from  the  entire  available  fund  universe,  which  permits  analyzing  whether 
institutional  boundaries  are  preventing  investors  from  chasing  performance. As  I obtain 
qualitatively  comparable  results  to  Gruber  (1996), I can  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
institutional boundaries are the reason why investors do not chase historical performance 
and hence I find additional evidence that investors are indeed unsophisticated. Second, if 
investors are not found to use historical performance, then the question, which has not yet 
been directly addressed, arises which purchase criterion investors are actually using. In this
paper  I comprehensively  address  this  question,  by  analyzing  which  particular  purchase 
criteria investors predominantly seem to use when making their mutual fund purchasing 
decisions.
Of course, results can only be obtained, if I enrich my dataset of mutual fund transactions
with information on the mutual fund universe from Morningstar and a German provider, 
VWD,  as  well  as with weekly  mutual  fund  performance  data  from  Thomson  Financial 
Datastream. Finally, I am thus able to construct a data  set that contains more than 1.5m 
mutual fund transactions. The data set includes portfolio compositions, respective trading
history as well as socio-demographics for all investors. On a fund level the database also 
contains total net assets as well as initial and annual charges.26
In order to make funds comparable across time and peer-groups I use a special approach 
ranking the mutual funds into deciles according to their historical performance and other 
fund characteristics, respectively. Thus, I am able to compare the relative performance of 
purchased  mutual  funds  with  the  average  performance  of  the  funds’  peer  group.  This 
methodology allows  me to  draw  conclusions  on  the  purchasing  behavior  of  the  mutual 
funds investors.
Using my methodological approach I find that the majority of private investors do not use 
historical performance as their decision criterion when purchasing mutual funds. I find that 
investors  mainly  purchase  high  volume  mutual  funds:  More  than  80%  of  all  purchased 
mutual  funds  are  in  the  top  20%  of  mutual  fund  volume  measured  in  total  net  assets. 
Moreover, I show that investors prefer mutual funds belonging to a top-brand fund family 
and that initial charges are apparently no crucial purchase criterion, as purchased mutual 
funds have above-average initial charges. Finally, by conducting a regression analysis I find 
that the fund volume indeed is the purchase criterion dominating all other criteria; historical 
performance is only of minor importance. Hence, the majority of investors make serious 
investment mistakes when investing in mutual funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I give an overview over existing 
literature in the field of mutual fund purchasing criteria and derive my research questions. 
Section  3  describes  the  construction  of  the  data  set this  paper  employs  to  address  my
research  questions.  Section  4  deals  with  methodological  issues.  The  empirical  results  on 
mutual fund purchasing decisions are reported and discussed in section 5. In section 6 I
describe results of some additional robustness tests and section 7 draws conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Research Questions
Existing literature on the purchase behavior of private mutual fund investors mainly focuses
on the relationship between historical performance and mutual fund cash inflow.
In  order  to  analyze  whether  investors  who  purchase  mutual  funds  without  chasing 
historical performance are making investment mistakes, it is an imperative that persistence
of mutual fund performance exists. Based on the existing evidence, performance persistence
in  the  mutual  fund  industry seems  to  be  present.  First  empirical  evidence  goes  back  to
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) who find that performance differences between funds persist 
over time. Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) confirm these results by applying risk-adjusted 27
measures.  Despite  interim  controversial  discussions  (e.g.  Carhart  (1997) in  response  to 
Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993)), subsequent studies again underline the notion of 
performance  persistence among  mutual  funds  (e.g.  Hsiu-Lang,  Jegadeesh  and  Wermers 
(2000) and  Wermers  and  Moskowitz  (2000)).  Furthermore,  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1999)
show  that  the  fund  managers  and  not  so  much  the  funds  themselves  are  the  cause  for 
outstanding  fund  performances.  Recently,  Kosowski,  Timmermann,  Wermers  and  White 
(2006), by  using  a  bootstrap  analysis, provided evidence  that  those  fund managers  who 
generate superior Alphas are not simply lucky but, in fact, skilled. For an extensive review 
on mutual fund performance persistence the interested reader is referred to Anderson and 
Schnusenberg (2005).
By analyzing US mutual funds cash flow data Gruber (1996) finds that there are indeed 
investors who invest in past winning mutual funds, but he also observes money remaining 
in the underperforming funds. This result is confirmed by Zheng (1999) expanding the data 
set to a larger time period, Keswani and Stolin (2008) using UK mutual fund data and Ber, 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) who focus on the German mutual fund market. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) again  show  that  mutual  fund  investors  fail  to  stop  investing  in  poor  performing 
funds.
In order to explain this investment behavior, the most intuitive explanation is the existence 
of  sophisticated  and  unsophisticated  investors  (see  Gruber  (1996)).  However,  apart  from 
lacking financial sophistication, Gruber (1996) provides a second plausible explanation: He 
argues  that  institutional  boundaries  might  hinder  investors  from  actually  chasing  past 
performance. However, Fischer, Hackethal and Meyer (2008) find evidence that institutional 
boundaries are only of economic relevance for sophisticated investors. Following this line of 
arguments leads to my first research question:
Question 1: Do investors who are institutionally unbounded use historical performance 
as a decision criterion when choosing among mutual funds?
Apart from historical performance, someone can imagine other crucial purchase criteria for 
private  mutual  funds  investors.  For  example, it  could  be  possible  that  private  investors 
purchase  mutual  funds with high  fund  volume,  reduced  initial  charges  or  less  annual 
charges. For this reason I want to expand the question on mutual fund purchase criteria to 
criteria other than historical performance in this paper.28
In contrast to historical performance, these other criteria are not covered comprehensively in 
the  existing  literature.  Only  a  few  articles  discuss  the  influence  of  other  criteria  than 
historical performance on the purchase behavior. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find by analyzing 
again  fund  inflows  that  funds  with  higher  fees  have  a  stronger  performance-inflow 
relationship than their rivals with lower fees. They explain their findings with the fact that 
high-fee  funds  usually  spend  more  money  for  marketing  activities.  Moreover, Sirri  and 
Tufano (1998) study the media coverage of mutual funds and find evidence that a high share 
of  media  attention  is  positively related  to  faster  fund  volume  growth.  Another  work 
concerning mutual fund fees is conducted by Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005). They find 
that  investors  are more sensitive  to  front-end  fees  than  operating  expenses  and,  counter 
intuitive, investors even purchase mutual funds with higher operating expenses. They again
explain this fact with the increased marketing efforts which are usually paid from operating 
expenses, and conclude that mutual fund marketing works. Finally, Ber, Kempf and Ruenzi 
(2008) state in their analysis of the flows in the German mutual fund market that the inflows 
are positively influenced by the funds family volume.
Therefore, I formulate my second research question as follows:
Question 2: Do investors purchase mutual funds by looking at other criteria than 
historical performance?
Elaborating several purchase criteria by answering question 1 and question 2 directly yield 
to my third and central research question. So far I (and existing literature as well) studied all 
possible purchase criteria separately. However, if I can observe more than one purchase 
criterion, which one of these criteria will be the dominating one and which criteria will be
only of minor importance? As - to the best of my knowledge - there is no research conducted 
so far concerning this issue, this is a central contribution of this paper. Summarizing, my
third research question is as follows:
Question 3: Which mutual fund purchase criterion is dominating the other criteria?
3 Data
In  contrast  to  most  of  the  existing  studies  on  the  purchasing  behavior  of  mutual  fund 
investors which use funds flow data (e.g. Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998) or Ber, 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008)), I build my analyses on a data set that enables me to work on a 29
transaction-specific level. This data set has been supplied by a German discount brokerage 
house  and contains in  total more  than  19m  transactions  of  all  types  of  securities. These
transactions have been placed by roughly 71k individual investors between January 1999 
and July 2007. Note that the customers of this bank can choose from the whole available 
fund universe and are thus institutionally unbounded. This comprehensive data set enables 
me to investigate the mutual fund purchasing behavior on investor- and transaction-level 
respectively. However a few amendments to the data have to be made, when constructing 
the final data set to answer the research questions (compare table 1).
Table 1: Construction of the data set
The table presents the necessary steps of data restriction.
Alpha APR Appraisal
Weekly
Returns
One-year
Returns
Volume
(TNA)
Initial
Charges
Original data base
restricted to mutual funds
2,816,030     2,816,030     2,816,030     2,816,030     2,816,030     2,816,030     2,816,030    
Saving plan transactions 841,222  -      841,222  -      841,222  -      841,222  -      841,222  -      841,222  -      841,222  -     
Without saving plans 1,974,808     1,974,808     1,974,808     1,974,808     1,974,808     1,974,808     1,974,808    
Sell Transactions 392,180  -      392,180  -      392,180  -      392,180  -      392,180  -      392,180  -      392,180  -     
Buy-Transactions Only 1,582,628     1,582,628     1,582,628     1,582,628     1,582,628     1,582,628     1,582,628    
No mutual fund performance data/ 
charactetristics available
54,841  -        107,257  -      54,841  -        8,210  -          53,343  -        369,265  -      735,613  -     
Final data base for analyses 1,527,787     1,475,371     1,527,787     1,574,418     1,529,285     1,213,363     847,015       
Number of Transactions
For this paper’s analyses I restrict the data set to mutual fund transactions resulting in more 
than 2.81m  mutual  fund  transactions  of  more  than  48k distinct  individual  investors. 
Approximately 30% of these transactions ( 841k) are part of mutual fund saving plans. 
However, when setting up a saving plan investors make the purchase decision only once in 
advance  and  then  the  mutual  funds  are  purchased  repeatedly and  automatically by  the 
bank. Also, saving plan investors usually cannot choose their mutual funds from the whole 
mutual funds universe, but can select only from a restricted set of mutual funds which are 
provided from the bank for saving plans. For these two reasons I exclude the ~841k saving 
plan transactions from my data set that then maintains approximately 1.97 transactions2.
My study  focuses  exclusively  on purchase transactions  for  mainly  two  reasons.  First,  in 
contrast to a purchase decision where the individual investor can choose among mutual 
funds of the whole available mutual fund universe, the choice set for sell transactions is 
                                                  
2 I also conduct all analyses including saving plan transactions for robustness reasons. Results mainly 
remain qualitative unchanged (compare section 6)30
limited to the funds the investor previously purchased. Second, when selling mutual funds 
there are further decision criteria imaginable which are investor-specific. For example, the 
concrete transaction date might be based on liquidity needs or considerations regarding tax 
optimization. Only analyzing purchase transactions reduces the number of transactions to 
approx. 1.58m transactions.
In order to address research question 1, I need to determine the relative performance of a 
fund purchased by an individual investor within its particular peer group of all available 
mutual funds. Therefore, it is highly important to create a survivorship bias free sample of 
the German mutual fund market. I use the Morningstar database that has been proven to be 
of high quality in studies on the American mutual fund market (see Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2001)).  Since  Morningstar  data  is  only  available  from  2002  to  2006,  I supplement  my
database with data that has been provided by two German suppliers, namely Hoppenstedt 
and VWD. Finally, the private investors purchase 254 funds that are not covered in one of 
my databases.  In  case  no  peer  group  was  provided  by  any  of  the  data  providers,  the 
mapping of funds into peer groups relies on regression techniques as they are also used in
Koijen (2008). Essentially, this means that this paper relies in self-reported peer groups on 
which private investors have to rely when selecting mutual funds.
The weekly mutual fund return data was obtained from Thomson Financial DataStream and 
is dividend adjusted and net of fees, but does not include initial charges. Unfortunately, 
(sufficient) performance data is not available for all funds purchased, which reduces the 
number of transactions. In case of the one-factor Alpha measure and the Appraisal measure 
I result in approx. 1.53m transactions, in case of the Alpha Persistence Ratio (APR) measure 
in  approx.  1.48m  transactions,  in  case  of  the  Weekly  Return measure in  approx.  1.57m 
transactions  and  in  case  of  the  One-year  Return measure  in  approx.  1.53m  transactions 
(compare table 1).
In order to answer research question 2 I am in need of some additional information on the 
purchased mutual funds (e.g. fund volume (monthly), initial charges (end of 2008)) which I
obtain from Lipper/Reuters. Unfortunately, these data are only available for the years 2002 –
2008, which leaves me with a database still consisting of 1.21m transactions in the case of the 
fund volume and of 847k transactions in the case of initial charge (see table 1).31
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
The  table  displays  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  investor  data  I use  for  my studies. Dummy 
variables indicate if an investor is classified as male, as married or as heavy trader by the bank’s data 
warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) 
to  6  (high).  Number  of  Portfolio  Positions  and  Share  of  International  Equity  are  proxies  for
diversification.
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) 43,880             84.31%
Age 43,881             46.12               44.00               12.16              
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 23,595             60.91%
Riskclass 43,679             4.56                 5.00                 1.28                
Heavy Trader (Dummy) 44,029             27.56%
Deposit Value 44,028             55,802             36,296             131,441          
Cash Value 44,029             34,637             15,139             86,061            
Mutual Funds Trade Volume 44,029             4,206               2,557               14,273            
Number of Trades 44,029             97                    22                    502                 
Number of Portfolio Positions 33,589             12.13               9.00                 11.64              
Share of International Equity 32,869             49%
Length of Customer Rel. (years) 44,029             8.05                 7.80                 3.01                
In  order  to  get  a  feeling  of  the  approx.  44k  investors3 purchasing  mutual  funds  in  my
database, I present some descriptive statistics in table 2. Note that the results are very similar 
if  I conduct  the same  descriptive analysis  with the investors before the data  restrictions 
discussed  above. Gender,  Marital  status  and  Heavy  Trader  are  dummy  variables  and 
indicate if an  investor is classified as male, married, or heavy trader by the bank’s data 
warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account on a 
scale  from  1  (low)  to  6  (high).  Number  of  Portfolio  Positions  is  a  simple  proxy  for 
diversification following Bernatzi and Thaler (2001). Another measure for diversification is 
the  ratio  of  international  equity  in  the  equity  portfolio  (compare Bluethgen,  Gintschel, 
Hackethal and Mueller (2007)).
Unfortunately, comprehensive socio-demographic information are not available for all 44k
investors  which  explains  the  lower  amount  of  observations  for  particular  descriptive 
numbers.  A  comparison  of  the  demographics  with  the  ones  provided  by  Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut (2004)4 indicates that my sample of 44k investors represents approximately 
0.6% of the whole mutual fund investor population in Germany. Investors in my sample are 
more likely to be male (84% compared to 58% in the population), are almost of the same 
average age (46 years compared to 47 years in the population) and have a higher average 
                                                  
3 Investors who only purchased mutual funds via a saving plan are already excluded in this analysis.
4 Deutsches Aktieninstitut  e.V.  is  a  German  Research  Association  of  public  listed  companies  and 
institutions.32
deposit value (€56k compared to €20k in the population). However, please note that the 
latter difference can be explained by the fact that average deposit value in the population is 
biased  by  Germans  who  rather  own  an  investment  portfolio  (approximately  41%  of  the 
population)  but  do  not  invest  in  equity  (only 16%  of  the  population  invest  in  stocks  or 
mutual  funds).  Therefore,  I  believe  that  the  gap  will  be  significantly  reduced  when 
considering only investors who own equity (like the majority of investors in my data set). 
Hence, my sample is fairly representative for the mutual fund population in Germany.
4 Model and Methodology
In order to address the first research question outlined in chapter 2, I use five fundamental 
metrics to evaluate mutual fund performance in order to account for the fact that results 
may depend on the specific performance measure used. These five measures are (i) Jensen’s 
Alpha, (ii) the Alpha Persistence Ratio (APR), (iii) the Appraisal Ratio, (iv) Weekly Returns 
and (v) One-year Returns.
The Jensen’s Alpha is obtained from a one-factor model (see Jensen (1968)):
  i f m i i f i r r r r         (1)
where ri is the return of fund i, rf is the return of a three month cash position, rm is the return 
of  a  peer  group’s  benchmark  index,  i is  the  sensitivity  of  fund  i  to  the  return  on  the 
benchmark  index,  i is  the  risk-adjusted  return  on  fund  i  and  i is  the  error  term. The 
benchmark indices are chosen in accordance with a fund’s peer group.
As shown in table 3 for all peer groups focusing on stocks this paper uses the according 
MSCI  indices,  Datastream  indices  are  used  for  bond  funds  and  indices  provided  by 
Citigroup are used for money market funds. The main reason for choosing these indices is 
that for these indices the required time series of returns are available. Several studies have 
shown  that  results  remain  qualitatively  unchanged  once  more  sophisticated  Alpha
estimation  techniques  are  used  (see Carhart  (1997),  Gruber  (1996) and  Kosowski, 
Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006)).
As a second performance measure I use the Alpha Persistence Ratio (APR) (compare Fischer, 
Hackethal and Meyer (2008)), which is a derivation of Jensen’s Alpha. It is computed by 
dividing Jensen’s Alpha by the standard deviation of the Alpha-deciles of the fund for the 
year prior to the investment date:33
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where  i,t-1t is  the  risk-adjusted  performance  of  fund  i  in  the  one  year  prior  to  the 
investment date, and Decile(it) represents the standard deviation of Alpha-deciles which is 
also calculated based on the prior year. The advantage of this measure is that it takes not 
only the fund managers’ ability to generate a high Alpha (measured by the nominator) into 
account, but  also  his  ability  to  repeat  superior  performance  regularly  (measured  by  the 
denominator).
Table 3: Definition of peer groups and peer group’s benchmark indices
In this table the definitions of the 56 peer group are given. The according peer group’s benchmark 
indices are used for calculating the risk-adjusted performances (Jensen’s Alpha).
ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index
Stock Market by Geography Stock Markets by Industry (cont'd)
1 Stocks World MSCI World 30 Stocks Financial Markets MSCI Financials
2 Stocks Europe MSCI Europe 31 Stocks Materials MSCI Materials
3 Stocks Germany MSCI Germany 32 Stocks Energy MSCI Energy
4 Stocks Spain MSCI Spain 33 Stocks Health Care MSCI Health Care
5 Stocks France MSCI France 34 Stocks Consumer Goods MSCI Consumer Staples
6 Stocks Switzerland MSCI Switzerland 35 Stocks Industrial MSCI Industrials
7 Stocks Italy MSCI Italy 36 Stocks Utilities MSCI Utilities
8 Stocks Scandinavia MSCI Nordic Countries 37 Stocks Media MSCI Media
9 Stocks UK MSCI UK 38 Stocks Biotech MSCI Pharmaceuticals & Biotech
10 Stocks Denmark MSCI Denmark 39 Stocks Real Estate MSCI Real Estate
13 Stocks Sweden MSCI Sweden 40 Money Market EUR CGBI WMNI 1MTH Euro debt
14 Stocks Turkey MSCI Turkey 41 Money Market GBP CGBI WMNI UK 1MTH Euro debt
15 Stocks Finland MSCI Finland 42 Money Market USD CGBI WMNI US 1MTH Euro debt
16 Stocks Russia MSCI Russia 43 Money Market CAD CGBI WMNI CN 1MTH Euro debt
17 Stocks North America MSCI North America 44 Money Market CHF CGBI WMNI SW 1MTH Euro debt
18 Stocks Australia MSCI Australia 45 Money market AUD CGBI WMNI AU 1MTH Euro debt
21 Stocks Emerging Markets MSCI EM 46 Bonds global (EUR) CGBI WGBI WORLD 10 MKT ALL MATS
22 Stocks Latin America MSCI EM Latin America 47 Bonds USD CGBI USBIG Gvt-spons 
23 Stocks Greater China MSCI Golden Dragon 48 Bonds CHF SW Total all
24 Stocks Singapore MSCI Singapore 49 Bonds GBP UK Total all
25 Stocks Thailand MSCI Thailand 50 Bonds AUD AU Total all
26 Stocks Korea MSCI Korea 51 Bonds JPY JP Total all
27 Stocks India MSCI India 52 Bonds DKK DK Total all
28 Stocks Brazil MSCI Brazil 53 Bonds CAD CN Total all
29 Stocks Information Technology MSCI Information Technology 56 Bonds Asia CGBI ESBI 10 years
20 Stocks Japan MSCI Japan
MSCI Netherlands
12 Stocks Austria MSCI Austria
SD Total all
55 Bonds NOK NW Total all
Stock Markets by Industry
Money Markets by Geography
Bond Markets by Geography
54 Bonds SEK
19 Stocks Asia/ Pacific MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan
11 Stocks Netherlands
The third risk-adjusted performance measure I use is the Appraisal ratio. Besides Jensen’s 
Alpha this measure also takes the non-systematic risk via the denominator into account. This 
means that a mutual fund is valuated the worse the larger the non-systematic risk is. The 
Appraisal ratio is computed by dividing the Alpha by the standard deviation of the error 
term of the one-factor model:34
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where i is Jensen’s Alpha of fund i from the one-factor model and (i) is the standard 
deviation of the error term of fund i in the one-factor model.
Whereas Jensen’s Alpha, the APR and the Appraisal measure are risk-adjusted performance 
measures,  I also  add two  simple  performance  measures into  my consideration, namely 
Weekly Returns and One-year Returns.
Using a rolling-window approach every performance measure for each fund is calculated 
based on weekly observations between 1997 and 2008. The underlying assumption is that a 
performance chasing investor chooses among mutual funds by looking at the performance 
of one year before. In order to assure the comparability of risk-adjusted performances of 
mutual  funds,  I compare  several  peer  groups,  which  are  identical  to  the  peer  groups  I
considered  already  before  when  calculating  the  risk-adjusted  performance  measures 
(compare table 3).
In order to address my research questions I need to compare the performance measures of 
the mutual funds purchased to the ones of all mutual funds available. However, it is not 
possible to compare the performance measures of the mutual funds of different peer groups 
and in different times directly with each other (for example, the Alpha measures are always 
subject to different betas). I address this issue by categorizing the funds by their deciles,
using their peer group specific past performance. Hence, in any given week and for every 
peer group the decile 1 contains the mutual funds with the poorest performance and decile 
10 contains the mutual funds with the strongest performance. This means that I create a 
basis  on  that  I can  compare  the  mutual  funds  according  to  their  relative  performance 
demonstrated by the deciles they join. This information is combined with the transaction 
data containing all funds purchased by private investors. Thus, this new constructed data 
set enables  me to  analyze  question  1,  as  it  provides  information  about  the  relative 
performance of a particular mutual fund at the time it was purchased by a private investor.
In order to answer research question 2, I further enrich this data set by adding other mutual 
fund  characteristics  (such  as  fund volume  measured  in  total  net  assets,  initial  charges, 
annual charges and a dummy variable indicating whether a mutual fund belongs to a top-
brand fund family). The methodology for mutual funds’ volume is the same as the one for 
the performance measures: Again I categorize all mutual funds into deciles (according to 35
funds’ volume) and combine these data with my transaction data. This leads to a data set
with information about the relative fund volume of a particular purchased mutual fund that 
is compared to all available mutual funds at this time.
As this methodology does not work properly for analyzing initial charges, I use a different 
approach in order to study this possible purchase criterion: I classify all mutual funds into 
three different categories regarding initial charges, namely (i) mutual funds with no initial 
charges, (ii) mutual funds with reduced initial charges (initial charges larger than zero and 
smaller than 5%) and (iii) mutual funds with full initial charges (initial charges of 5% and 
larger). Subsequently, I compare the proportion of theses three categories for all available 
mutual funds versus the purchased mutual funds. I use a similar approach in order to study 
whether  purchased  mutual  funds  belong  to  a  top-brand  fund  family  by  introducing  an 
accordant indicator  variable  and  comparing  this  variable  for  all  available  mutual  funds 
versus purchased mutual funds.
For the third research question, namely to identify which of the analyzed purchase criterion 
is the dominating one, I switch from the transaction-specific level to a fund-specific level 
analyzing mutual fund flows. For that reason I construct a new database containing the sum 
of the purchased volume of all investors in my database for every mutual fund and for every 
week. If a fund is not traded in a given week, this fund week combination will get the value 
zero. Note that I take only the traded volume of the investors who are in my database into 
account. Hence this methodology differs from the one e.g. Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) or Ber, Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) use, as they analyze aggregated net fund flows. The 
advantages of my methodology are that I can analyze the data on a weekly basis (instead of 
monthly fund flows), can consider private investors exclusively (instead of the combination 
of private and institutional investors in fund flows) and can distinguish between purchases 
and sells (If someone considers net flows, he will observes only changes in the aggregated
fund volume which is the result of purchases minus sells).
Adding the mutual fund characteristics and performance measures allows me to conduct a 
multiple regression with the logarithm of the purchased volume as depending variable and 
the performance measures and fund characteristics as independent variables:
it it it it it it it TB TNA LN AC IC PM PV LN        ) ( ) ( (4)
where LN(PV)it is the natural logarithm of the purchased volume of fund i in week t, PMit is 
the performance measure of fund i in week t, ICit is the initial charge of fund i in week t, ACit36
is the annual charge of fund i in week t, LN(TNA)it is the natural logarithm of the fund 
volume (measured in total net assets) of fund i in week t, TBit is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the fund i in week t belongs to one of the top-brand mutual fund families and it is 
the error term.
In order to take into account that my data set contains panel data across time (I have one 
observation  for  every  mutual  fund  in  every  week), I also  compute Fama-MacBeth 
regressions  (compare  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)) for  robustness  reasons.  This  regression 
technique  is  a  two-step  approach.  First,  regressions  for  each  single  time  period  are 
computed. Afterwards, the final regression coefficients are calculated as the average of the 
first step coefficient estimates.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Chasing historical performance when choosing among mutual 
funds
In  order  to  determine  whether  investors  choose  mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical 
performance, I analyze the approx. 1.5m considered purchase-transactions of mutual funds 
where  performance  data  is  available.  Note  again  that  the  investors  in  my database  can 
choose  from  the  whole  available  mutual  fund  universe  and  are  thus  institutionally
unbounded. As described in section 4, I use five different performance measures to evaluate 
fund  performance.  I rank  all  available  funds  into  deciles  according  to  their  historical 
performance and  observe  the  deciles  of  the  purchased  funds  in  my database.  Table  4
summarizes the results for Jensen’s Alpha for the 20 largest peer groups5 as well as the total 
results over all peer groups. The peer groups are presented on the vertical axis, whereas the 
horizontal axis shows the Alpha deciles. Decile 1 contains the proportion of purchased funds 
with  the  weakest  historical  Alpha performance  and  decile  10  contains  the  proportion of 
purchased  funds  with  the  best  historical  Alpha performance.  The  mean  represents  the 
average Alpha decile. Over all peer groups the mean of 6.40 indicates that on average the 
investors purchase mutual funds with above-median historical Alpha performance.
However, only ~25% of purchased mutual funds are in decile 9 or 10, i.e. in the top 20% with 
respect  to historical  performance.  Assuming  that  investors  who  actively  chase  historical 
                                                  
5 The 20 largest peer groups represent 99% of total observations. However, results for the remaining 
36 peer groups are qualitatively identical.37
performance purchase only mutual funds belonging to this top 20%, implies that in 75% of 
transactions  investors  do  not  derive their purchase  decision  by  looking  at  the  historical
Alpha performance.  Obviously,  they  use  a  different  purchasing  criterion.  Recalling  that 
mutual fund performance persistence is present (compare section 2), these investors seem to 
make a serious investment mistake.
The results still hold on when drilled down to a peer group level: On the one hand, in all but 
three  peer  groups  the  mean  of  the  purchased  decile  is  greater  than  5.56 indicating  that 
investors purchase mutual funds with above average historical performance. On the other 
hand, within the 20 largest peer groups there is only one peer group, namely Stocks Greater 
China, in which investors invest in the top 20% in more than 50% of the cases.
While the mean of purchased deciles of 5.45 (Stocks Germany) and 5.21 (Stocks Asia/Pacific) 
is very close to the average of 5.50 and hence the difference can probably be explained with 
statistical noise, investors definitely purchase below-average mutual funds in the peer group 
Money Market EUR (mean of 4.52). In this peer group only 14% of purchased mutual funds 
belong to the top 20% of historical performance, whereas more than 30% of purchases took 
place in the 20% of weakest performing funds. One possible explanation could be that these 
money market funds by majority invest in short-term securities, which perform worse when 
upward slopping yield curves are present.
Besides Jensen’s Alpha, I consider two further risk-adjusted performance measures, namely
the  Alpha  Persistent  Ratio  (APR)  (see Fischer,  Hackethal  and  Meyer  (2008))  and  the 
Appraisal ratio and two simple performance measures, namely Weekly Returns and One-
year Returns. As the results are very similar to the ones of the Alpha measure, I provide 
them at this point only on an aggregated level in table 5. The ten deciles are presented on the 
vertical axis, whereas the horizontal axis shows the different performance measures. For 
detailed, peer group specific results for the measures APR-, Appraisal, Weekly Returns and 
One-year  Returns (analogous  to  table  4  for  the  Alpha-measure), the  interested  reader  is 
referred  to  the  Appendix.  Table  5  shows  that  the  mean  of  the  deciles  of  the  purchased 
mutual funds are above average for all considered performance measures.
                                                  
6 Note that 5.5 will be the mean of decile 1 to 10, if the purchase transactions are equally distributed38
Table 4: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds
This table presents results for research question 1. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of historical performance-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the 
mean and the standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. As performance measure I use Jensen’s Alpha. The analyzed time period 
is January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 403,235             4.79% 4.45% 4.45% 6.44% 13.55% 17.54% 13.70% 9.05% 9.27% 16.77% 6.45         2.55        
Stocks World 393,009             4.99% 2.11% 2.54% 6.56% 11.02% 12.62% 15.87% 17.75% 11.67% 14.87% 6.81         2.41        
Stocks Germany 125,703             14.85% 4.65% 12.27% 9.57% 10.30% 6.32% 7.45% 14.70% 12.68% 7.21% 5.45         2.95        
Bonds World 116,102             3.82% 8.27% 7.87% 5.85% 5.98% 7.86% 17.43% 20.64% 9.93% 12.35% 6.44         2.64        
Stocks North America 77,543               3.25% 5.60% 10.98% 8.43% 7.34% 9.37% 15.77% 19.68% 8.88% 10.69% 6.29         2.55        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 57,705               13.55% 10.64% 13.30% 7.22% 12.11% 7.43% 6.05% 8.14% 10.45% 11.09% 5.21         3.03        
Stocks Biotech 53,254               0.71% 2.30% 5.91% 4.70% 5.86% 13.35% 11.71% 23.81% 19.18% 12.48% 7.21         2.16        
Stocks IT 47,372               5.05% 4.63% 6.53% 9.20% 10.81% 9.07% 12.06% 14.22% 7.01% 21.43% 6.55         2.74        
Stocks Real Estate 42,916               0.31% 1.54% 0.17% 4.39% 19.79% 37.74% 16.91% 8.47% 6.02% 4.66% 6.34         1.55        
Money Market EUR 35,952               2.84% 29.67% 17.92% 7.43% 8.86% 10.36% 4.76% 4.06% 6.44% 7.66% 4.52         2.70        
Stocks Emerging Markets 26,596               8.93% 10.16% 7.11% 5.08% 6.34% 10.37% 5.99% 15.05% 8.93% 22.04% 6.28         3.11        
Stocks Materials 24,042               1.08% 1.73% 13.06% 4.32% 10.95% 15.31% 7.30% 11.33% 21.67% 13.26% 6.77         2.45        
Stocks Japan 20,067               10.09% 5.91% 4.59% 7.55% 5.68% 6.22% 5.66% 7.95% 20.69% 25.67% 6.78         3.16        
Stocks Greater China 19,361               0.19% 1.71% 6.39% 6.04% 5.93% 6.92% 8.59% 10.35% 17.57% 36.30% 7.82         2.40        
Stocks India 18,777               0.16% 0.43% 3.05% 22.83% 21.39% 15.99% 20.34% 7.41% 6.84% 1.55% 5.83         1.69        
Stocks Healthcare 15,419               2.09% 9.00% 7.84% 10.99% 8.13% 13.42% 12.84% 6.34% 15.09% 14.26% 6.28         2.67        
Stocks Latin America 15,006               0.57% 2.25% 5.72% 4.75% 13.03% 31.47% 14.57% 8.98% 13.29% 5.36% 6.42         1.93        
Stocks Energy 7,070                 3.39% 3.51% 4.58% 8.95% 7.92% 13.97% 36.51% 10.93% 5.53% 4.70% 6.23         2.06        
Stocks Media 4,388                 4.35% 6.11% 8.71% 24.52% 10.48% 11.53% 9.16% 5.24% 9.14% 10.76% 5.58         2.57        
Stocks Russia 3,866                 0.05% 0.59% 9.70% 17.54% 14.28% 19.87% 25.14% 4.01% 5.43% 3.39% 5.82         1.80        
Other 20,404               3.82% 5.28% 6.35% 6.13% 6.31% 9.23% 7.65% 19.27% 16.48% 19.47% 6.96        
All 1,527,787          5.41% 4.91% 6.13% 7.07% 10.94% 13.30% 13.32% 13.90% 10.94% 14.08% 6.40         2.62        
Alpha-Decile39
Interestingly, the means of the purchased deciles of the risk-adjusted measures (6.40 – 6.62) 
are  slightly  higher  than  the  means  of  the  purchased  deciles  of  the  simple  performance
measures (5.66 – 5.68).
Hence, I conclude that, if investors use historical performance as their purchase criterion, 
they  will  also  take  the  risk  component  into  account  and  use  a  risk-adjusted  measure. 
However, for all considered performance measures the partition of purchased mutual funds 
belonging to the top 20 % of all available mutual funds (deciles 9 and 10) is only between 
20% and 30%. This implies that, regardless of the specific performance measure, investors 
come to the purchase decision by looking at another criterion than historical performance in 
more than 70% of cases.
However,  I conduct  all  analyses  with  an  one-year  observation  period  for  the  historical 
performance. Hence there is a small probability that investors use historical performance as 
their decision criterion but base their purchase decisions on performance evaluations for a 
different time period. However, assuming that there is a gap of two weeks between the 
observation  an  investor  makes  and  his purchase  decision,  or  assuming  an  investor  only 
bases his decisions on last week’s raw performance leads to qualitatively unaltered results.
Table 5: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds – different performance 
measures
The table presents results for research question 1. The frequency of historical performance-deciles of 
the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds is presented on the vertical axis, whereas on the 
horizontal  axis  the  table  shows  5  different  performance  measures. Moreover  the  mean  and  the 
standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. The analyzed time period is 
January 1999 – July 2007.
Alpha APR Appraisal Weekly Returns One-year Returns
Observations 1,527,787              1,475,371           1,527,787           1,574,418           1,529,285          
Decile 1 5.41% 5.16% 3.30% 8.36% 7.50%
Decile 2 4.91% 5.72% 5.15% 9.25% 9.48%
Decile 3 6.13% 7.24% 5.26% 11.14% 11.74%
Decile 4 7.07% 8.00% 7.53% 9.34% 8.69%
Decile 5 10.94% 8.25% 10.39% 9.82% 10.02%
Decile 6 13.30% 9.20% 11.14% 9.86% 10.52%
Decile 7 13.32% 12.26% 14.78% 10.29% 9.47%
Decile 8 13.90% 13.95% 15.00% 9.83% 10.66%
Decile 9 10.94% 13.58% 14.31% 11.19% 12.21%
Decile 10 14.08% 16.64% 13.14% 10.91% 9.71%
Mean 6.40                       6.53                       6.62                       5.66                       5.68                      
Std. Dev. 2.62                       2.75                       2.51                       2.86                       2.82                      
Risk-adjusted Performance Measures Simple Performance Measures
Summarizing the results concerning the first research question, I find that there are indeed 
transactions  where  investors  purchase  mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical  performance. 40
However,  in  the  majority  of  transactions  investors  apparently  use a  different  purchase 
criterion. Recalling that persistence in mutual fund performance exists, these investors make 
serious investment mistakes. As the investors in my data set are institutionally unbounded, I
continue the line of arguments of Gruber (1996) and conclude that institutional boundaries 
can hardly be the reason for investors not chasing historical performance and that investors 
are rather unsophisticated.
5.2 Other purchasing criteria than historical performance
As  we  learned  in  section  5.1,  it  is in  only  less  than  30%  of  transactions that investors 
purchase mutual funds belonging to the top 20% funds regarding historical performance. 
This implies that the majority of mutual fund investment decisions are made by looking at a 
different decision criterion. In order to approach my second research question, I first study
mutual fund characteristics per historical performance deciles.
Table 6 presents average volume, average initial charges and average annual charges for the 
considered performance deciles. I use Jensen’s Alpha as performance measure. Note, that 
results keep qualitatively unchanged if I use one of the other four performance measures. It 
becomes  obvious  that  the  top  performing  mutual  funds  as  well  as  the  poor  performing
mutual funds have a lower average volume than the middle-rate performing funds. These 
results are in line with the findings of Koijen (2008) and show that investing in high-volume 
mutual funds results in obtaining only middle-rate performing funds.
Table 6: Mutual fund characteristics per historical performance deciles
The table presents results for research question 2. Average volume (measured in Total Net Assets), 
average  initial  charge  and  average  annual  charge are  displayed per  performance  deciles.  As 
performance measure I use Jensen’s Alpha. The analyzed time period is January 1999 – July 2007.
Alpha-Deciles
Average Volume 
(in M€ TNA)
Average Initial Charge
(in %)
Average Annual Charge
(in %)
1 462                         3.10                                     1.41                                      
2 943                         2.75                                     1.20                                      
3 1,100                      3.56                                     1.20                                      
4 2,970                      4.03                                     1.27                                      
5 5,090                      3.97                                     1.31                                      
6 5,760                      3.88                                     1.33                                      
7 5,140                      3.94                                     1.33                                      
8 3,070                      4.02                                     1.37                                      
9 1,860                      4.35                                     1.44                                      
10 732                         4.54                                     1.50                                      
Total 3,210                      3.95                                     1.35                                      
Moreover, table 6 presents average initial charges and average annual charges for the funds 
purchased by the private investors. The values in table 6 are equally weighted but are in the 41
same range as those reported in Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2008) for Germany. Recall 
that Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2008) use value-weighted averages. Interestingly, top 
performing funds have a higher average initial charge than funds with average historical 
performance, which is in line with the findings of Gruber (1996). It seems, as if investors 
who purchase mutual funds by chasing historical performance are poised to pay more initial 
charge.  When  considering  average  annual  charges I come  to  very  similar  results:  Better 
performing mutual funds tend to have higher annual charges.
In a second step I repeat the detailed deciles analyses I conducted in section 5.1 but rank the 
mutual  funds  by  their  fund volume  (measured  in  Total  Net  Assets). Table  7  shows the 
respective results. It can be stated that over all per groups the mean of the volume deciles of 
the purchased mutual funds is 9.16 and that more than 80% of all purchased mutual funds 
are in the top 20% regarding the fund volume. This implies that in the broad majority of all 
transactions investors purchase high-volume mutual funds.
On the one hand, someone may claim these results are a self-fulfilling prophecy to some 
extent,  as high-volume  funds  have  just  a high volume  because  investors  purchase  these 
funds. On the other hand, this heuristic cannot explain the whole extent of the results. The 
fact that more than 80% of purchased mutual funds belong to the top 20% volume funds, 
allows the conclusion, that investors in fact purchase mutual funds mainly by concentrating 
on the top-volume funds.
A possible explanation is the media attention and marketing efforts of the top-brand fund 
families. Investors seem to prefer mutual funds of the well-known investment companies to 
the ones of smaller companies with lower media attention. These results are in line with Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) as well as Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005).
Drilled down on peer group level the results still remain similar. The mean of the volume 
deciles is larger than 7.5 for all of the 20 largest peer groups7 displayed in table 7 and larger 
than 9.0 for even ten of these 20 peer groups. For 14 peer groups the proportion of mutual 
funds purchased in decile 9 or 10 is higher than 75%. Therefore, volume seems to be an 
important purchase criterion for all kind of mutual funds.
When studying the results for initial charges (table 8) I observe that investors indeed mainly 
purchase mutual funds with higher than average initial charge (as already indicated in table 
6).
                                                  
7 Please note that the 20 largest peer groups represent 99% of total observations.42
Table 7: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds regarding fund volume
The table presents results for research question 2. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of mutual fund volume-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the mean
and the standard deviation of the mutual fund volume deciles are presented. The volume is measured in Total Net Assets (TNA). The analyzed time period is 
January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 329,868               0.02% 0.12% 0.27% 0.78% 1.83% 5.93% 5.56% 2.53% 9.20% 73.75% 9.28         1.45        
Stocks World 326,167               0.05% 0.13% 0.32% 0.79% 0.57% 1.92% 3.21% 5.21% 12.06% 75.73% 9.49         1.17        
Bonds World 101,510               0.02% 0.84% 1.25% 2.69% 4.13% 6.82% 9.46% 9.84% 18.05% 46.89% 8.54         1.89        
Stocks Germany 73,387                 0.07% 0.57% 4.78% 13.85% 1.32% 2.22% 6.05% 12.27% 41.44% 17.44% 7.79         2.23        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 53,528                 0.03% 0.68% 0.69% 0.64% 1.13% 2.98% 2.93% 4.86% 12.07% 74.00% 9.38         1.41        
Stocks North America 49,181                 0.00% 0.08% 0.08% 1.20% 0.56% 1.28% 1.19% 1.74% 17.91% 75.95% 9.59         1.03        
Stocks Biotech 40,375                 0.14% 0.15% 0.44% 0.21% 0.18% 0.69% 0.40% 0.15% 3.52% 94.13% 9.85         0.84        
Stocks Real Estate 39,187                 0.02% 0.05% 0.13% 0.47% 3.74% 0.98% 2.14% 2.22% 65.37% 24.89% 8.97         1.11        
Money Market EUR 29,999                 0.01% 1.18% 0.48% 0.37% 0.73% 1.37% 0.57% 4.60% 23.30% 67.38% 9.42         1.29        
Stocks IT 27,757                 0.00% 0.06% 0.35% 0.23% 0.43% 1.21% 1.40% 0.98% 57.30% 38.04% 9.25         0.88        
Stocks Materials 23,657                 0.00% 0.03% 0.11% 0.22% 0.16% 0.77% 1.15% 4.40% 8.46% 84.69% 9.73         0.78        
Stocks Emerging Markets 20,993                 0.07% 0.16% 0.23% 4.99% 6.10% 16.84% 16.57% 16.57% 9.01% 29.46% 7.77         1.88        
Stocks India 18,544                 0.17% 0.15% 0.22% 0.35% 0.61% 0.97% 1.41% 7.65% 4.55% 83.92% 9.63         1.06        
Stocks Greater China 15,793                 0.32% 0.32% 0.84% 0.13% 0.72% 0.61% 3.84% 4.74% 8.40% 80.08% 9.52         1.26        
Stocks Healthcare 11,514                 0.03% 0.06% 0.43% 0.59% 0.32% 0.99% 1.64% 0.47% 92.48% 3.00% 8.89         0.76        
Stocks Japan 11,434                 0.23% 0.24% 0.52% 1.26% 1.08% 1.24% 3.18% 21.44% 40.48% 30.33% 8.82         1.29        
Stocks Latin America 10,548                 0.03% 1.98% 0.12% 0.15% 18.00% 6.18% 7.51% 4.17% 2.61% 59.24% 8.34         2.24        
Stocks Energy 7,121                   0.01% 6.61% 3.74% 0.56% 5.35% 0.53% 1.76% 2.50% 7.67% 71.27% 8.71         2.52        
Stocks Russia 3,925                   0.28% 0.71% 0.92% 0.61% 0.36% 20.10% 6.01% 11.39% 10.34% 49.27% 8.48         1.86        
Stocks Media 2,788                   0.04% 0.04% 0.36% 0.07% 0.04% 0.47% 0.47% 21.31% 64.49% 12.73% 8.86         0.76        
Other 16,087                 0.60% 1.63% 2.83% 6.92% 9.01% 9.46% 12.85% 18.92% 17.31% 20.46% 7.44        
All 1,213,363            0.05% 0.33% 0.72% 1.81% 1.75% 3.73% 4.53% 5.30% 17.37% 64.39% 9.16         1.54        
Volume-Decile43
Table 8: Comparison of initial charges of purchased mutual funds versus all mutual funds
The table presents results for research question 2. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of mutual funds with no initial charges, reduced initial charges and full initial charges. These numbers are 
compared for all available mutual funds versus purchased mutual funds. “No Initial Charges” means initial charge of zero, “Reduced Initial Charges” means 
initial charge is larger than zero but smaller than 5% and “Full Initial Charge” means a initial charge of 5% or larger.
Peer Group Observations
No
Initial Charge
Reduced
Initial Charge
Full
Initial Charge
No
Initial Charge
Reduced
Initial Charge
Full
Initial Charge
Stocks World 317,293          22% 46% 33% 1% 13% 86%
Stocks Europe 158,293          35% 22% 43% 17% 2% 81%
Stocks Germany 82,020            13% 29% 58% 26% 3% 71%
Bonds World 78,452            32% 62% 7% 28% 71% 0%
Stocks Asia/Pacific 34,617            39% 18% 44% 3% 28% 69%
Money Market EUR 30,408            69% 29% 2% 98% 2% 0%
Stocks Materials 22,348            32% 29% 39% 0% 3% 97%
Stocks IT 17,951            28% 30% 42% 79% 0% 21%
Stocks North America 17,742            49% 16% 35% 64% 3% 33%
Stocks Real Estate 14,708            39% 7% 54% 0% 6% 94%
Stocks Emerging Markets 13,581            44% 15% 41% 0% 6% 93%
Stocks Latin America 11,848            31% 16% 53% 3% 43% 54%
Stocks Healthcare 11,148            29% 32% 39% 3% 7% 90%
Stocks Japan 10,646            42% 17% 40% 1% 25% 74%
Stocks Energy 5,864              37% 30% 33% 1% 7% 92%
Stocks Greater China 2,466              44% 9% 47% 5% 0% 95%
Stocks Austria 2,341              5% 60% 35% 0% 22% 78%
Stocks Biotech 2,332              31% 28% 42% 68% 7% 25%
Stocks India 2,269              38% 10% 52% 0% 11% 89%
Stocks Consumer Goods 2,151              10% 57% 33% 0% 1% 99%
Other 8,537              43% 37% 21% 8% 24% 68%
All 847,015          33% 38% 29% 16% 15% 69%
All Mutual Funds Purchased Mutual Funds44
Over all peer groups, investors purchase mutual funds with a full initial charge (i.e. initial 
charges of 5% or larger) in 69% of cases. In only 15% of transactions investors purchase 
mutual funds with reduced initial charges (i.e. initial charges larger than zero and smaller 
than 5%) and in 16% of cases mutual funds with no initial charges (i.e. initial charge of zero).
When comparing these numbers to the corresponding ones of all available mutual funds, I 
state that only 29% of all available mutual funds have full initial charges whereas 38% have 
reduced  initial  charges  and  33%  have  no  initial  charges.  This  implies  that  even  though 
mutual funds with high initial charges present only 29% of all available funds, the majority 
of funds purchased (69%) belongs to this category.
At first view these results seem to be counterintuitive as someone could expect investors to 
avoid fees and to purchase mutual funds with low initial charges. However, as I discussed 
earlier  (compare  table  6)  mutual  funds  with  higher  historical  performance  tend  to  have 
higher initial charges as well. Therefore, investors who purchase mutual funds by chasing 
historical performance are poised to pay higher initial charge for the top-performing funds. 
On the other hand, mutual funds with higher (initial and annual) charges can spend more 
money for their marketing activities which yield obviously to increased demand.
Drilled down on peer group level, I get a rather heterogeneous picture. For the majority of 
stock peer groups within the 20 largest peer groups8 displayed in table 8, the results are 
close to the total results, namely investors purchase mutual funds with higher than average 
initial charges. However, I get a different picture when looking at the peer groups Bond 
World and the Money Market EUR. In these peer groups investors purchase mainly funds 
with reduced initial charges (Bonds World) and no initial charges (Money Market EUR), 
respectively.
Finally, I study the proportion of mutual funds belonging to a top-brand fund family. Again, 
I compare these numbers for the set of purchased mutual funds with the set of all available 
funds. The results are displayed in table 9. I state that investors prefer mutual funds of the 
top-brand fund families. Whereas over all peer groups only 18% of all available mutual 
funds are classified as top-brand funds, the proportion of top-brand mutual funds within 
the purchased mutual funds is 37%. Considering the results on peer group level9, I get a 
very heterogeneous picture. There are peer groups in which the proportion of top-branded 
                                                  
8 Again, the 20 largest peer groups represent 99% of total observations.
9 I again display only the 20 largest peer groups which account for 99% of observations45
mutual funds within the purchased funds is clearly larger compared to all available funds. 
On the other hand, there are peer groups where the results are just vice versa. Interestingly, 
investors seem to prefer top-brand mutual funds especially in the large and important peer 
groups (such as Stocks World, Bonds World, Money Market EUR, Stocks Germany, etc.) 
whereas  investors  purchasing  mutual  funds  in  niche  markets  (e.g.  Biotech,  Real  Estate, 
Energy, etc.) invest in funds of smaller, non top-branded investment companies.
Table  9:  Comparison  the  variable  Top-Brand  Indicator  of purchased mutual  funds  versus  all 
mutual funds
The  table  presents results  for  research  question  2. The  twenty  largest  peer  groups  of  considered 
mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on the horizontal axis the table shows the 
frequency of mutual funds with belonging to a Top-Brand fund family. These numbers are compared 
for all available mutual funds with purchased mutual funds.
Peer Group Observations No Top-Brand Top-Brand No Top-Brand Top-Brand
Stocks Europe 372,525          85% 15% 81% 19%
Stocks World 349,731          74% 26% 39% 61%
Bonds World 105,217          80% 20% 39% 61%
Stocks Germany 97,706            64% 36% 41% 59%
Stocks North America 68,383            89% 11% 83% 17%
Stocks Asia/Pacific 55,053            89% 11% 85% 15%
Stocks Biotech 40,677            77% 23% 96% 4%
Stocks Real Estate 39,995            84% 17% 99% 1%
Money Market EUR 30,514            71% 29% 12% 88%
Stocks Emerging Markets 29,796            91% 9% 90% 10%
Stocks IT 28,601            83% 17% 38% 62%
Stocks Materials 23,965            76% 24% 88% 12%
Stocks Greater China 19,029            92% 8% 90% 10%
Stocks India 18,607            98% 2% 97% 3%
Stocks Japan 16,990            92% 8% 90% 10%
Stocks Latin America 15,158            99% 1% 100% 0%
Stocks Healthcare 11,571            86% 14% 9% 91%
Stocks Energy 7,361              83% 17% 98% 2%
Stocks Russia 4,012              85% 15% 17% 83%
Stocks Media 2,992              78% 22% 40% 60%
Other 17,360            90% 10% 61% 39%
All 1,355,243       82% 18% 63% 37%
All Mutual Funds Purchased Mutual Funds
Summarizing  the  results  for  the  second  research  question,  I find that  investors indeed 
purchase  mutual  funds  by  looking  at  other  criteria  than  historical  performance.  More 
concrete, they mainly purchase high-volume mutual funds and funds belonging to a top-
brand fund family. On the other hand, initial charges do not seem to be a major purchase 
criterion.
5.3 Dominating purchase criterion
In sections 5.1 and 5.2 I analyzed different criteria private investors may consider when 
choosing among mutual funds. I find that volume is a major purchase criterion while initial 46
charges seem to have no impact on the purchase decision and that there is a mixed picture 
concerning  historical  performance:  There  is  a  group  of  investors  who  indeed  purchase 
mutual funds by chasing historical performance but there is also a group of investors who 
apparently do not consider historical performance as their decision criterion.
Table 10: Impact of different purchase criteria on purchase volume 
The table presents results for research question 3. Regression coefficients from regression of different 
purchase criteria on purchased fund volume are displayed. The KAG Top Brand Dummy-Variable 
indicates  whether  a  fund  is  classified  as  belonging  to  a  top-brand  fund  family.  For  comparison 
reasons  it  is  crucial  to  consider  standardized  regression  coefficients,  which  are  displayed  in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The analyzed time 
period is January 1999 – July 2007.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Depending Variable Log. Of
Purchase
Volume
Log. Of
Purchase
Volume
Log. Of
Purchase
Volume
Log. Of
Purchase
Volume
Log. Of
Purchase
Volume
Alpha Decile 0.0401***
(0.0674)
APR Decile 0.0528***
(0.0877)
Appraisal Decile 0.0496***
(0.0836)
Weekly Returns Decile 0.0109***
(0.0192)
One-year Returns Decile 0.00969***
(0.0167)
Initial Charge 0.0135*** 0.0126*** 0.0109*** 0.0150*** 0.0153***
(0.0165) (0.0148) (0.0133) (0.0193) (0.0191)
Annual Charge 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.181*** 0.160*** 0.172***
(0.0585) (0.0601) (0.0582) (0.0535) (0.0565)
Log. Of Volume (TNA) 0.114*** 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.117***
(0.158) (0.166) (0.157) (0.159) (0.165)
KAG Top Brand (Dummy) 0.190*** 0.217*** 0.196*** 0.154*** 0.166***
(0.0528) (0.0587) (0.0546) (0.0450) (0.0475)
Constant -2.182*** -2.499*** -2.219*** -1.851*** -2.044***
Observations 1,208,046        1,087,075        1,208,046 1,362,631 1,267,501
R-squared 0.039 0.044 0.041 0.032 0.034
However,  I  cannot  make  a  statement  concerning  the  question  which  of  the  considered 
criteria is the dominating one (compare research question 3) so far. It is a major contribution 
of this paper to deal with this issue. In order to answer the third research question I use a 
regression model and study the influence of the analyzed purchase criteria on the purchased 
fund  volume.  I  conduct  a  single  regression  model  for  every  considered  performance 
measure. The results are given in table 10. As I want to figure out which of the purchase 
criteria has the strongest influence on the fund volume, I need to compare the standardized 
regression coefficients (displayed in parentheses). With these standardized coefficients it is 
possible to compare the different criteria with each other. Note that multi-collinearity is not 47
a problem in my model specification: Variance inflation factors (VIF) show values between 
1.00 and 1.15 for all independent variables in all computed regression models.10
Studying the standardized regression coefficients presented in table 9 I find that the natural 
logarithm of the mutual fund volume has the highest impact on the natural logarithm of the 
purchased volume regardless the performance measure used (standardized coefficients vary 
from 0.157 to 0.166). Hence, volume is the dominating purchase criterion.
The historical performance only has the second largest standardized regression coefficient in 
the first three regression models (using Jensen’s Alpha, the APR measure and the Appraisal 
ratio as performance measure) and is thus the second most important purchase criterion. In 
the  other  regression  models  (using  simple  performance  measures)  the  performance 
measures are only the least important criterion. In all models the criterion Annual Charges 
followed by Top Brand are of medium importance to private investors. Finally, in three of 
five  regression  models  the  initial  charge  shows  the  lowest  standardized  regression 
coefficient.  Hence,  my presumption  in  section  5.2  that  investors  purchase  mutual  funds 
without regarding initial charges is confirmed and initial charges are no purchase criterion 
at all.
These  results  imply  that  the  majority  of  investors  make  serious  and  costly  investment 
mistakes  by  purchasing  high-volume  funds  of  well-known  and  top-branded  investment 
companies as these funds usually show only a middle-rate performance.
Summarizing results for research question 3, I state that fund volume is the most important 
purchase criterion. This criterion is clearly dominating all other purchase criteria including 
historical  performance, which  shows  only  a minor  influence in  all  conducted  regression 
models.  Moreover, investors  apparently  purchase  mutual  funds  without  avoiding  high 
initial charges.
6 Robustness
In order to check the validity of the results regarding my three research questions, I perform 
several robustness tests.
First, I exclude all investors who purchased only one fund in the analyzed time period from 
my data set. After recalculating the decile analyzes and the regression model, it turns out 
                                                  
10 Recall that usually multi-collinearity is considered as present if VIF values are larger than 1048
that the results remain qualitatively unchanged. The volume is still the dominant purchasing 
criterion  and  the  majority  of  investors  come  to  their  purchase  decision  without  chasing 
historical  performance.  Moreover,  initial  charges  do  not  play  any  role  for  mutual  fund 
purchasing decisions.
After not taking very infrequent traders into account, I investigate whether investors who 
trade very frequently bias the results. In the data set a variable indicating if an investor is 
categorized as “heavy trader” by the banks’ data warehouse is included. Excluding all these 
heavy  traders  from the  analyzed  data  set and  repeating  all  analyzes  yields qualitatively 
unchanged  results  for  all  three  research  questions,  since  these  investors  predominantly 
invest into single stocks and options.
As described in section 3 I excluded all transactions which are part of a mutual fund saving 
plan when constructing the final data base. However, I repeat all analyzes with the data set
including  the  saving  plan  transactions  for  robustness  reasons.  Again, all  results  remain 
qualitatively  unchanged  (e.g.  the  mean  of  the  purchased  Alpha-decile  is  6.20 including 
saving plan transactions compared to 6.40 excluding safety plan transactions (compare table 
4)). This result confirms even more my conclusion that institutional boundaries are not the 
reason  why  investors  do  not  chase  historical  performance,  as  adding  saving  plan 
transactions implies considering investors who are institutionally bounded as well.
Finally, I also conduct Fama-MacBeth regression in order to account for the fact that my data 
is panel data across time. The methodology of this two-step regression approach is already 
described  in  section  4. The  group-average  regression  coefficients  are  very  similar  to  the 
coefficients estimated in the regular regressions. Hence, the impression that volume is the 
strongest purchasing criterion dominating the historical performance and that initial charge 
is a subordinated purchase criterion is confirmed.
7 Conclusion
This  paper  contributes  to  the  growing  body  of  literature  on  mutual  fund purchasing 
decisions. In contrast to earlier studies (e.g. Gruber (1996) or Keswani and Stolin (2008)), I
use a data set of a German online brokerage house that allows me to analyze the investment 
behavior on an transaction- and investor-specific level. Combining this data set with data on 
the mutual fund universe from Morningstar and a German provider, VWD, and weekly 
mutual fund performance data from Thomson Financial Datastream, I am able to construct a49
data set that contains approximately 1.5m mutual fund transactions of roughly 44k distinct 
individual investors.
By grouping funds into deciles at a peer group level I make the performance measures and 
fund  characteristics  of  different  peer  groups  comparable  and  in  this  way  study  the 
purchasing  behavior  of  private  mutual  fund  investors.  In  detail,  I focus  on  three  major 
research questions.
First,  I contribute  to  the  open  issue  if  institutional  boundaries  prevent  investors from 
chasing historical  performance  when  choosing  among  mutual  funds.  By  considering 
institutionally  unbounded  investors  I show  that  there  are indeed investors  who  use 
historical performance as purchase criterion, but that there is still a large group of investors 
who apparently use a different purchase criterion than historical performance. In detail, in 
only 25% of all transactions investors purchase mutual funds which belong to the top 20% 
within its according peer group as regards historical Alpha performance. Following Gruber 
(1996), I conclude that investors are indeed unsophisticated.
Second, I analyze further possible purchase criteria for a mutual fund investment and find 
out that in more than 80% of transactions investors purchase mutual funds belonging to the 
top 20% funds with the highest volume. Moreover, I provide evidence that investors prefer 
mutual  funds  belonging  to  top-brand  fund  families  and conclude  that  the  volume  and 
possibly the funds family brand power is an important purchase criterion in the majority of
cases. Furthermore, I find that initial charges are not an important purchase criterion, as 
investors on average purchase mutual funds with above average initial charges. Apparently,
investors feel poised to pay higher initial charges for mutual funds they are committed to for 
other reasons.
Third, I discuss which of the analyzed purchase criteria is the dominating one. This is a key 
contribution of this paper, as – to the best of my knowledge – nobody considered this issue 
so far. By performing regression analyses I find that the mutual fund volume is indeed the 
all-dominant  criterion  and  that historical  performance  is  only  of secondary  importance.
Moreover, I confirm again that low initial charges are no purchase criterion at all. As from a
scientific  point  of  view, historical  performance  is  the  only  reasonable  criterion  someone 
should use when investing in actively managed mutual funds (compare e.g. Gruber (1996)),
I conclude that the majority of investors make serious and costly investment mistakes when 
investing in mutual funds.50
Research in mutual funds remains an interesting domain. In this paper I have shown that 
there is a group of investors who purchase mutual funds by chasing historical performance 
but that the majority of investors do not and that institutional boundaries are not the reason 
that prevents investors from chasing performance. Hence, the next logical question is why 
investors  do  not  chase  historical  performance or  - in  other  words  - why  investors  are 
unsophisticated.  One  possible  explanation  is  missing  feedback.  Therefore,  an  interesting 
area for further research is to analyze whether investors learn over time when investing in 
mutual  funds  and  start  chasing  historical  performance  after  recognizing  their  former 
investment mistakes.
Moreover, potential  further  research  could concentrate  on  the  question  which  particular 
investors make  correct  purchase  decisions  and which  do  not,  i.e.  deal  with  the  issue  to 
divide investors in smart acting and non-smart acting investor groups.
Another interesting field of research is the impact of financial advice. Recent literature (e.g. 
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009); Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008)) have 
shown that  investors  who  make  their  investment  decisions  supported  by  a  professional 
advisor  cannot improve  their  investment  success  after cost  consideration.  It  would be 
interesting to analyze if advised investors use historical performance as purchase criterion 
more frequently than their unadvised peers.
Finally, potential further research could deal with mutual fund marketing. I show that the 
majority of individual investors do not use historical performance as their decision criterion. 
I also find that purchased funds have a clear above average fund volume and assume that 
advertising works. It would be interesting to study the effects of marketing and advertising 
activities as well as the effect of news on the individual purchasing behavior in greater detail 
(compare e.g. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) or Sirri and Tufano (1998)).51
Table A1: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds – APR-Measure
The table presents results for research question 1. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of historical performance-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the 
mean and the standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. As performance measure I use the Alpha Persistence Ratio (APR). The 
analyzed time period is January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 392,171             4.24% 6.03% 7.81% 9.95% 8.39% 7.45% 12.53% 15.38% 11.20% 17.01% 6.48         2.73        
Stocks World 386,220             4.16% 2.77% 5.03% 4.90% 8.88% 12.22% 17.25% 16.84% 15.15% 12.81% 6.82         2.41        
Stocks Germany 120,078             13.30% 10.19% 5.53% 6.10% 7.85% 7.76% 8.88% 10.43% 19.42% 10.54% 5.86         3.11        
Bonds World 110,120             5.72% 7.24% 7.34% 6.20% 4.66% 7.09% 13.42% 18.44% 14.60% 15.30% 6.59         2.80        
Stocks North America 76,864               5.31% 4.83% 11.74% 12.02% 8.28% 4.54% 6.22% 7.53% 15.16% 24.37% 6.51         3.01        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 57,065               12.50% 8.63% 9.04% 12.31% 11.28% 9.08% 7.52% 7.94% 11.06% 10.63% 5.39         2.94        
Stocks Biotech 48,587               1.95% 5.58% 13.35% 15.17% 13.52% 8.57% 3.48% 10.62% 12.40% 15.35% 6.07         2.71        
Stocks IT 42,904               4.27% 11.68% 8.93% 8.77% 7.82% 9.50% 10.94% 13.50% 10.60% 13.99% 6.06         2.83        
Stocks Real Estate 40,980               0.07% 0.08% 0.36% 0.54% 2.67% 1.77% 4.56% 3.49% 3.57% 82.90% 9.48         1.32        
Money Market EUR 35,034               3.11% 5.30% 7.56% 6.81% 16.32% 15.92% 21.08% 15.09% 2.18% 6.63% 5.95         2.19        
Stocks Emerging Markets 23,366               7.78% 11.20% 12.51% 8.15% 5.79% 6.61% 5.12% 10.13% 17.50% 15.22% 5.95         3.12        
Stocks Materials 23,185               1.19% 6.97% 12.51% 4.62% 10.13% 24.97% 5.09% 7.16% 17.69% 9.67% 6.20         2.50        
Stocks Japan 19,543               7.30% 10.27% 6.57% 6.82% 4.26% 4.48% 6.19% 13.53% 17.41% 23.18% 6.63         3.14        
Stocks Greater China 18,674               0.76% 3.33% 8.65% 4.62% 3.41% 2.42% 9.02% 18.82% 18.43% 30.55% 7.68         2.50        
Stocks India 18,599               0.42% 2.76% 7.68% 31.25% 10.22% 16.36% 4.02% 3.69% 16.94% 6.66% 5.80         2.31        
Stocks Latin America 14,652               1.54% 2.30% 4.48% 11.54% 5.06% 12.71% 16.82% 23.92% 15.90% 5.71% 6.77         2.13        
Stocks Healthcare 14,525               3.66% 11.04% 12.61% 7.84% 5.90% 10.91% 12.96% 6.65% 14.01% 14.43% 6.04         2.86        
Stocks Energy 6,803                 4.57% 3.92% 5.10% 8.92% 2.09% 17.29% 27.43% 17.89% 6.92% 5.87% 6.34         2.25        
Stocks Media 4,268                 10.59% 8.25% 7.50% 11.93% 14.69% 11.43% 12.00% 5.06% 4.83% 13.73% 5.45         2.81        
Stocks Russia 2,697                 0.04% 1.93% 1.67% 1.78% 1.59% 4.52% 16.72% 27.62% 43.20% 0.93% 7.87         1.54        
Other 19,036               4.52% 8.12% 7.58% 5.22% 5.26% 10.73% 9.09% 10.97% 17.52% 20.99% 6.74        
All 1,475,371          5.16% 5.72% 7.24% 8.00% 8.25% 9.20% 12.26% 13.95% 13.58% 16.64% 6.53         2.75        
APR-Decile52
Table A2: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds – Appraisal-Measure
The table presents results for research question 1. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of historical performance-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the 
mean and the standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. As performance measure I use Appraisal. The analyzed time period is 
January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 403,235             3.37% 3.73% 6.15% 10.84% 12.07% 11.75% 10.08% 14.14% 18.36% 9.51% 6.48         2.48        
Stocks World 393,009             2.19% 2.87% 2.92% 3.88% 10.49% 12.31% 24.48% 18.34% 10.84% 11.69% 6.91         2.13        
Stocks Germany 125,703             7.54% 16.13% 6.97% 9.21% 8.76% 7.09% 6.83% 13.56% 17.27% 6.64% 5.62         2.94        
Bonds World 116,102             3.17% 9.27% 7.15% 5.02% 6.60% 10.26% 15.10% 15.05% 13.30% 15.10% 6.54         2.69        
Stocks North America 77,543               0.46% 4.17% 7.73% 10.22% 9.88% 10.57% 14.41% 16.34% 15.63% 10.58% 6.64         2.34        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 57,705               13.85% 12.70% 7.57% 8.75% 11.27% 9.02% 7.51% 7.72% 9.19% 12.41% 5.29         3.05        
Stocks Biotech 53,254               0.52% 2.06% 3.51% 6.28% 5.57% 15.25% 23.55% 13.20% 18.81% 11.25% 7.12         2.02        
Stocks IT 47,372               1.78% 3.47% 7.28% 7.38% 11.91% 13.75% 13.27% 14.13% 8.36% 18.67% 6.70         2.45        
Stocks Real Estate 42,916               0.14% 0.26% 1.66% 0.51% 2.22% 1.44% 7.54% 6.98% 15.86% 63.40% 9.13         1.55        
Money Market EUR 35,952               0.12% 1.55% 5.37% 5.40% 2.69% 14.27% 23.86% 34.77% 3.40% 8.56% 7.01         1.81        
Stocks Emerging Markets 26,596               8.08% 10.79% 7.61% 4.62% 6.47% 10.62% 5.59% 10.91% 10.41% 24.89% 6.36         3.16        
Stocks Materials 24,042               0.09% 1.20% 2.43% 12.56% 23.98% 8.21% 11.89% 11.51% 13.79% 14.34% 6.72         2.18        
Stocks Japan 20,067               9.57% 6.96% 6.34% 6.54% 5.52% 5.15% 7.00% 9.99% 18.18% 24.75% 6.67         3.16        
Stocks Greater China 19,361               0.54% 0.89% 2.04% 6.13% 18.38% 8.03% 11.37% 17.75% 21.91% 12.95% 7.21         2.07        
Stocks India 18,777               0.29% 0.61% 1.64% 20.78% 23.05% 8.70% 10.20% 10.11% 9.86% 14.75% 6.46         2.22        
Stocks Healthcare 15,419               1.01% 3.87% 7.06% 9.13% 12.74% 15.21% 14.67% 6.03% 17.60% 12.68% 6.58         2.38        
Stocks Latin America 15,006               0.87% 1.15% 4.24% 8.55% 15.05% 30.43% 11.14% 7.46% 11.04% 10.06% 6.46         2.02        
Stocks Energy 7,070                 2.08% 5.11% 3.89% 14.09% 37.36% 14.79% 9.80% 4.12% 3.01% 5.76% 5.42         1.93        
Stocks Media 4,388                 1.53% 5.54% 10.62% 19.58% 15.13% 13.67% 10.96% 5.97% 7.27% 9.73% 5.68         2.37        
Stocks Russia 3,866                 0.05% 0.31% 0.85% 10.81% 4.63% 12.49% 6.62% 17.23% 24.29% 22.71% 7.74         2.04        
Other 20,404               3.95% 5.40% 7.71% 5.60% 6.44% 8.62% 6.79% 14.23% 18.42% 22.84% 7.00        
All 1,527,787          3.30% 5.15% 5.26% 7.53% 10.39% 11.14% 14.78% 15.00% 14.31% 13.14% 6.62         2.51        
Appraisal-Decile53
Table A3: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds – Weekly Returns
The table presents results for research question 1. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of historical performance-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the 
mean and the standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. As performance measure I use Weekly Returns. The analyzed time 
period is January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 408,013             8.40% 7.88% 9.70% 9.07% 9.55% 10.72% 11.89% 8.63% 12.89% 11.26% 5.83         2.84        
Stocks World 400,348             9.88% 9.88% 13.81% 8.21% 7.61% 7.44% 7.21% 10.45% 10.93% 14.59% 5.65         3.06        
Stocks Germany 132,999             7.36% 8.36% 12.13% 10.46% 11.68% 10.95% 11.83% 10.46% 9.03% 7.74% 5.51         2.68        
Bonds World 117,853             8.04% 9.54% 9.66% 8.03% 10.59% 9.33% 10.71% 12.14% 10.89% 11.07% 5.78         2.85        
Stocks North America 77,941               11.02% 14.20% 9.03% 8.53% 10.53% 8.46% 11.34% 9.63% 10.38% 6.88% 5.23         2.87        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 58,678               9.33% 8.81% 13.79% 8.25% 10.82% 10.64% 11.87% 8.51% 11.04% 6.95% 5.39         2.76        
Stocks Biotech 57,612               5.65% 12.58% 10.67% 11.45% 7.66% 17.99% 11.79% 8.33% 9.16% 4.71% 5.34         2.55        
Stocks IT 56,133               9.97% 8.22% 10.58% 10.37% 10.06% 9.82% 8.29% 8.66% 10.65% 13.36% 5.66         2.95        
Stocks Real Estate 43,334               3.05% 7.75% 14.31% 15.59% 14.79% 10.67% 9.64% 9.81% 6.16% 8.22% 5.45         2.47        
Money Market EUR 36,024               3.25% 1.80% 7.25% 11.89% 14.43% 11.93% 13.00% 16.90% 16.64% 2.91% 6.25         2.25        
Stocks Emerging Markets 31,280               9.18% 10.05% 10.00% 9.56% 14.14% 8.56% 7.31% 10.55% 9.26% 11.38% 5.52         2.87        
Stocks Materials 24,359               6.47% 10.16% 7.44% 9.67% 8.70% 6.81% 11.85% 11.78% 12.07% 15.05% 6.08         2.91        
Stocks Japan 20,688               10.96% 10.01% 10.15% 9.06% 7.99% 9.49% 8.56% 8.54% 11.10% 14.14% 5.64         3.04        
Stocks Greater China 19,959               7.71% 8.15% 7.83% 8.84% 11.13% 7.29% 13.11% 8.98% 14.89% 12.07% 6.01         2.86        
Stocks India 19,070               1.59% 8.24% 6.99% 14.81% 21.50% 13.00% 15.14% 8.21% 7.83% 2.68% 5.53         2.13        
Stocks Healthcare 16,491               8.50% 13.38% 16.94% 8.92% 10.18% 7.78% 10.13% 6.91% 9.79% 7.47% 5.08         2.80        
Stocks Latin America 15,093               5.14% 18.45% 6.23% 10.93% 5.93% 17.43% 9.81% 5.25% 13.61% 7.23% 5.44         2.77        
Stocks Energy 7,591                 6.35% 12.30% 8.19% 8.42% 9.93% 7.85% 11.43% 10.51% 9.84% 15.16% 5.90         2.93        
Stocks Media 4,728                 12.23% 9.96% 9.90% 7.40% 7.25% 5.77% 12.84% 9.22% 13.58% 11.84% 5.67         3.07        
Stocks Russia 3,976                 3.02% 2.39% 10.56% 14.99% 11.29% 16.55% 14.03% 9.83% 14.46% 2.87% 5.91         2.26        
Other 22,248               5.73% 7.78% 9.83% 9.72% 11.22% 12.44% 12.06% 10.05% 9.88% 11.30% 5.87        
All 1,574,418          8.36% 9.25% 11.14% 9.34% 9.82% 9.86% 10.29% 9.83% 11.19% 10.91% 5.66         2.86        
Weekly Returns - Decile54
Table A4: Distribution of purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds – One-year Returns
The table presents results for research question 1. The twenty largest peer groups of considered mutual funds are presented on the vertical axis, whereas on 
the horizontal axis the table shows the frequency of historical performance-deciles of the purchased mutual funds within all mutual funds. Moreover the 
mean and the standard deviation of the historical performance deciles are presented. As performance measure I use One-year Returns. The analyzed time 
period is January 1999 – July 2007.
Peer Group Observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Std. Dev.
Stocks Europe 403,462               8.02% 9.75% 9.21% 8.39% 10.30% 11.93% 10.44% 9.94% 12.35% 9.68% 5.72         2.81        
Stocks World 393,194               8.84% 10.19% 16.24% 8.17% 6.45% 7.74% 6.52% 9.86% 13.48% 12.51% 5.60         3.03        
Stocks Germany 125,879               7.98% 8.34% 13.25% 11.60% 11.27% 9.98% 11.41% 10.98% 8.04% 7.14% 5.39         2.67        
Bonds World 116,180               8.12% 7.57% 8.67% 9.01% 10.04% 9.93% 10.70% 11.83% 13.42% 10.71% 5.93         2.82        
Stocks North America 77,560                 6.33% 9.73% 11.41% 7.81% 11.75% 10.56% 9.65% 13.09% 12.06% 7.60% 5.70         2.73        
Stocks Asia/Pacific 57,757                 6.59% 8.27% 10.50% 8.12% 13.73% 9.97% 11.25% 8.64% 14.59% 8.34% 5.78         2.73        
Stocks Biotech 53,378                 6.76% 12.10% 12.49% 6.03% 11.33% 18.67% 10.46% 7.69% 7.50% 6.97% 5.33         2.62        
Stocks IT 47,505                 6.25% 7.68% 11.80% 9.80% 13.52% 10.67% 8.16% 13.19% 9.45% 9.47% 5.70         2.70        
Stocks Real Estate 42,931                 3.49% 6.75% 10.22% 9.88% 15.67% 15.57% 10.64% 12.61% 9.44% 5.73% 5.77         2.40        
Money Market EUR 35,954                 2.17% 2.50% 7.57% 8.21% 14.91% 11.93% 13.98% 18.07% 17.86% 2.81% 6.40         2.20        
Stocks Emerging Markets 26,881                 7.44% 13.49% 9.17% 11.09% 12.43% 7.93% 6.77% 10.51% 11.24% 9.92% 5.48         2.87        
Stocks Materials 24,044                 4.59% 16.70% 8.46% 6.31% 8.43% 5.93% 10.90% 14.56% 12.74% 11.37% 5.88         2.93        
Stocks Japan 20,080                 7.42% 10.49% 8.92% 8.89% 8.88% 10.59% 7.39% 9.63% 14.37% 13.43% 5.91         2.94        
Stocks Greater China 19,385                 6.36% 10.43% 9.56% 8.22% 7.71% 10.91% 10.56% 10.74% 16.32% 9.20% 5.91         2.83        
Stocks India 18,781                 2.78% 7.12% 13.23% 8.26% 17.40% 15.36% 10.82% 13.73% 7.30% 3.99% 5.60         2.31        
Stocks Healthcare 15,442                 5.81% 13.55% 10.14% 9.56% 12.61% 9.47% 9.81% 8.68% 14.68% 5.67% 5.49         2.73        
Stocks Latin America 15,059                 6.85% 13.45% 6.60% 10.66% 11.29% 15.51% 7.34% 7.90% 13.58% 6.82% 5.51         2.73        
Stocks Energy 7,072                   6.24% 10.41% 7.28% 5.66% 6.32% 9.79% 11.41% 8.03% 13.48% 21.39% 6.41         3.01        
Stocks Media 4,388                   11.94% 12.33% 9.09% 10.92% 7.54% 5.99% 14.27% 9.14% 9.32% 9.46% 5.33         2.95        
Stocks Russia 3,875                   1.75% 6.30% 12.75% 14.86% 15.77% 14.06% 16.31% 8.36% 7.15% 2.68% 5.48         2.15        
Other 20,478                 6.46% 7.71% 11.54% 10.18% 8.61% 12.28% 10.91% 12.96% 10.09% 9.26% 5.77        
All 1,529,285            7.50% 9.48% 11.74% 8.69% 10.02% 10.52% 9.47% 10.66% 12.21% 9.71% 5.68         2.82        
One-year Returns - Decile55
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Whose money is smart? Smart Decision Making Measured
by Investors’ Ability to Select Mutual Funds
Fabian Niebling1
Abstract: 
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on mutual fund persistence, smart 
investment  decision  making  and  household  finance.  I derive  three  key  findings  by  using 
administrative data for an empirical analysis on investor-specific level. First, I show that 
persistence exists in the German mutual fund market resulting in above-average returns for 
investors who purchase mutual funds by chasing historical performance. Second, I find that 
smart investment decisions are made by investors who are older, more experienced, wealthier 
and less overconfident. Third, I provide evidence on the economic impact of smart decision 
making by pointing out that smart investors  realize on average a 179bp higher portfolio 
return per year. Therefore, I suggest that the quality of mutual fund investment decisions 
should be used as an ex-ante measure to assess investment decisions of private investors
without the problem of potential randomness of stock market returns.
Keywords: Mutual  funds,  Fund  performance, Mutual  fund  persistence,  Smart 
Decision Making, Household finance
                                                  
1 Fabian Niebling (f.niebling@gmx.net) is with Retail Banking Competence Center - Goethe University 
Frankfurt am Main, Finance Department, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main.58
1 Introduction
Research  in  mutual  fund investments  of  private  investors remains  an  interesting  field. 
Recently, Keswani and Stolin (2008) documented a robust smart money effect even after 
controlling for stock momentum for both, individual and institutional investors. The smart 
money effect reveals that investors by majority purchase mutual funds which outperform 
their respective benchmarks in the future. Therefore, investors’ money is “smart” enough to 
flow to such funds that will outperform the market. If persistence in the mutual fund market 
exists, consequently, it will be a winning strategy to purchase mutual funds which have
outperformed the  market  in  the  past.2 However,  various  research  find  that  inferior 
performing mutual funds still receive net cash inflows (e.g. Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) or Keswani and Stolin (2008)). These results are confirmed for the German mutual 
fund  market  by  Ber,  Kempf  and  Ruenzi  (2008) and  Niebling  (2010) who  works on an
investor-specific level. Given these findings Keswani and Stolin (2008) claim: “Much more 
needs to be done, however, to understand how different categories of investors arrive at their mutual 
fund buying and selling decisions”.
Directly addressing their claim, I am able to identify smart acting investor groups as I work 
on an investor-specific data level. Moreover, this investor-specific level enables me to show 
that mutual fund investment decisions are a very good proxy in order to measure overall 
investment  success.  In  this  paper  I thereby  develop  an  ex-ante  measure  for  investment 
success which can be used in order to consider various future research questions for which a 
measure for investment success is needed.
This paper builds on and contributes to three different strands of literature: First, I add to 
literature on performance persistence and confirm the existence of performance persistence 
in the German mutual fund market. I find that investors seem to make smart investment 
decisions once they decide to purchase mutual funds with respect to historical performance, 
as they realize above-average returns in the following year. Not chasing past performance is 
therefore an investment mistake. This result is not surprising considering that performance 
persistence is proven to be present in the dataset at hand.
                                                  
2 Basically,  persistence  in  the  mutual  fund market  is proven to  be  existent  by  many studies (e.g. 
Gruber,  M.J.,  1996,  "Another  puzzle:  The  growth  in  actively  managed  mutual  funds",  Journal  of 
Finance 51, 783-810. or Elton, E.J., M.J. Gruber, and C.R. Blake, 1996, "The persistence of risk-adjusted 
mutual  fund  performance",  Journal  of   Business 69, 133-157. However,  in this  paper  I  confirm the 
mutual fund persistence once more for the German mutual fund market.59
Second, I examine  which  particular  investor  groups  act  smart  and  chase  historical 
performance. Answering  this  question  contributes  to  the  emerging  body  of  literature  on 
smart decision making (e.g. Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004), Feng and Seasholes (2005) and
Keswani  and  Stolin  (2008)). This  paper  is the  first,  of  which  the  author  is aware,  that 
particularly targets determining which particular investors act smart and purchase mutual 
funds by chasing historical performance. I find that investors making smart investments are 
older,  more  experienced,  wealthier  and  less  overconfident.  On  the  other  hand,  Gender, 
Marital  Status  and  the  Deposit  Value  do not  seem  to  have  influence  on  the  investment 
behavior.  Moreover,  I also  consider  funds’  expenses  and  construct  a  variable  measuring 
investors’  smartness  by  taking  the  funds  historical  Alpha as  well  as  initial  charges  into 
account. The impact of the investor characteristics on this new variable is very similar to the 
one on the historical performance.
Third, I discuss the economic impact of smart decision making and therefore contribute to 
literature on household finance. I analyze whether investors, who act smart and purchase 
mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical  performance,  realize  higher  portfolio  returns. In 
particular, I find that investors who act smart when purchasing mutual funds generate on 
average a  179bp  higher  portfolio  return  per  year  than  investors  who  do  not  act  smart 
regarding mutual fund investment decisions. When also taking portfolio risk into account 
by considering the Sharpe ratio, smart investors even generate on average a 299bp higher 
Sharpe ratio than non-smart acting investors. Being able to reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship  between  mutual  fund  selection  and  investment  success makes  the  previous 
results even more valuable. The outcomes of my analyses are not subject to any potential 
random realization of stock markets as in previous studies, e.g. by Campbell (2006), Barber 
and  Odean  (2000) and Hackethal,  Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2008).  Having  empirically 
confirmed this relationship I suggest using mutual fund investment decisions as an ex-ante 
measure  for  investment  decision  quality,  i.e.  for  financial  ability.  This  measure  can  be 
applied to various research questions for which financial ability has to be measured.
In order to derive my findings, I use a high-quality administrative data set of a German 
online  brokerage house  and  data  on  the  mutual  fund  universe  from Morningstar  and  a 
German provider, VWD, as well as weekly mutual fund performance data from Thomson 
Financial Datastream. Combining these data sources I am able to construct a dataset that 
contains  more  than 1.5m  mutual fund  transactions  of  roughly  44k  distinct  individual 
investors.  For  all  of  these  investors  the  dataset  includes  portfolio  compositions,  their 60
respective  trading  history  as  well  as socio-demographics. Moreover,  the  database  also 
contains total net assets and initial charges on a fund level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I give an overview over existing 
literature in the field of mutual fund persistence, smart decision making as well as over 
household finance and derive my research questions. Section 3 describes the construction of 
the dataset this paper employs in order to address the research questions. Section 4 deals 
with  methodological  issues.  The  empirical  results  on  mutual  fund  persistence,  the 
determination of particular smart acting investor groups and the overall economic impact of 
smart decision making are reported and discussed in section 5. In section 6 I describe results 
of some additional robustness tests and section 7 draws conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Research Questions
This  paper  builds  on  a  wide  array  of  research  on  mutual  funds  and  behavioral  finance 
adding  to  three different  strands of  literature,  namely  (i)  literature  on  mutual  funds 
performance  persistence,  (ii)  literature  on  smart  investment  decisions  making  and  (iii) 
literature on household finance.
In order to be able to differentiate between smart and non-smart acting investors based on 
historical performance of mutual funds, it is necessary that persistence exists. This topic has 
been heavily discussed over the last years. Nevertheless, following the dominating academic 
opinions,  performance  persistence in  the  mutual  fund  industry  can  be  considered  to  be 
present. First empirical evidence goes back to Grinblatt and Titman (1992) who find that 
performance differences between funds persist over time. These results are confirmed by the 
work of Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996). They apply risk-adjusted measures and again find 
performance persistence. Even though there has been interim controversial discussions (e.g. 
Carhart (1997) in response to Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993)), subsequent studies 
again underline the notion of performance persistence among mutual funds (e.g. Hsiu-Lang, 
Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000), Wermers and Moskowitz (2000)). Moreover, Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) show that not so much the funds themselves but the fund managers are the 
cause for outstanding fund performances. Recently, Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and 
White (2006) by using a bootstrap analysis provided evidence that those fund managers who 
generate superior Alphas are not simply lucky but, in fact, are skilled. For an extensive 
review  on  mutual  fund  performance  persistence I refer  to Anderson  and  Schnusenberg 
(2005). However,  as  the  picture  is  not  comprehensively  consistent  I contribute  to  this 61
question and recalculate the performance existence for the German mutual fund market. 
Consequently, my first research question is: 
Question 1: Does mutual fund performance persistence apply in the German mutual fund 
market?
After  considering  the  whole  German  mutual  fund  market,  I consider  the  specific 
transactions in my data set from an investor-specific point of view. I address the question 
whether investors who have behaved smart in the past and have purchased mutual funds by 
chasing historical performance benefit by generating above average returns in the future.
Affirming  this  question  by showing  that  smart-acting  investors  indeed purchase  ex-post 
outperforming  mutual  funds,  finally  confirms  the  hypothesis  that  chasing  historical 
performance is a valid purchase criterion. Summarizing these issues, my second research 
question is:
Question 2: Do mutual funds purchased by investors who act smart and chase historical 
performance perform better than mutual funds purchased by investors who 
do not chase historical performance?
Gruber (1996) by analyzing US mutual funds cash flow data finds that there are indeed 
investors who invest in past winning mutual funds, but he also observes money remaining 
in the losing funds. This result is confirmed by Zheng (1999) expanding the dataset to a 
longer  period  of  time, Keswani  and  Stolin  (2008) using  UK  mutual  fund  data  and  Ber, 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) focusing on the German mutual fund market. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) again  show  that  mutual  fund  investors  fail  to  stop  investing  in  poor  performing 
funds. All these works have in common that they use aggregated fund flow data. In contrast, 
Niebling (2010) uses transaction-specific data and finds that there are indeed investors who 
use historical performance as their decision criterion but that there is also a large investor 
group who do not chase historical performance and apparently use a  different purchase 
criterion.  Moreover,  Niebling  (2010) shows that  mutual  fund volume  is  the  dominating 
purchase  criterion  for  private  investors when  choosing  among  mutual  funds  and  he
concludes that the majority of investors makes serious investment mistakes.
All these findings lead to the question which particular investors act smart and which do
not. Recently, Keswani and Stolin (2008) addressed this question by asking “Which money is 
smart?”. They use a detailed dataset with net inflows instead of Total Net Assets (TNA)62
flows and are able to differentiate between fund purchases and fund sells in contrast to 
former studies on aggregated mutual fund flows (e.g. Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999)). They 
find some indications of educated, smart investors and additionally document a learning 
effect  among  investors  within  the  last  years.  Complementary  to  these  findings, Elton, 
Gruber and Busse (2004) and more recently Boldin and Cicci (2008) analyze easy predictable 
index funds and conclude the existence of uninformed investors from their results. They 
argue that potentially suboptimal financial advice causes net inflows to dominated funds.
All  this  research  suggests  the  existence  of  smart  acting  and  non-smart  acting  investors. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive research dividing mutual 
fund  investors  in  smart  acting  and  non-smart  acting  groups  regarding  their  individual 
investor characteristics. Therefore, I formulate my third research question as follows:
Question 3: Which  particular  investor  groups act  smart  and  chase  historical 
performance?
After answering research question 3 I contribute to the field of household finance by using 
my results on the purchase decisions of mutual fund investors.
Campbell  (2006) initiated  a  broad  discussion  on  household  finance.  He  finds  that 
households make various investment mistakes, e.g. nonparticipation in risky asset markets, 
underdiversification  of  risky  portfolios  and  failure  to  exercise  options  to  refinance 
mortgages. He also shows that less wealthy and less educated households are more likely to 
make these investment mistakes than wealthier and better educated households.
Besides  Campbell  (2006),  there  are  several  studies  investigating  the  influence  of  certain 
factors on the overall investment success. For example Barber and Odean (2000) show that 
investors  who  are  excessive  traders  generate  below  average  returns  and  conclude  that 
“trading  is  hazardous  to your  wealth”. Moreover,  Barber  and  Odean  (2001) analyze  the 
influence of gender on investment success and find that men generate less portfolio return 
than women do, as men are more likely to be overconfident.
All  these  studies  have  in  common  that  they  use  ex-post  measures  in  order  to  detect 
investment  success  and,  therefore,  are  subject  to  potential  random  realization  of  stock 
markets.  As  far  as  I know,  nobody  has  developed  an  ex-ante  measure  for  evaluating 
investment success. 63
In this paper I introduce a measure detecting investors’ smartness through their mutual 
fund investments. If this measure has a positive influence on investors overall investment 
success (and not only on their success in mutual fund investments), I will indeed find an ex-
ante measure for superior investment behavior. Therefore, my fourth research question is as 
follows:
Question 4: Do  investors  who  act  smart  and  chase  historical  performance  have  more 
overall investment success?
3 Data
For this paper’s analyses I construct a comprehensive data set from mainly two different 
sources, namely (i) a database containing transaction and portfolio data and (ii) a database 
containing mutual fund performance data and other fund characteristics.
The first database has been supplied by a German discount brokerage house and contains in 
total  more  than  19m transactions  of  roughly  71k individual  investor  transactions  placed 
between  January  1999  and  July  2007.  Therefore,  I am able  to  work  on  investor- and 
transaction-level respectively in contrast to most of the existing studies on the purchasing 
behavior of mutual fund investors which use funds flow data (e.g. Gruber (1996), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998),Ber, Kempf and Ruenzi (2008)). However, in order to answer the research 
questions I have to make a few amendments to this dataset.
In a first step, I restrict the data set to mutual fund transactions resulting in more than 2.81m 
transactions  of more  than  48k distinct  individual  investors3. In a  second  step, I exclude 
transactions which are part of mutual funds saving plans mainly due to two reasons: First, 
when setting up a saving plan investors make the purchase decision only once in advance 
and then the mutual funds are purchased repeatedly and automatically by the bank. Second, 
saving plan investors usually cannot choose from the whole mutual fund universe, but can 
select only from a restricted set of mutual funds which are provided  from the bank for 
saving plan purposes.
For  sell  transactions, the  choice  set  of  an  individual  investor  is  limited  to  the  funds  he 
previously purchased, and the actual transaction date might be determined by factors like 
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liquidity needs or tax reasons instead of smart decision making. For these reasons, I remove 
all sell transactions in a third step and exclusively focus on mutual fund purchases, where 
investors choose funds from the entire mutual fund universe at a specific and individual 
date.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The  table  displays  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  investor  data  I use  for  my studies.  Dummy
variables indicate if an investor is classified as male, married or as a heavy trader by the bank’s data 
warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) 
to  6  (high).  Number  of  Portfolio  Positions  and  Share of  International  Equity  are  proxies  for 
diversification.
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) 43,880             84.31%
Age 43,881             46.12               44.00               12.16              
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 23,595             60.91%
Riskclass 43,679             4.56                 5.00                 1.28                
Heavy Trader (Dummy) 44,029             27.56%
Deposit Value 44,028             55,802             36,296             131,441          
Cash Value 44,029             34,637             15,139             86,061            
Mutual Funds Trade Volume 44,029             4,206               2,557               14,273            
Number of Trades 44,029             97                    22                    502                 
Number of Portfolio Positions 33,589             12.13               9.00                 11.64              
Share of International Equity 32,869             49%
Length of Customer Rel. (years) 44,029             8.05                 7.80                 3.01                
In order to address research questions 3 and 4 I need to work on investor-specific level. This 
requires  not  considering the  investors  with  missing  observations  - socio-demographic 
information as well as other information (e.g. risk class, deposit value, trading frequency).
In  order  to  get  a  feeling  of  the  approx.  44k  investors4 purchasing  mutual  funds  in  my 
database,  I  present  some  descriptive  statistics in  table  1. Unfortunately,  comprehensive 
socio-demographic  information  is not  available  for  all  44k  investors, which  explains the 
lower  amount  of  observations  for  particular  descriptive  numbers.  A  comparison  of  the 
demographics with the ones provided by Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2004)5 indicates that my 
sample of 44k investors represents approximately 0.6% of the whole mutual fund investor 
population in Germany. Investors in my sample are more likely to be male (84% compared 
to 58% in the population), are almost of the same average age (46 years compared to 47 years 
in the population) and have a higher average deposit value ( € 56k compared to € 20k in the 
population). However, please note that the latter difference can be explained by the fact that 
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average  deposit  value  in  the  population  is  biased  by  Germans  who  rather  own  an 
investment portfolio (approximately 41% of the population) but do not invest in equity (only 
16% of the population invest in stocks or mutual funds). Therefore, I believe that the gap 
will  be  significantly  reduced  when  considering only  investors  who  own  equity  (like  the 
majority of investors in my data set). All in all, my sample is fairly representative for the 
mutual fund population in Germany.
The second database I use is a survivorship bias free sample of the German mutual fund 
market. I use the Morningstar database that has been proven to be of high quality in studies 
on  the  American  mutual  fund  market  (see Elton,  Gruber  and  Blake  (2001)).  Since 
Morningstar  data  is  only  available  from  2002  to  2006,  I supplement  my database  with 
information provided  by  two  German  suppliers,  namely  Hoppenstedt  and  VWD. From 
these databases I also obtain corresponding peer groups.
Finally, the private investors purchase 254 funds that are not covered in either of my data 
sets. In case no peer group was provided by any of the data providers, the mapping of funds 
into  peer  groups  relies  on  regression  techniques  as  they  are also  used  in Koijen  (2008). 
Essentially,  this  means  that  this  paper  uses  self-reported  peer  groups  on  which  private 
investors have to rely when selecting mutual funds.
The weekly mutual fund return data was obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream and 
is dividend adjusted and net of fees, but does not include initial charges. Unfortunately, 
(sufficient) performance data is not available for all purchased funds, which reduces the
number of transactions to approx. 1.5m transactions which are the base for the analyses 
answering research question 2.
For some of my analyses I need some additional information on the purchased mutual funds 
(e.g. fund volume, initial charge) which I obtain from Lipper/Reuters. Regrettably, these 
data are only available for the years 2002 – 2008 which yields to another restriction of the 
dataset for these analyses.
4 Model and Methodology
The major performance measure I use for my analyses in order to evaluate mutual fund 
performance is Jensen’s Alpha (see Jensen (1968)). Recent studies have shown that results 
remain qualitatively unchanged once more sophisticated Alpha estimation techniques are 66
used  (see Carhart  (1997), Gruber  (1996),  Kosowski,  Timmermann,  Wermers  and  White 
(2006)). The formula for the one-factor model is 
  i f m i i f i r r r r         (1)
where ri is the return of fund i, rf is the return of a three month cash position, rm is the return 
of  a  peer  group’s  benchmark  index,  i is  the  sensitivity  of  fund  i  to  the  return  on  the 
benchmark  index,  i is  the  risk-adjusted  return  on  fund  i  and  i is  the  error  term.  The 
benchmark indices are chosen in accordance with a fund’s peer group. As shown in table 2,
for all peer groups focusing on stocks this paper uses the accordant MSCI indices, for bond 
funds  Datastream indices  are  used  and  for  money  market  funds  indices  provided  by 
Citigroup are used.
In order to control for the fact that results may depend on the specific risk measure used, I 
consider as a second performance measure the Appraisal ratio6. Besides Jensen’s Alpha this 
measure takes also the non-systematic risk via the denominator into account. This means 
that a mutual fund is valuated the worse the larger the non-systematic risk is.
The Appraisal ratio is computed by dividing the Alpha by the standard deviation of the 
error term of the one-factor model:
) ( i
i Appraisal
 

 (2)
where i is Jensen’s Alpha of fund i from the one-factor model and (i) is the standard 
deviation of the error term of fund i in the one-factor model.
Using a rolling-window approach, the Alpha for each fund and the Appraisal ratio for each 
fund are calculated based on weekly observations between 1997 and 2008. The underlying 
assumption is that that a performance chasing investor chooses among mutual funds by 
looking at the historical performance of the year before. In order to assure the comparability 
of risk-adjusted performances of mutual funds, I compare several peer groups (compare 
table 2).
                                                  
6 Note that I performed all analyses with three further performance measures, namely the Alpha 
Persistence Ratio (APR), Weekly Returns and One-year Returns. As all results and conclusions remain 
qualitatively unchanged, I abstain from displaying these results. For a definition and results of these 
measures regarding mutual fund purchasing criteria, the reader is referred to Niebling, F., 2010, "The 
determinants of mutual funds inflows - evidence from private investor transactions", Working Paper, 
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Table 2: Definition of peer groups and peer group’s benchmark indices
In this table the definitions of the 56 peer group are given. The according peer group’s benchmark 
indices are used for calculating the risk-adjusted performances (Jensen’s Alpha) and for ranking the 
mutual funds into peer group specific deciles.
ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index
Stock Market by Geography Stock Markets by Industry (cont'd)
1 Stocks World MSCI World 30 Stocks Financial Markets MSCI Financials
2 Stocks Europe MSCI Europe 31 Stocks Materials MSCI Materials
3 Stocks Germany MSCI Germany 32 Stocks Energy MSCI Energy
4 Stocks Spain MSCI Spain 33 Stocks Health Care MSCI Health Care
5 Stocks France MSCI France 34 Stocks Consumer Goods MSCI Consumer Staples
6 Stocks Switzerland MSCI Switzerland 35 Stocks Industrial MSCI Industrials
7 Stocks Italy MSCI Italy 36 Stocks Utilities MSCI Utilities
8 Stocks Scandinavia MSCI Nordic Countries 37 Stocks Media MSCI Media
9 Stocks UK MSCI UK 38 Stocks Biotech MSCI Pharmaceuticals & Biotech
10 Stocks Denmark MSCI Denmark 39 Stocks Real Estate MSCI Real Estate
13 Stocks Sweden MSCI Sweden 40 Money Market EUR CGBI WMNI 1MTH Euro debt
14 Stocks Turkey MSCI Turkey 41 Money Market GBP CGBI WMNI UK 1MTH Euro debt
15 Stocks Finland MSCI Finland 42 Money Market USD CGBI WMNI US 1MTH Euro debt
16 Stocks Russia MSCI Russia 43 Money Market CAD CGBI WMNI CN 1MTH Euro debt
17 Stocks North America MSCI North America 44 Money Market CHF CGBI WMNI SW 1MTH Euro debt
18 Stocks Australia MSCI Australia 45 Money market AUD CGBI WMNI AU 1MTH Euro debt
21 Stocks Emerging Markets MSCI EM 46 Bonds global (EUR) CGBI WGBI WORLD 10 MKT ALL MATS
22 Stocks Latin America MSCI EM Latin America 47 Bonds USD CGBI USBIG Gvt-spons 
23 Stocks Greater China MSCI Golden Dragon 48 Bonds CHF SW Total all
24 Stocks Singapore MSCI Singapore 49 Bonds GBP UK Total all
25 Stocks Thailand MSCI Thailand 50 Bonds AUD AU Total all
26 Stocks Korea MSCI Korea 51 Bonds JPY JP Total all
27 Stocks India MSCI India 52 Bonds DKK DK Total all
28 Stocks Brazil MSCI Brazil 53 Bonds CAD CN Total all
29 Stocks Information Technology MSCI Information Technology 56 Bonds Asia CGBI ESBI 10 years
Stock Markets by Industry
Money Markets by Geography
Bond Markets by Geography
54 Bonds SEK
19 Stocks Asia/ Pacific MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan
11 Stocks Netherlands
SD Total all
55 Bonds NOK NW Total all
20 Stocks Japan MSCI Japan
MSCI Netherlands
12 Stocks Austria MSCI Austria
In order to address my research questions I need to compare the performance measures of 
the  mutual  funds  purchased by  investors  with the  ones  of  all  mutual  funds available. 
However, it is not possible to compare the performance measures of the mutual funds of 
different peer groups and in different times directly with each other (for example the Alpha
measures are always subject to different betas). I address this issue by categorizing the funds 
according to their deciles using their past performance in every specific peer group. Hence, 
in any given week and for every peer group the decile 1 contains the mutual funds with the 
poorest performance  and  decile  10  contains  the  mutual  funds  with  the  strongest 
performance.  This  means  that  I create  a  basis  on  that  I can  compare  the  mutual  funds 
according to their relative performance indicated by the deciles they belong to. Using this 
data I am able to analyze research question 1.
In order to address research question 2, this information is combined with the transaction 
data  containing  all  funds  purchased  by  private  investors.  Thus,  this  newly constructed 
dataset provides information about the relative performance of a particular mutual fund at 
the time it was purchased by a private investor.68
In order to answer questions 3 and 4, I further enrich this dataset by adding additional 
investor and mutual fund characteristics. As I want to measure the quality of an investors’
mutual fund investment decision and not consider single transactions, which could be lucky 
draws, I calculate investor averages.
Table 3: Definition of Initial Charge Groups
Definitions and proportions of the three initial charge groups are displayed in this table.
Initial Charge Group Name Definition Proportion
1 No Initial Charges Initial Charges = 0% 33%
2 Reduced Initial Charges 0% < Initial Charges < 5% 38%
3 Full Initial Charges Initial Charges ≥ 5% 29%
Following  this  approach, the  paper  implicitly  makes  the  assumption  that  it  is  a  smart 
strategy to purchase mutual funds by chasing Alphas. Whereas the operating expenses are 
already factored into the Alpha, I do not take any initial charges into account. In order to 
account for this issue I classify all mutual funds into three different categories with respect 
to their initial charges, namely (i) mutual funds with no initial charges, (ii) mutual funds 
with reduced initial charges (initial charges larger than zero and smaller than 5%) and (iii) 
mutual funds with full initial charges (initial charges of 5% and larger) (compare table 3).
Subsequently, I define  a  new  variable  “Smartness”  assuming  that  smart  investors  (i) 
purchase the mutual funds with the highest historical Alpha performance and (ii) purchase 
the  mutual  funds  with  the  lowest  initial  charge  within  the  group of  all  funds  with  the 
highest historical Alpha performance:
Smartness = 3 x Alpha-decile – Initial-charge-group + 1 (3)
“Smartness” is a natural number between 1 and 30 and it holds that the larger the value of 
“Smartness”, the smarter the investors’ investment decisions. Note that the historical Alpha
has a stronger influence on the value of “Smartness” than the initial charge. 
Table 4: Examples for variable “Smartness”
Table 4 displays some examples for the variable “Smartness”. The larger the variable “Smartness” is,
the smarter appears the investment decision.
Alpha Deciles Initial Charge Group Smartness
10 1 30
10 3 28
9 1 27
1 3 169
Once “locked-in” into an Alpha decile it is not possible to change the decile by purchasing a 
fund with a low initial charge. In order to illustrate the intuition behind the “Smartness” 
variable, some examples for the calculation of the variable are given in table 4.
In  order to  address  research  question  3,  i.e.  to  identify  smart  acting  investor  groups, I
conduct a multiple regression model with the investor’s average of the purchased Alpha
decile and the average Smartness value of an investor, respectively, as depending variable. 
As both the purchased Alpha decile and the Smartness are censored variables (from 1 to 10 
for the Alpha decile and from 1 to 30 for Smartness, respectively), I use a Tobit-Regression 
model. Depending variables are several investor characteristics. I also control for a couple of
fund characteristics which are usually used in other papers7. I use the regression model:
i i i i i i i TradeFreq TradeVol DepVal LN Mar Age Gen PM       ) (
i i i i i i TB TNA LN IC Risk Len        ) (
(4)
where PMi is the investor-average of a given performance measure8 of investor i, Geni is a 
dummy variable indicating if the investor i is male, Agei is the age of investor i, Mari is a 
dummy variable indicating if the investor i is married, LN(DepVal)i is the natural logarithm 
of the average deposit value of investor i, TradeVoli is the average fund trade volume of 
investor  i, TradeFreqi is  the  trading  frequency  of  investor  i9,  Leni is  the  length  of  the 
relationship to the bank of investor i, Riski is the self-reported risk class10 of investor i, ICi is 
the investor-average initial charge of investor i, LN(TNA)i is the natural logarithm of the 
investor-average  fund  volume11 of  investor  i,  TBi is  the  investor-average  of  a  dummy 
variable indicating whether a fund belongs to one of the top mutual fund families and i is 
the error term.
Finally,  I conduct  a  second  regression  analysis  in  order  to  answer  research  question  4, 
namely if the investors Smartness does have a positive influence on the overall investment 
success.  I use  an  out-of-sample  approach  using  the  time  period  from  October  2006  to 
September 2007 for measuring the portfolio returns and the time period from January 2003 
                                                  
7 For a detailed derivation of these fund characteristics please compare section 5.2
8 In this regression I use Jensen’s Alpha (defined in (1)) and the variable Smartness (defined in (3)) as 
performance measures.
9 Measured on a scale from 1 (low trading frequency) to 5 (high trading frequency)
10 On a scale from 1 (low risk) to 6 (high risk)
11 Measured in Total Net Assets (TNA)70
to September 2006 for calculating the investor average Smartness. This approach with two 
distinct time periods guarantees that the investment success is not mainly driven by the 
purchased  outperforming  mutual  funds  which  are  reflected  already  in  the  value  of  the 
variable Smartness. Additionally, I include several investor characteristics and the portfolio 
risk as control variables:
i i i i i i DepVal LN Mar Age Gen PM PortPerf ) (     
i i i i i PortRisk Len TradeFreq TradeVol      
(5)
where PortPerfi is the one-year portfolio performance12 of investor i, PMi is the investor-
average of a given performance measure13 of investor i, Geni is a dummy variable indicating 
if an investor is male, Agei is the age of investor i, Mari is a dummy variable indicating if the 
investor i is married, LN(DepVal)i is the natural logarithm of the average deposit value of 
investor i, TradeVoli is the average fund trade volume of investor i, TradeFreqi is the trading 
frequency of investor i14, Leni is the length of the relationship of investor i with the bank, 
PortRiski is the portfolio risk15 of investor i, and i is the error term.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Performance persistence among mutual funds
Although several previous studies have already shown that there is persistence in mutual 
fund performance (e.g. Gruber (1996) and for the German market Fischer, Hackethal and 
Meyer  (2008)), I replicate  these  analyses in  order  to  assure  the  existence  of performance 
persistence within my data set.
In order to determine the performance persistence, I follow the approach outlined by Gruber 
(1996). I group funds into deciles according to their historical performance and then observe
the average performance of funds from a particular decile in the following year. Note that I
first calculate averages per given week and peer group respectively and then average over 
                                                  
12 I use the simple portfolio performance as well as the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio
13 I use  the  investor  average  Alpha  decile  as  well  as  the  investor average  Smartness  variable. 
Additionally I perform the regressions with so called Top20 dummies indicating whether an investor 
purchases on average mutual funds in the Alpha deciles 9 and 10 and whether an investor has an 
average Smartness value of 25 to 30 respectively.
14 Measured on a scale from 1 (low trading frequency) to 5 (high trading frequency)
15 Portfolio risk is measured as the portfolios standard deviation.71
all  weeks and  peer  groups  equally.  This  approach  allows  me to  display  absolute 
performance measures as I take into account the unequal distribution of the transactions 
over time and peer groups (Otherwise I could derive only relative statements by considering 
deciles).
First, I address research question 1 based on the whole German mutual fund market. The 
results for Jensen’s Alpha are summarized in panel A of table 5. The decile 1 includes the 
10% of funds with the lowest prior Alpha performance whereas the decile 10 includes the 
10% of funds with the highest prior Alpha performance. Column 2-5 present results for the 
Alpha performance in the following year, whereas column 6-9 display results for average 
Alpha deciles. Accordingly, the results for the One-year Return measure and for One-year 
Return deciles respectively are presented in column 10-17.
Looking at the results for the Alpha measure (column 2-5), I observe a positive trend in the 
mean from the bottom decile to the top one. The average Alpha of the previously poorest 
performing funds is -1.25% p.a. and the average Alpha of the previously best performing 
funds is 2.16% p.a.. The results become even more obvious when I compare the average 
Alpha of deciles 1-8 with the average Alpha of deciles 9 and 10: An investor who purchases 
mutual funds in the top 20% of historical Alpha performance (deciles 9 and 10) can expect 
on average an Alpha performance of 1.10% p.a. in the following year. In contrast, an investor 
who purchases mutual funds in deciles 1 to 8 of historical Alpha performance can expect on 
average an Alpha performance of only -0.43% p.a.; i.e. he can improve the expected future 
Alpha performance by investing in previously top performing funds on average by 1.53% 
p.a..  The  difference  between  deciles  1-8  and  9-10  is  statistically  significant  as  the t-test 
reveals.
Results still hold when considering average Alpha deciles instead of the absolute Alpha 
measure  (compare  column  6-9):  The  Alpha  decile  of  the  previously  poorest  performing 
funds is on average 4.80 and the Alpha decile of the previously best performing funds is on 
average 6.16. All average deciles are pairwise statistically different. If an investor purchases 
mutual funds in the top 20% of historical Alpha performance (deciles 9 and 10) he will 
expect the funds on average in decile of 6.13 in the following year. For comparison, investors 
who purchase mutual funds in deciles 1 to 8 of historical Alpha performance can expect the 
funds in the following year on average to be only in decile 5.40. This means, that investors 
can improve the future Alpha performance of their purchased mutual funds by 0.73 in terms 
of average deciles by purchasing funds in deciles 9 and 10 of past Alpha performance.72
Additionally,  I consider simple  One-year  Returns in the  following  year  (columns  10-17). 
Results indicate that investors who invest in previously outperforming funds can expect 
higher returns in the future than investors who invest in previously poor performing mutual 
funds: Again, I observe a positive trend in the mean of the One-year Returns from decile 1 
(mean of 3.55% p.a.) to decile 10 (mean of 10.69% p.a.). An investor who invests in the top 
20% of previous Alpha performance can expect on average a future return of 9.78% p.a., 
whereas  an  investor  who  purchased  mutual  funds  in  deciles  1-8  of  previous  Alpha 
performance can expect on average only a return of 6.10% p.a.. Therefore, chasing historical 
performance  improves  expected future  returns  on  average  by  3.68%  p.a..  Although  the 
differences of two succeeding deciles are not statistically significant, the difference between 
decile 1-8 and 9-10 is significant at all common thresholds.
Again,  results  are  confirmed  by  considering  deciles  instead  of  absolute  measures  in  the 
following  year.  The  average  One-year  return  decile  of  funds  in  Alpha  decile  1  is  5.27, 
whereas the average One-year Return decile of funds in Alpha decile 10 is 5.81 and investors 
can improve the expected average One-year Return decile by 0.29 when investing in the top 
20% of historical Alpha performance.
The results do not depend on the specific performance measure used as the picture for the 
Appraisal ratio is very similar (compare panel B of table 5). I observe a positive trend along 
the previous Appraisal ratio deciles when considering the average Appraisal ratio in the 
following year. Investors who purchase mutual funds in the top 20% regarding historical 
Appraisal  ratio  generate  higher  future  returns  than  investors  who  purchase  funds  in 
previous  Appraisal  ratio  deciles  1  to  8.  These  results hold  regardless  considering  future 
Appraisal ratios or simple returns and regardless considering absolute measures or deciles. 
Again, all differences of decile 1-8 and 9-10 are statistically significant.
Therefore,  I can  confirm  the  previous  results  of Kosowski,  Timmermann,  Wermers  and 
White (2006) and Fischer, Hackethal and Meyer (2008) and conclude that it is reasonable to 
assume that performance persistence among German mutual funds exists.
In a second step I turn on a transaction-specific level and test whether these results still hold 
when considering only the actual mutual funds purchased by the private investors in my
transactions data base. I use the same methodology, i.e. rank the purchased mutual funds by 
their historical performance deciles and display average performances of the following year 
by the previous deciles. Results are given in table 6.73
Table 5: Performance persistence of all mutual funds in the German mutual fund universe
Table 5 presents results for research question 1. Funds are sorted into deciles16 based on their performance over the prior year. Decile 10 includes the funds 
with the highest performance, while funds with the lowest performance are summarized in decile 1. The last two rows represent the deciles 1 to 8 and 9 to 10
respectively. The last column reports p-values of a parametric t-test. The analyzed time period is January 1997 – July 2007. Panel A presents results for 
Jensen’s Alpha whereas Panel B shows results for the Appraisal ratio.
Panel A: Alpha Persistence of All Mutual Funds
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
1 23,259        -1.25% 17.23% 23,259        4.80        2.54          23,422        3.55% 153.29% 23,422        5.27        2.41         
2 27,657        -1.28% 15.45% 0.866 27,657        4.90        2.20          0.000 27,715        4.81% 159.94% 0.366 27,715        5.34        2.13          0.001
3 29,262        -0.81% 14.56% 0.000 29,262        5.07        1.92          0.000 29,312        5.39% 156.75% 0.663 29,312        5.42        1.93          0.000
4 26,910        -0.85% 15.38% 0.788 26,910        5.28        1.74          0.000 26,949        5.53% 148.04% 0.916 26,949        5.47        1.79          0.003
5 27,503        -0.40% 13.06% 0.000 27,503        5.50        1.76          0.000 27,572        6.32% 143.63% 0.526 27,572        5.54        1.80          0.000
6 29,531        0.49% 18.46% 0.000 29,531        5.71        1.68          0.000 29,564        7.79% 159.45% 0.247 29,564        5.60        1.75          0.000
7 27,952        -0.07% 14.21% 0.000 27,952        5.85        1.74          0.000 28,010        6.99% 144.61% 0.525 28,010        5.65        1.80          0.002
8 28,166        0.54% 15.46% 0.000 28,166        5.98        1.95          0.000 28,251        7.89% 156.09% 0.478 28,251        5.68        1.96          0.035
9 28,655        0.21% 16.56% 0.013 28,655        6.11        2.21          0.000 28,776        9.00% 158.02% 0.395 28,776        5.77        2.16          0.000
10 24,313        2.16% 21.48% 0.000 24,313        6.16        2.55          0.008 24,476        10.69% 167.53% 0.232 24,476        5.81        2.48          0.117
1-8 220,240      -0.43% 15.56% 220,240      5.40        1.99          220,795      6.10% 152.95% 220,795      5.50        1.95         
9-10 52,968        1.10% 19.00% 0.000 52,968        6.13        2.37          0.000 53,252        9.78% 162.46% 0.000 53,252        5.79        2.31          0.000
Panel B: Appraisal Persistence of All Mutual Funds
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
1 23,291        -20.88 87.90        23,291        4.27        2.39          23,422        4.18% 138.22% 23,422        5.22        2.25         
2 27,679        -11.68 49.07        0.000 27,679        4.76        2.13          0.000 27,715        4.91% 158.32% 0.583 27,715        5.37        2.04          0.000
3 29,257        -6.87 19.40        0.000 29,257        4.98        1.90          0.000 29,312        5.33% 160.00% 0.752 29,312        5.46        1.91          0.000
4 26,885        -3.92 15.08        0.000 26,885        5.28        1.78          0.000 26,949        5.57% 151.61% 0.855 26,949        5.48        1.83          0.212
5 27,493        -5.09 17.72        0.000 27,493        5.46        1.78          0.000 27,572        6.06% 146.64% 0.701 27,572        5.56        1.84          0.000
6 29,527        -2.93 17.01        0.000 29,527        5.69        1.70          0.000 29,564        7.70% 163.82% 0.207 29,564        5.60        1.79          0.040
7 27,968        -2.42 10.27        0.000 27,968        5.83        1.77          0.000 28,010        7.34% 149.54% 0.780 28,010        5.65        1.85          0.001
8 28,193        -1.23 9.29          0.000 28,193        6.01        1.89          0.000 28,251        7.88% 156.54% 0.677 28,251        5.64        1.98          0.816
9 28,680        -0.11 8.92          0.000 28,680        6.32        2.07          0.000 28,776        8.99% 154.98% 0.394 28,776        5.73        2.12          0.000
10 24,275        4.60 25.14        0.000 24,275        6.55        2.32          0.000 24,476        10.17% 149.94% 0.374 24,476        5.83        2.34          0.000
1-8 220,293      -6.56 36.51        220,293      5.31        1.99          220,795      6.17% 153.72% 220,795      5.50        1.94         
9-10 52,955        2.05 18.39        0.000 52,955        6.42        2.19          0.000 53,252        9.53% 152.68% 0.000 53,252        5.78        2.22          0.000
One-year Returns t + 1 One-year Returns Decile t + 1
Appraisal t + 1 Appraisal Decile t + 1 One-year Returns t + 1 One-year Returns Decile t + 1 Appraisal
Decile t
Alpha
Decile t
Alpha t + 1 Alpha Decile t + 1
                                                  
16 Note that the number of observations is not exactly the same for all deciles as Alpha performances may show same values at the corresponding thresholds.74
Table 6: Performance persistence of all purchased mutual funds
Table 6 presents results for research question 2. Funds are sorted into deciles based on their performance over the prior year. Decile 10 includes the funds 
with the highest performance, while funds with the lowest performance are summarized in decile 1. The last two rows represent the deciles 1 to 8 and 9 to 10
respectively. The last column reports p-values of a parametric t-test. The analyzed time period is January 1999 – July 2007. Panel A presents results for 
Jensen’s Alpha whereas Panel B shows result for the Appraisal ratio.
Panel A: Alpha Persistence of Purchased Mutual Funds
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
1 3,118          -6.99% 22.35% 3,118          4.77        3.24          3,180          -7.15% 197.16% 3,180          5.38        3.05         
2 3,437          -2.99% 13.23% 0.000 3,437          4.85        2.60          0.312 3,461          0.14% 160.49% 0.097 3,461          5.55        2.64          0.014
3 3,814          -2.87% 13.41% 0.698 3,814          5.03        2.51          0.002 3,835          -0.87% 170.34% 0.796 3,835          5.47        2.56          0.192
4 3,976          -2.54% 13.23% 0.266 3,976          5.24        2.35          0.000 3,990          -0.80% 160.64% 0.987 3,990          5.48        2.44          0.885
5 4,207          -1.74% 12.67% 0.005 4,207          5.51        2.24          0.000 4,235          5.47% 156.00% 0.072 4,235          5.53        2.40          0.329
6 4,894          -1.72% 15.82% 0.955 4,894          5.60        2.28          0.058 4,910          3.75% 201.18% 0.652 4,910          5.56        2.39          0.557
7 5,002          -1.99% 13.92% 0.378 5,002          5.74        2.30          0.004 5,020          6.04% 157.20% 0.527 5,020          5.64        2.41          0.081
8 5,406          -2.17% 15.09% 0.514 5,406          5.93        2.37          0.000 5,422          7.24% 158.97% 0.697 5,422          5.67        2.41          0.612
9 5,889          -1.78% 16.44% 0.193 5,889          5.94        2.56          0.901 5,933          5.60% 168.09% 0.593 5,933          5.78        2.53          0.018
10 6,419          -1.56% 19.76% 0.490 6,419          6.22        2.98          0.000 6,502          9.18% 170.41% 0.240 6,502          5.85        2.85          0.116
1-8 33,854        -2.67% 15.09% 33,854        5.40        2.49          34,053        2.42% 170.53% 34,053        5.55        2.52         
9-10 12,308        -1.67% 18.25% 0.000 12,308        6.08        2.79          0.000 12,435        7.47% 169.31% 0.005 12,435        5.82        2.70          0.000
Panel B: Appraisal Persistence of Purchased Mutual Funds
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
1 2,491          -6.10 16.73        2,491          4.34        2.92          2,525          -8.27% 177.60% 2,525          5.35        2.82         
2 3,301          -5.95 16.50        0.731 3,301          4.84        2.60          0.000 3,325          -1.81% 180.36% 0.172 3,325          5.44        2.67          0.201
3 3,808          -5.80 14.98        0.686 3,808          5.07        2.49          0.000 3,832          2.28% 178.42% 0.337 3,832          5.50        2.59          0.310
4 4,024          -3.45 11.61        0.000 4,024          5.40        2.37          0.000 4,058          1.54% 174.44% 0.852 4,058          5.52        2.51          0.781
5 4,284          -3.02 11.15        0.090 4,284          5.46        2.29          0.227 4,316          2.25% 168.00% 0.849 4,316          5.54        2.52          0.733
6 4,904          -1.46 8.16          0.000 4,904          5.73        2.29          0.000 4,925          4.05% 176.36% 0.616 4,925          5.63        2.49          0.100
7 5,167          -1.33 8.96          0.449 5,167          5.91        2.28          0.000 5,186          1.75% 197.41% 0.536 5,186          5.63        2.49          0.901
8 5,535          -0.63 8.24          0.000 5,535          6.12        2.31          0.000 5,557          8.94% 171.12% 0.043 5,557          5.70        2.54          0.172
9 6,063          0.42 8.72          0.000 6,063          6.22        2.42          0.031 6,111          6.53% 164.91% 0.439 6,111          5.74        2.56          0.418
10 6,574          2.13 18.85        0.000 6,574          6.65        2.56          0.000 6,652          8.75% 162.45% 0.444 6,652          5.86        2.70          0.009
1-8 33,514        -3.02 11.94        33,514        5.48        2.46          33,724        2.27% 178.41% 33,724        5.56        2.56         
9-10 12,637        1.31 14.90        0.000 12,637        6.45        2.50          0.000 12,763        7.69% 163.63% 0.0028 12,763        5.80        2.64          0.000
Appraisal
Decile t
One-year Returns Decile t + 1
Appraisal t + 1 Appraisal Decile t + 1 One-year Returns t + 1 One-year Returns Decile t + 1
Alpha
Decile t
Alpha t + 1 Alpha Decile t + 1 One-year Returns t + 175
Similar to the considerations of the whole German Mutual Fund market, I again observe a 
positive trend from the poorest performing funds (decile 1) to the best performing funds 
(decile 10). The results for the Alpha performance are displayed in panel A of table 6. An 
investor who purchases a mutual fund in decile 1 of previous Alpha performance can expect 
a mutual fund with an average Alpha of -6.99% p.a. in the following year. In contrast, an 
investor  who  purchases  a mutual  fund  in  decile  10  of  previous  Alpha  performance  can 
expect  a  fund  with  an  average  Alpha  of  -1.56%  p.a..  Again  comparing  deciles  1-8  with 
deciles 9-10 makes the results even clearer: Investors investing in mutual funds belonging to 
the  top  20%  of  historical  Alpha  performance  can  expect  a  future  Alpha  of  -1.67%  p.a., 
whereas investors purchasing funds in deciles 1 to 8 can expect only an future Alpha of 
-2.67%  p.a.; i.e.  investors  can  improve  their  future  Alpha  performance  by  1.00%  p.a. by 
chasing historical performance. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Results  hold  when  considering  future  Alpha  deciles  instead  of  the  absolute  measure: 
Investors who purchased a mutual fund in decile 1 can expect an underperforming fund in 
the following year with an average of deciles of 4.77. In contrast, investors who purchased a 
mutual fund in decile 10 can expect an outperforming fund in the following year, which is in 
an  average  decile  of  6.22. Moreover,  it  is  a  winning  strategy  to  purchase  mutual  funds 
belonging to the top 20% regarding Alpha performance: Mutual funds belonging to decile 9 
and 10 are in an average Alpha decile of 6.08 in the following year, whereas mutual funds 
belonging to Alpha decile 1 to 8 are in the following year in an average Alpha decile of 5.40.
Most results are pairwise statistically different.
Considering  One-year  Returns  instead  of  Alpha  performances  in  the  following  year 
(compare columns 10-18 of table 6, panel A) confirms the previous results: A positive trend 
along the Alpha deciles of the average One-year Return from -7.15% p.a. (decile 1) to 9.18% 
p.a. is observable. Moreover, investors who purchase mutual funds belonging to the top 20% 
of historical Alpha performance can expect on average a 5.05% p.a. higher return in the 
following year than investors who do not invest in the top 20%. Again, results still hold 
when I consider One-year Return deciles instead of the absolute performance measure. 
When  considering  the  Appraisal  Ratio  in  panel  B, results  are  qualitatively  unchanged. 
Investors who purchase mutual funds belonging to the top 20% regarding the Appraisal 
ratio (deciles 9 and 10) in the following year obtain outperforming mutual funds, which 
have an average Appraisal ratio of 1.31. On the other hand, investors who purchase mutual 
funds belonging to decile 1 to 8, realize an average Appraisal ratio of -3.02 in the following 76
year. From the poorest performing funds (decile 1) to the best performing funds (decile 10) 
again a positive trend is observable. The majority of the differences is statistically significant.
Once  again,  the  results  hold  regardless of considering  One-year  Returns  instead  of  the 
Appraisal ratio and regardless of considering deciles instead of the absolute measures.
Summarizing the results of research question 1 and 2 I state that performance persistence
within the German mutual fund market does exist and that investors seem to make smart 
investment  decisions  once  they  decide  to  purchase  mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical 
performance.  Consequently,  investors who  do  not  use  historical  performance  as  their 
decision criterion definitely make serious and costly investment mistakes. For a detailed 
analysis of the purchase criteria of private mutual fund investors, the reader is referred to
Niebling (2010).
5.2 Identification of smart acting investors
Niebling  (2010) shows that  there  are  indeed  investors  who  purchase  mutual  funds  by 
chasing historical performance, but that there is as well a large group of investors who do 
not look at historical performance when choosing among mutual funds. As I have shown in 
the previous part of this paper, there is persistence in mutual fund performance. Thus, these 
investors  make  costly  investment  mistakes.  The  next  logical  step  is  to  analyze  which 
investors act smart and purchase mutual funds by chasing performance and which investors 
do not, i.e. which particular investors make investment mistakes. In order to understand the 
influence of socio-demographics and investor characteristics on the investment behavior, I
use a regression model. The results are given in table 7.
The factors potentially affecting the smartness of private investors can be derived from the 
existing literature. It can surely be expected that experience influences trading behavior, as 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) point out. On the other hand, 
Barber and Odean (2000) argue that excessive trading yields to overconfidence and thus 
influences  investment  behavior  negatively.  For  my analysis  I include the variables  Age, 
Length of Customer Relationship and Trading Frequency measured on a 1 to 5 scale, where 
1 indicates the lowest value in each case. Additionally, Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) argues that 
irrationality disappears with wealth. In order to capture this effect in my model, I include 
Average  Trade  Volume  and  the  natural  logarithm  of  Average  Deposit  Value.  I use  the 
average since the deposit value can change over time due to external effects others than 
investment success (e.g. purchase of additional securities). Furthermore, Barber and Odean 
(2001) show that overconfidence plays a crucial role in determining portfolio performance. 77
Their results actually indicate that men are more exposed to overconfidence and are thus 
more likely not to make smart investment decisions. As usual, Gender is coded as a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the investor is male.
Table 7: Impact of investor characteristics on investor-average Alpha deciles and Smartness
Table 7 shows results  for  research  question  3.  Regression  coefficients  from regression  of  investor 
characteristics  on  investor-average  Alpha deciles  and  Smartness are  displayed.  Moreover,  some 
investor-average fund characteristics are included as control variables. Dummy variables indicate if 
an investor is classified as male or married by the bank’s data warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the 
investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Average deposit value and 
average trade  volume  are  proxies  for  wealth,  whereas  trading  frequency  and  length  of customer 
relationship are proxies for trading experience. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The analyzed time period is January 
2003 – July 2007.
Tobit-Regression 01 Tobit-Regression 02
Depending Variable
Investor Average
Alpha Decile
Investor Average
Smartness
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.0193 0.0242
(0.0258) (0.0906)
Age 0.00919*** 0.0237***
(0.000853) (0.00299)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) -0.0181 -0.0996
(0.0221) (0.0775)
Log of Average Deposit Value -0.00121 -0.0365
(0.00819) (0.0287)
Average Trade Volume 2.91e-06*** -3.27e-06
(7.21e-07) (2.51e-06)
Trading Frequency -0.0964*** -0.224***
(0.00828) (0.0292)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.0256*** -0.140***
(0.00685) (0.0240)
Riskclass 0.0180** 0.0417
(0.00795) (0.0279)
Investor Average Initial Charge 0.244***
(0.00766)
Log of Investor Average Volume (TNA) -0.133*** -0.199***
(0.00785) (0.0263)
Investor Average KAG-Top-Brand -1.048*** -3.722***
(0.0329) (0.0969)
Constant 8.964*** 25.50***
(0.199) (0.651)
Observations 19,423 19,235
Pseudo R-quared 0.047 0.016
Intuitively, including a variable measuring the risk-aversion of an investor is reasonable. 
Therefore I employ a variable called Riskclass, based on the self-reported assessment by 
investors when opening an account. The scale ranges from 1 (low risk-tolerance) to 6 (high 
risk-tolerance). Moreover, I include a dummy for married investors in the analysis, in order 78
to  capture  further  potential  factors  explaining  investor  Smartness.  Finally,  I incorporate 
investor averages of fund characteristics as additional control variables for determinants of 
investment decisions, namely Initial Charge, the logarithm of the Fund Volume (measured 
in TNA) and a dummy variable indicating whether a fund belongs to one out of six top-
brand investment companies.
The  second  column  of  table  7  shows  results  of  the  Tobit-Regression  on  the  average 
purchased Alpha decile. I find that age has a positive influence on the average purchased 
Alpha decile which is statistically significant. As age is a proxy for investment experience, I
observe that experienced investors make more correct investment decisions. Moreover, the 
average trade volume affects the average purchased Alpha decile positively. This matches 
the  findings  of Vissing-Jorgensen  (2003) as  it  is  a  proxy  for  wealth.  Interestingly,  the 
coefficient of the variable “Riskclass” is positive and statistically significant at the 5%-level. 
Therefore,  investors, who  assess  themselves  as more  risky, purchase  on  average  mutual 
funds  with  higher  Alpha.  A  possible  explanation  is  that  experienced  investors  assess 
themselves more likely as risky as this assessment allows them to trade riskier securities (e.g. 
options  or  derivatives).  On the  other hand,  Trading  Frequency  and  Length  of  Customer 
Relationship  influence  the  average  purchased  Alpha decile  negatively.  Hence,
overconfidence is to the detriment of smart investment behavior. These results are in line 
with Barber and Odean (2000). Gender, Marital Status and the logarithm of the Average 
Deposit Value have no statistically significant influence on the average purchased Alpha
deciles.  The  investor-average  fund  characteristics  are  included  as  control  variables only. 
Interestingly, the investor-average Initial Charge has a positive and statistically significant 
influence on the average purchased Alpha decile. This is consistent with the results Niebling 
(2010) obtains, who finds that private investors are poised to pay higher initial charges for 
better performing mutual funds.
In column 3 of table 7 I present results for the Tobit-regression on the variable Smartness as 
defined  in  formula  (3).  The  regression  coefficients  are  very similar  to  the  ones  in  Tobit-
Regression  01.  The  only  difference  is  that  the  variables  “Average  Trade  Volume”  and 
“Riskclass” are no longer statistically significant. Hence, if I take additional initial charge 
into account, the results remain very similar compared to measuring investors’ Smartness
solely by considering his ability to chase historical performance.79
Summarizing  the  results  for  question  3,  I find  that  smart  investors  are  older,  more 
experienced, wealthier and less overconfident than non-smart investors. On the other hand, 
Gender and Marital Status do not seem to have influence on the investment smartness.
5.3 The influence of smart mutual fund investment behavior on
overall investment success
Finally,  I study  the  economic  impact  of  the  variables  Smartness  and  Average  Decile 
purchased and address research question 4, i.e. the question whether investors who behave 
smart  regarding  mutual  fund  purchases  are  overall  better  investors.  I measure  overall 
investment  success  by  the  one-year  portfolio  return  in  the  time  from  October  2006  till 
September  2007.17 For  this  reason I perform  a regression  model,  regressing  the  variables 
Investor Average Smartness and Investor Average Alpha Decile on the average portfolio 
return. Moreover, I define two additional dummy variables. Top 20 Alpha indicates whether 
an investor purchases on average mutual funds in the top 20% of Alpha performance. Top 
20 Smartness indicates whether an investor has a Smartness value of more than 24. The 
underlying rationale is that investors who act smart will purchase on average mutual funds 
which  are in  decile  9  or  10 of  previous  Alpha  performance.  If  an  investor  purchase  on 
average mutual funds which are in decile 1 to 8 or have a Smartness value smaller than 24, I
will assume that his investment decision is not based on historical performance. Of course, 
in this case single transactions can still be made in decile 9 and 10. However, the underlying 
assumption is that these single transactions are due to randomness as long as the average is 
not within the top 20%.
Additionally, several investor characteristics used already in the Tobit-Regressions 01 and 
Tobit-Regressions 02 are included. As I perform the regressions on portfolio returns in this 
subsection, I replace the self reported variable Riskclass with the real observable Portfolio 
Risk which can take values varying from 1 (low portfolio risk) to 5 (high portfolio risk)18. The 
main advantage of the variable portfolio risk is that it reflects the actual risk in the portfolio. 
On the  other  hand,  the  variable  Riskclass is  based  on  investors  self  assessment  which, 
indeed, can differ from the actual portfolio risk significantly. Table 8 presents the results of 
this analysis.
                                                  
17 I have to deal with several outliers in the portfolio return data which are obviously due to data 
errors. Thus, I winsorize the data at the 1% level before performing regressions.
18 I calculate the standard deviations of portfolio returns and rank the standard deviations within five 
groups from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk)80
Regression  03  is  the  basic  regression  to  explain  abnormal  portfolio  performance  for  my
dataset. Age, Average Trade Volume and Trading Frequency have a negative influence on 
the portfolio performance, indicating that successful investors are younger, purchase mutual 
funds with lower trade volume and trade more infrequent than non-successful investors.
Table  8:  Impact  of  Investors’  Smartness  and  Average  Alpha  Decile  Purchased  on  Investors’ 
portfolio performance
Table 8 shows results for research question 4. Regression coefficients from regression of the variables 
Smartness  and  investor-average  Alpha decile  on  investors’  average  portfolio  performance are 
presented. The  dummy variables  Top  20  Alpha and  Top  20  Smartness indicate  if  an  investor on 
average purchases funds which have an Alpha decile larger or equal than 9 or has a Smartness value 
larger than 24 respectively. Moreover, several investor-characteristics are included. Dummy variables 
indicate  if  an  investor  is  classified  as  male  or  married  by  the  bank’s  data  warehouse.  Trading 
frequency, length of customer relationship and portfolio risk take values from 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level  respectively.  The  analyzed  time  period  is  January  1999  – July  2007 (regressions  03-05)  and 
January 2002 – July 2007 (regressions 06-07) respectively.
Reg 03 Reg 04 Reg 05 Reg 06 Reg 07
Depending Variable
Portfolio
Performance
Portfolio
Performance
Portfolio
Performance
Portfolio
Performance
Portfolio
Performance
Investor Average Alpha Decile 0.00225*
(0.00133)
Top 20 Alpha (Dummy) 0.0120*
(0.00695)
Investor Average Smartness 0.000969**
(0.000399)
Top 20 Smartness (Dummy) 0.0179***
(0.00528)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.00543 -0.00541 -0.00540 -0.00209 -0.00199
(0.00427) (0.00427) (0.00427) (0.00424) (0.00425)
Age -0.000761*** -0.000787*** -0.000783*** -0.000734*** -0.000743***
(0.000145) (0.000146) (0.000145) (0.000150) (0.000149)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 0.00612 0.00607 0.00618 0.00965** 0.00978**
(0.00414) (0.00414) (0.00413) (0.00420) (0.00420)
Log of Average Deposit Value 0.0501*** 0.0500*** 0.0502*** 0.0458*** 0.0460***
(0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00294) (0.00310) (0.00309)
Average Trade Volume -2.78e-07** -2.75e-07** -2.84e-07** -3.32e-07 -3.51e-07
(1.22e-07) (1.23e-07) (1.25e-07) (3.41e-07) (3.51e-07)
Trading Frequency -0.00790*** -0.00764*** -0.00769*** -0.00578*** -0.00569***
(0.00170) (0.00171) (0.00171) (0.00177) (0.00177)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.00105 -0.00100 -0.00112 -0.00164 -0.00173
(0.00122) (0.00122) (0.00122) (0.00126) (0.00126)
Portfolio Risk -0.00154 -0.00182 -0.00190 -0.00247 -0.00274
(0.00204) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00225) (0.00225)
Constant -0.345*** -0.358*** -0.345*** -0.326*** -0.311***
(0.0309) (0.0317) (0.0309) (0.0332) (0.0328)
Observations 21401 21401 21401 18203 18203
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.050 0.051
On the other hand, Log Average Deposit Value affects the portfolio performance positively, 
indicating that successful investors are wealthier. These results are in line with the existing 
literature  discussed  earlier.  The  variables  Gender,  Marital  Status,  Length  of  Customer 81
Relationship and Portfolio Risk are not statistically significant and do not seem to have a 
major influence on the investment success.
In Regression 04 I add the average purchased Alpha decile as an additional independent 
variable. While all other coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged, the investor average 
Alpha decile has a small but positive influence on the portfolio performance. Hence, the 
ability of an investor to purchase mutual funds by chasing Alpha improves the investors’ 
overall  investment  success. The  fact that  this  effect  is  only  small  and  only  statistically 
significant at the 10%-level is not entirely surprising as the mere difference between the 
average Alpha deciles of purchased funds by private investors do not need to carry any 
information on the ability of an investor to chase performance. Hence, I follow a different 
approach  and  consider  investors  purchasing  mutual  funds  from  the  two  top  deciles. 
Therefore, I mark those investors with a dummy equal to one if their average purchase 
decile is higher than 8 and label this variable as “Top 20”.
Considering regression 05 I find that the Top 20 Alpha dummy does influence the portfolio 
performance  statistically  significantly  and  positively,  whereas  again  all  other  coefficients 
remain qualitatively unchanged. The value of the coefficient allows me to state the economic 
impact of smart mutual fund investment behavior: Investors, who purchase mutual funds in 
the top 20% of historical Alpha performance on average, generate a 120bp higher portfolio 
return per  annum  than  investors, who  purchase  mutual  funds  in  the  bottom  80%  of 
historical Alpha performance on average.
Considering Regression 06 and 0719 and adding the Investor Average Smartness and the top 
20 Smartness dummy respectively yield to very similar results. Again, the variable Investor 
Average Smartness is statistically significant and has a positive influence on the portfolio 
return. The variable Top 20 Smartness has a clear positive influence on the portfolio return 
and is statistically significant at the 1%-level. I conclude that investors who have a Smartness
value of more than 24 generate a 179bp higher portfolio return per annum than investors 
who have a Smartness value of less than 24.
So far I have studied the impact of investors’ Smartness on the simple portfolio performance. 
Now, I will repeat the regression, but use the portfolios’ Sharpe ratio as depending variable 
and  thus  take  the  portfolio  risk  component  into  account  as  well.  The  results  which  are 
                                                  
19 Note that the number of observations is smaller for these regressions as the variable Smartness can 
only be calculated for a restricted set of investors. However, performing the regressions 01 – 03 on 
this restricted data set yields to qualitatively unchanged results.82
shown in table 8 are very similar. Let me again analyze the basic regression (Regression 08) 
first. Age, Average Trade Volume, Trading Frequency, Length of Customer Relationship 
and Portfolio Risk affect the Sharpe ratio negatively; whereas the variable Marital Status and 
the logarithm of Average Deposit Value have a positive influence.
Table  9:  Impact  of  Investors’  Smartness  and  Average  Alpha  Decile  Purchased  on  Investors’ 
portfolio Sharpe ratio
Table 9 shows results for research question 4. Regression coefficients from regression of the variables 
Smartness  and  investor-average  Alpha decile  on  investors’  average  portfolio  Sharpe  ratio are 
presented. The  dummy  variables  Top  20  Alpha and  Top  20  Smartness indicate  if  an  investor
purchases on average funds which have an Alpha decile larger or equal than 8 or has a Smartness
value  larger  24 respectively.  Moreover,  several  investor-characteristics  are  included.  Dummy 
variables  indicate  if  an  investor  is  classified  as  male  or  married  by  the  bank’s  data  warehouse. 
Trading frequency, length of customer relationship and portfolio risk take values from 1 (low) to 5 
(high). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. The analyzed time period is January 1999 – July 2007 (regressions 08-10) and 
January 2002 – July 2007 (regressions 11-12) respectively.
Reg 08 Reg 09 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12
Depending Variable
Portfolios
Sharpe Ratio
Portfolios
Sharpe Ratio
Portfolios
Sharpe Ratio
Portfolios
Sharpe Ratio
Portfolios
Sharpe Ratio
Investor Average Alpha Decile 0.00462***
(0.00141)
Top 20 Alpha (Dummy) 0.00332
(0.00724)
Investor Average Smartness 0.00216***
(0.000459)
Top 20 Smartness (Dummy) 0.0299***
(0.00613)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.00445 -0.00441 -0.00444 0.00219 0.00233
(0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00609) (0.00609)
Age -0.00124*** -0.00129*** -0.00124*** -0.00127*** -0.00126***
(0.000194) (0.000195) (0.000194) (0.000217) (0.000217)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 0.0108** 0.0107** 0.0108** 0.0117** 0.0119**
(0.00482) (0.00482) (0.00482) (0.00516) (0.00516)
Log of Average Deposit Value 0.0461*** 0.0459*** 0.0462*** 0.0453*** 0.0456***
(0.00213) (0.00213) (0.00214) (0.00250) (0.00250)
Average Trade Volume -5.35e-07*** -5.29e-07*** -5.37e-07*** -7.88e-07 -8.20e-07
(1.70e-07) (1.71e-07) (1.71e-07) (5.53e-07) (5.69e-07)
Trading Frequency -0.0106*** -0.0101*** -0.0106*** -0.00941*** -0.00952***
(0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00197) (0.00197)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.00344** -0.00334** -0.00346** -0.00326* -0.00347**
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00170) (0.00170)
Portfolio Risk -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.114***
(0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00185) (0.00201) (0.00201)
Constant 0.320*** 0.292*** 0.320*** 0.283*** 0.316***
(0.0256) (0.0268) (0.0256) (0.0303) (0.0295)
Observations 21,401 21,401 21,401 18,203 18,203
R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.239 0.239
The addition of the investor average Alpha performance (Regression 09) has again a positive 
and statistically significant influence on the Sharpe ratio. The coefficient of the Alpha Top 20 83
dummy (Regression 10) is positive but not statistically significant. Again, all other results 
remain qualitatively unchanged compared to the basic regression 08.
In  a  last  step,  I study  the  influence  of  the  variable  Smartness on  the  Sharpe  ratio  in 
regression 11 and 12. Both the variable Smartness itself and the Smartness top 20 dummy 
affect the Sharpe ratio positively and are statistically significant. A smart investor who has a 
Smartness value of more than 24 generates on average a 299bp higher portfolio return in 
terms of the Sharpe ratio than a non-smart investor with a Smartness value of 24 or smaller.
These results imply that investors, who make smart mutual funds investment decisions and 
purchase funds by chasing historical performance, are not only likely to make better mutual 
fund  investment  decisions.  They  also  have  overall  more  investment  success  and  are 
consequently better investors.
Given the higher significance of the variable Smartness I suggest to use this variable as ex-
ante measure for assessing the overall investment success of private investors. Note again 
that this measure does not depend on potential randomness of stock markets returns as it is 
measured in advance (ex-ante).
6 Robustness
In order to check the validity of the results regarding my four research questions, I perform 
several robustness tests.
First, I exclude all investors who purchased only one fund in the analyzed period from my
data  set.  After  recalculating  the  regression  model,  it  turns  out  that  the  results  remain 
qualitatively unchanged. Investors who act smart and purchase mutual funds by chasing 
Alpha are still older, more experienced, wealthier and less overconfident than investors who 
do not act smart. In addition smart acting investors still generate a higher portfolio return on 
average and the economic impact also remains unchanged.
After not taking very infrequent traders into account, I investigate whether investors who 
are very frequent traders bias the results. In the data set a variable is included indicating if
an investor is categorized as “heavy trader” by the banks’ data warehouse. Excluding all 
these  heavy  traders  from  the  data set  and  repeating  the  analyses  yields to  qualitatively 
unchanged results for all research questions.84
In  the  investor  data  set  I can  identify  approximately  14%  of  all  investors  who  received 
financial advice. For another robustness test I exclude these advised investors in order to 
validate whether financial advice skews the results. Again, repeating all regression models 
only for non-advised investors yield to qualitatively unchanged results.
As mentioned above I used a Tobit-regression model in order to analyze the impact of the 
investor characteristics on the investor-average purchased Alpha decile and the investor-
average value of the variable Smartness, as the data is naturally censored. However, when 
using a conventional regression model the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Finally, multi-collinearity does not seem to be a problem in my regression models as all 
variance-inflation-factors are reasonable small (between 1.02 and 1.23)20.
Therefore,  I state  that  the  results  of  my research  questions  presented  and  discussed  in 
section 5 are robust and are not due to potential data errors.
7 Conclusion
This  paper  contributes  to  three  different  strands of  literature,  namely  mutual  fund 
persistence, smart investment decision making and household finance. In contrast to earlier 
studies (e.g. Gruber (1996), Keswani and Stolin (2008)), I use a dataset of a German online 
brokerage house that allows me to analyze the investment behavior on an investor-specific 
level. Combining this dataset with data on the mutual fund universe from Morningstar and 
a  German  provider,  VWD,  and  weekly  mutual  fund  performance  data  from  Thomson 
Financial Datastream, I am able to construct a dataset that contains more than 1.5m mutual
fund transactions of roughly 44k distinct individual investors.
I focus on four major research questions. First, I contribute to the heavily discussed issue 
whether mutual fund performance is persistent or not (see Gruber (1996)). I show that there 
is persistence in mutual fund performance in the analyzed German mutual fund market.
Second, I investigate specific mutual fund transactions in order to test whether investors 
who  purchase mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical  performance  indeed  benefit  from  this 
strategy.  I find  that  investors  who  purchase mutual  funds belonging  to  the  top  20%  of 
historical Alpha performance can improve the performance of the purchased fund by 1.00% 
                                                  
20 Note that multi-collinearity usually will be considered as present if VIF values are larger than 10.85
p.a. in terms of Alpha and by 5.05% p.a. in terms of simple returns. Therefore, not chasing 
historical performance is a serious and costly investment mistake.
Third, I turn to investor-specific level examining which particular investor groups act smart 
and chase historical performance. With this analysis I contribute to the emerging body of
literature on smart decision making (e.g. Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) and Keswani and 
Stolin  (2008)).  I find  that  investors  making  smart  mutual  fund  investment  decisions  are 
older, more experienced, wealthier and less overconfident than investors who do not make 
smart investment decisions. On the other hand, Gender and Marital Status do not seem to 
have influence on the investment behavior.
Finally,  I discuss  the  economic  impact  of  smart  decision  making  and  analyze whether 
investors who act smart and purchase mutual funds by chasing historical performance have 
more  overall  investment success. I show  that  investors  who  act  smart  when  purchasing 
mutual funds generate on average a 179bp higher portfolio return per year than investors 
who do not act smart regarding mutual fund investment decisions. This makes my previous 
results  on  the  mutual  fund  purchasing  behavior  and  smart  decision  making  even  more 
valuable,  as  the  outcomes  of  these  analyses  are  not  subject  to  any  potential  random 
realization of stock market returns (as in previous studies, e.g. Campbell (2006), Barber and 
Odean  (2000) and Hackethal,  Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2008)).  The  outcomes are  rather 
indicators of superior investment sophistication and, therefore, I find an ex-ante measure to 
predict overall investment success which can be easily applied for future studies in which
researchers need to measure investment success. These studies are not restricted to research 
on  mutual  fund  investment,  but  can  also  be  used  for  all  kinds  of  questions  concerning 
private investment behavior.
For example, someone could contribute to the issue whether financial advice helps private 
investors to enhance their portfolio returns by comparing the Smartness value of advised 
investors with the one of non-advised clients. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study
whether  investors  can  benefit  from  a  learning  effect  when  conducting the  transactions. 
Again,  someone  could  use  the  Smartness measure  in  order  to measure  the  investment 
success.
Research  in  mutual  funds  remains  an  interesting  domain  even besides  applying  the 
Smartness measure to  several research questions. For example, potential further research 
could  deal  with  mutual  fund  marketing.  Niebling  (2010) shows that  the  majority  of 
individual investors does not use historical performance as their decision criterion. He also 86
finds that  purchased  funds  have  a  clear  above  average  fund  volume  and  assumes that 
advertising works. It would be interesting to study the effects of marketing and advertising 
activities as well as the effect of news on the individual purchasing behavior in greater detail 
(compare Barber and Odean (2008)).
Beyond the scientific contribution of this paper, the results may also affect banks and policy 
makers  in  particular.  Having  shown  that performance  chasing  is  a  wise strategy, policy 
makers might consider creating incentives to motivate investors and banks to invest into 
mutual funds that have performed well in the past. In the light of the introduction of MiFID 
EU  Directive  aimed  at  increasing  financial  market  transparency  and  competition,  which
requires banks to gather information on the financial sophistication on a private investor, it 
might also be useful to look at the transaction history of a client to determine the investor’s 
financial sophistication. The potential of creating value for banks and customers by advising 
customers based on their financial sophistication has already been clearly proven (see e.g. 
Hackethal and Jansen (2007) and Fischer, Hackethal and Meyer (2008)).87
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Abstract: 
Using  account-level  data  on  about 44k investors,  this  paper  extends  recent  findings  of
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) and contributes to the emerging literature on the 
role  of  financial  advice.  We  find  that  unsophisticated  investors  are  more  likely  to  seek 
financial advice than sophisticated investors. Furthermore, we show that financial advisors 
do not help their clients to enhance the quality of their investment decisions. In fact, they 
tend to recommend mutual funds with high volume, belonging to a top-brand fund family 
and with less initial charges. As the past performance of a fund is not different for advised 
and  non-advised  clients,  we  conclude  that  advisors are  much  more  salesmen  than  real 
advisors. The results hold when controlling for potential endogeneity issues.
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1 Introduction
The  influence  of  financial  advice  on  private  investor’s  investment  decisions  is  a  highly 
relevant and heavily debated topic in both research and practice, since the vast majority of 
people relies on financial advice (DABBank (2004)). Given that financial advisors have been 
repeatedly  and  publically  accused  of  misselling  financial  products  (German  Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection (2008)), policy makers have adopted measures like MiFID 
to enhance the quality of financial advice. However, a scientific debate on the influence of 
financial  advice  has  only  recently  been  started.  The  existing  empirical  literature  on  the 
influence of financial advice in Germany (Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008)) and of 
mutual fund brokers in the United States (Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009)), has 
only detected a small, albeit negative impact of financial advice on investment performance.
This paper is most closely related to and extends the recent work of Bergstresser, Chalmers 
and Tufano (2009) who compare mutual funds sold via the direct channel with mutual funds 
sold via the broker channel. They find that broker-sold funds have smaller risk-adjusted 
returns even before cost considerations than direct-sold funds. Consequently, they conclude 
that brokers do not add value to private investors’ portfolios. As a potential explanation,
Bergstresser,  Chalmers  and  Tufano  (2009) conjecture that  advisors  may  provide  other 
intangible assets or simply put client interests behind their own interests. They point out: 
“Future research using account-level data […] may have more success identifying these less easily 
measured benefits of brokers”.
Having  access  to  account  level  data  allows us to  extend  the  analyses  of  Bergstresser, 
Chalmers and Tufano (2009). We can clearly identify which single investors receive financial 
advice and which investors make their investment decisions on their own. In addition, we 
are able to compare private investors’ investment behavior before and after they received 
financial  advice. Using  this  methodology, this  paper  addresses  the  question  whether 
financial advisors help their clients to arrive at better investment decisions. Moreover, this
investor-specific approach allows us to analyze which particular sales arguments advisors
use when selling mutual funds.
Additionally, this paper differs from the work of Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009), 
as we use a different measure for assessing investment decision quality. We use the degree
of which individual investors chase historical performance when choosing among mutual 
funds. This measure is proven to be an ex-ante proxy for overall investment success and 91
therefore  for  investment  sophistication  (compare Niebling  (2010b)).  In  contrast,  existing 
studies on the role of financial advice, such as Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) and 
Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008), always use ex-post returns in order to measure 
investment success. The big advantage of our approach compared to using ex-post returns is 
that  the  ex-ante  measure  is  not subject  to potential  random  realizations  of  stock  market 
returns.
This paper builds on and contributes to two strands of literature on financial advice: First, 
we address the question which particular investors receive financial advice. At first view we 
confirm the former result (e.g. of Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008)) that financial 
advisors  are  matched  with  older,  wealthier  and  less  overconfident  investors.  However, 
when  applying  our  ex-ante  measure  for  investment  sophistication, we  find  that 
unsophisticated  investors  are  more  likely  to  ask  for  financial  advice  than  sophisticated 
investors are. Note that these results are contradictory to Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli 
(2008), who show that financial advice is rather matched with more experienced investors.
Second,  we  investigate  whether  financial  advice  helps these  clients  to  make better 
investment decisions. Our results generally confirm findings of Bergstresser, Chalmers and 
Tufano  (2009) as  we  find  that  financial  advisors  do  not  improve private  investors’ 
investment sophistication. Extending Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009), we show 
that advised investors purchase on average mutual funds which have a higher fund volume
and which more likely belong to a top-brand  fund family. However, we also show that 
financial  advisors  recommend  mutual  funds  with  lower  initial  charges,  which  is 
counterintuitive as advisors benefit from high initial charges by their commission model.
These findings imply that financial advisors sell mutual funds which they believe clients 
would have purchased also without receiving advice. Hence, they are much more salesmen 
than  advisors  and seem  to  make  the  same  investment  mistakes  as  the  private  investors 
themselves make: They recommend high-volume and top-brand mutual funds instead of 
using historical performance as decision criterion.
These results are robust to endogeneity. In order to control for potential endogeneity issues,
we perform a propensity matching as well as an event study, in which we compare the 
investment behavior of identical  clients before and after the time they received financial 
advice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize existing literature 
on financial advice and derive our research questions. Section 3 describes the data set we use 92
in  our  analyses.  In  section  4  we  give  an  overview  of the  statistical  models  and  the 
methodology applied. Results on the questions who receive financial advice and whether 
financial advice can improve private investors’ investment sophistication are displayed and 
discussed in section 5. In section 6 we describe additional robustness tests and section 7 
draws conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Research Questions
There is only a small set of theoretical literature on the role of advice within the financial
retail industry. The goal of these studies is to provide a guideline for reasonable regulation 
within  the  financial  retail  industry. For  example,  Ottaviani  (2000) introduces  a model  of 
advice in which an informed advisor transmits information to an investor who is otherwise 
uninformed and has an uncertain degree of strategic sophistication.
Recently,  Inderst  and  Ottaviani  (2009) analyzed misselling  of  agents,  i.e.  the  selling  of 
financial  products  without  considering  the  product  suitability  for  the  specific  need  of 
customers. The  authors  find  that advisory firms’  compliance  standards  are  affected  by 
several factors, such as the internal organization of a firms’ sales process, the transparency of 
its commission structure and the steepness of its agents’ sales incentives. Consequently, they 
conclude that political decision makers must take these factors into account when refining
regulation in the financial retail industry.
Besides these theoretical papers, there are some studies which deal with empirical issues 
concerning financial advice. These studies can be differentiated into three strands, namely (i) 
literature on the issue which particular investors seek for financial advice, (ii) literature on 
the issue whether financial advisors can forecast future stock price returns and therefore can 
generate abnormal returns for private investors’ portfolios and (iii) literature on the issue 
whether financial advisors can help investors to overcome behavioral biases.
In general, one could expect that financial advice is demanded by younger, less-educated 
and poorer investors, as financial advice can help these investors to overcome behavioral 
biases and to improve portfolio performance. However, Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli 
(2008) find that advisors are rather matched to richer, older and more experienced investors. 
They conclude that financial advisors are similar to babysitters, as they match with well-to-
do households and offer a service that parents themselves could do even better. However,
observed achievement of children with babysitters is usually better than the achievement of 93
children  without  babysitters,  for  what  apparently  other  contributing  factors  than  the 
babysitters  themselves  are  accountable.  Moreover,  Guiso  and  Jappelli  (2006) show  that 
overconfidence reduces the propensity to seek financial advice.
In  this  paper  we  will  replicate  these  analyzes  with  our  data  set  including  additional 
investor-specific  characteristics  and  restricting  ourselves  to mutual  fund  investors. 
Therefore, we formulate our first research question as follows:
Question 1: Which mutual fund investors ask for financial advice?
For a long time, researchers have analyzed whether professionals have the ability to forecast 
the stock market (compare e.g. Cowles (1933), Barber and Loeffler (1993), Desai and Jain
(1995)). For example, Womach (1996) investigates how stock prices proceed after “buy” or 
“sell” recommendations of U.S. brokerage firms. He finds that stock prices significantly react 
into the forecasted direction accompanied by volume increases. However, the author also 
documents that the total amount of “buy” recommendations exceeds the total amount of 
“sell”  transactions  by  factor  seven  and  concludes  that  brokers  are  reluctant  to  issue  sell 
recommendations  in  order  to  avoid  harming  investment  banking  relationships  and  to 
maintain future information flows from managers. Metrick (1999) analyzes the quality of a 
set of investment newsletters and finds no evidence that a  strategy of purchasing stocks 
recommended by the newsletters promises abnormal returns.
More  recently,  Bergstresser,  Chalmers  and  Tufano  (2009) compared  mutual  fund 
performance of funds sold via broker channel with funds sold via direct channel. They find 
that broker-sold funds have smaller risk-adjusted returns than direct-sold funds even before 
cost considerations and conclude that either brokers may provide other intangible benefits 
(e.g. increase in saving rates or increase in comfort with investment decisions) or brokers 
simply put clients’ interest behind their own interest. These results are in line with the ones 
of Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008) who show that the effect of financial advice is 
negative  after  controlling  for  endogeneity.  Thus,  investors who  receive financial  advice 
generate lower total and excess returns and also have higher portfolio risk and probability of 
losses than investors who do not receive financial advice.
However, Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008) also find that financial advisors help their 
client to diversify their portfolios in a better way. This finding could imply that financial 
advisors may not improve investors’ portfolio returns but can help investors to overcome 
behavioral biases. One specific behavioral bias is the disposition effect, i.e. the tendency of 94
investors to sell winning investments too early and to hold on to losing investments for too 
long.  Stuber  (2008) shows  that  advised  investors  indeed  display  a  significant  lower 
disposition effect than unadvised investors. Moreover, Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano 
(2009) find evidence that funds sold by brokers (which are associated with financial advice) 
are  more  likely  to  invest  in  foreign  mutual  funds  and  conclude  that  financial  advisors 
therefore help clients to fight the home bias.
All these existing pieces of literature have in common that they use ex-post portfolio returns 
as measure for investment success. Therefore, they are always subject to potential random 
realization of stock markets. In a recent paper, Niebling (2010b) has proven that the degree 
to which investors chase historical performance when choosing among mutual funds has a 
direct positive influence on the overall investment success. This result is a contribution to
literature on mutual fund purchasing decisions. In this field of research, various authors 
show that  mutual  fund  inflows  are  positively  related  to historical  performance  but  that 
inferior  performing  mutual  funds still  receive  net  cash  inflows.  Hence, the  majority  of 
investors  fail  to  flee  from  underperforming  mutual  funds  (e.g.  Gruber  (1996), Sirri  and 
Tufano  (1998),  Keswani  and  Stolin  (2008) or Niebling  (2010a). Consequently,  Niebling 
(2010b) suggests to use mutual fund investment decision as an ex-ante measure for financial 
ability.  The  advantage  of  this  ex-ante  measure  is  that  it  is  not  subject  to  any  potential 
realization  of  stock  market  returns,  but  is  rather  an  indicator  of  superior  investment 
sophistication. In this paper we will use this ex-ante measure in order to shed light on the 
question  whether  financial  advisors  help  private  investors  to  come  to  better  investment 
decisions.
If advisors do not recommend mutual funds with the goal of increasing clients’ investment 
sophistication,  this in  fact  implies a  “misselling”  in  the  sense  that  Inderst  and  Ottaviani 
(2009) discuss the term in their recent theoretical work. Consequently, the next question is 
which other criteria financial advisors use as sales arguments in order to convince private 
investors. In a recent paper Niebling (2010a) analyzes mutual fund purchasing decisions of 
private investors in detail. He finds that investors rather use fund volume and the fact that a 
fund belongs to a top brand fund family as decision criterion when choosing among mutual 
funds.  Therefore,  the  question  arises  whether  advisors  use  the  same  criteria  when 
recommending mutual funds to their clients.
In summary, our second research question is as follows:95
Question 2: Do  financial  advisors  help  clients  to  increase  their  level  of  investment 
sophistication?
3 Data
In order to compare the investment behavior of advised and non-advised investors, we use a 
comprehensive data set on an investor- and transaction-specific level. This data set has been 
supplied  by  a  German  discount  brokerage  house and  contains  in  total more  than  19m
transactions of roughly 71k individual investors placed between January 1999 and July 2007.
As we restrict ourselves for our analyses to mutual fund transaction, the relevant data set 
contains ~2.8m mutual fund transactions of ~48k distinct individual investors. The data base 
also contains several investor characteristics such as socio-demographic information as well 
as other information (e.g. risk class, deposit value, trading frequency). Unfortunately, these 
investor characteristics are not available for all investors which slightly reduce our data.
For  sell  transactions  the  choice  set  of  an  individual  investor  is  limited  to  the  funds  he 
previously purchased and the actual transaction date might be determined by factors like 
liquidity needs or tax considerations instead of smart decision making. Therefore, our study 
exclusively focuses on mutual fund purchases, where investors choose funds from the entire 
mutual fund universe at a specific and individual date. Moreover, we exclude transactions 
which are part of mutual funds saving plans mainly due to two reasons: First, when setting 
up a saving plan, investors make the purchase decision only once in advance and then the 
mutual funds are purchased repeatedly and automatically by the bank. Second, saving plan
investors usually cannot choose from the whole mutual funds universe, but can select only 
from a restricted set of mutual funds which are provided from the bank for saving plan 
purposes. Not considering sell and saving plan transactions leaves us with a  data set of 
~1.5m transactions of ~44k investors.
In table 1 some descriptive statistics of the investors are displayed. Marital Status, Advised 
and Heavy Trader are dummy variables and indicate whether an investor is classified as 
married, advised or heavy trader by the bank’s data warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the 
investors themselves when opening an account on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Number 
of Portfolio Positions is a simple proxy for diversification following Benartzi and Thaler 
(2001). Another measure for diversification is the share of international equity in the equity 
portfolio (see Bluethgen et al. (2007)).96
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The table displays some descriptive statistics of the investor data we use for our studies. Dummy
variables indicate if an investor is classified as male, as married, as a heavy trader or as an advised 
investor  by  the  bank’s  data  warehouse.  Riskclass  is  reported  by  the  investors  themselves  when 
opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Number of Portfolio Positions and Share of International 
Equity are proxies for diversification.
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev.
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) 43,880      84.31%
Age 43,881      46.12         44.00        12.16         
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married)23,595      60.91%
Riskclass 43,679      4.56           5.00          1.28           
Heavy Trader (Dummy) 44,029      27.56%
Deposit Value 44,028      55,802       36,296      131,441     
Cash Value 44,029      34,637       15,139      86,061       
Mutual Funds Trade Volume 44,029      4,206         2,557        14,273       
Number of Trades 44,029      97              22             502            
Number of Portfolio Positions 33,589      12.13         9.00          11.64         
Share of International Equity 32,869      49%
Length of Customer Rel. (years) 44,029      8.05           7.80          3.01           
Advice 44,029      14.42%
A  comparison  of  the  demographics  with  the  ones  provided  by  Deutsches  Aktieninstitut 
(2004)3 indicates  that  our  sample  of  44k  investors  represents  approximately  0.6%  of  the 
whole mutual fund investor population in Germany. Investors in our sample are more likely 
to be male (84% compared to 58% in the population), are almost of the same average age (46 
years compared to 47 years in the population) and have a higher average deposit value 
(€56k compared to €20k in the population). However, please note that the latter difference 
can be explained by the fact that the deposit value in the population is biased by Germans 
who rather own an investment portfolio (approximately 41% of the population) but do not 
invest in equity (only 16% of the population invest in stocks or mutual funds). Therefore, we
believe that the gap will be significantly reduced when considering only investors who own 
equity  (like  the  majority  of  investors  in  our data  set).  All  in  all,  our sample  is  fairly
representative for the mutual fund population in Germany.
In the year 2004 the online brokerage house decided to offer financial advice as an additional 
service for their customers. For this reason, the data set allows us to differentiate between 
advised  and  non-advised  investors  for  transactions placed  in  the  years  2005  to  2007. 
Moreover, we can perform an event study and compare the investors’ behavior before and 
after the introduction of financial advice.
                                                  
3 Deutsches Aktieninstitut  e.V.  is  a  German  Research  Association  of  public  listed  companies  and 
institutions.97
In  a  second  step  of  data  preparation we  enrich  the  data  we  obtain  from  the  discount 
brokerage house with performance data of the German mutual fund market. We use the 
Morningstar database that has been proven to be of high quality in studies on the American 
mutual  fund  market  (see  Elton,  Gruber  and  Blake  (2001)).  In  order  to  calculate  funds’ 
relative performances to benchmark indices, we also need information to which particular 
peer group the fund belongs. These peer groups are also available via the Morningstar data 
base.  Since  Morningstar  data  is  only  available  from  2002  to  2006,  we  supplement  our 
database  with  funds’  data that  has  been  provided  by  two  German  suppliers,  namely 
Hoppenstedt  and  VWD.  Finally,  the  private  investors  purchase  254  funds  that  are  not 
covered in one of our databases. In case no peer group was provided by any of the data 
providers, the mapping of funds into peer groups relies on regression techniques as they are
also used in Koijen (2008). Essentially, this means that this paper relies on self-reported peer 
groups on which private investors have to rely when selecting mutual funds.
The weekly mutual fund return data was obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream and 
is dividend adjusted and net of fees, but does not include initial charges. Additionally, we 
need some information on the purchased mutual funds (e.g. fund volume, initial charge) 
which we obtain from Lipper/Reuters. Unfortunately, these data is only available for the 
years 2002 – 2008.
4 Model and Methodology
In order to measure the impact of financial advice it is crucial to measure the performance of 
mutual funds. We group all mutual funds into deciles based on Jensen’s Alpha (see Jensen 
(1968)). The formula for the one-factor model is 
  i f m i i f i r r r r         (1)
where ri is the return of fund i, rf is the return of a three month cash position, rm is the return 
of  a  peer  group’s  benchmark  index,  i is  the  sensitivity  of  fund  i  to  the  return  on  the 
benchmark  index,  i is  the  risk-adjusted  return  on  fund  i  and  i is  the  error  term.  The 
benchmark indices are chosen in accordance with a fund’s peer group. As shown in table 2,
this paper uses the according MSCI indices for all peer groups focusing on stocks, for bond 
funds  Datastream  indices  are  used  and  for  money  market  funds  indices  provided  by 
Citigroup are used. 98
In this paper we exclusively focus on Jensen’s Alpha from the one-factor model, as recent 
studies have shown that results remain qualitatively unchanged once more sophisticated 
Alpha estimation  techniques  are  used  (see Carhart  (1997), Gruber  (1996) and  Kosowski, 
Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006)). Moreover former analyses have shown that the 
results also remain qualitatively unchanged when we use both other risk-adjusted measures 
(e.g. the Alpha Persistence Ratio (APR) or the Appraisal Ratio) as well as simple return 
measures (compare Niebling (2010a) and Niebling (2010b)).
Using a rolling-window approach, the Alpha for each fund is calculated based on weekly 
observations between 1997 and 2008. The underlying assumption is that that a performance 
chasing investor (i.e. Alpha chasing investor) chooses among mutual funds by looking at last 
year’s  Alpha performance.  In  order  to  assure  the  comparability  of  risk-adjusted 
performances of mutual funds, we compare several peer groups which are presented in 
table 2.
Table 2: Definition of peer groups and peer group’s benchmark indices
In this table the definitions of the 56 peer groups are given. The accordant peer group’s benchmark 
indices are used for calculating the risk-adjusted performances (Jensen’s Alpha) and for ranking the 
mutual funds into peer group specific deciles.
ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index ID Peer group Peer group's benchmark index
Stock Market by Geography Stock Markets by Industry (cont'd)
1 Stocks World MSCI World 30 Stocks Financial Markets MSCI Financials
2 Stocks Europe MSCI Europe 31 Stocks Materials MSCI Materials
3 Stocks Germany MSCI Germany 32 Stocks Energy MSCI Energy
4 Stocks Spain MSCI Spain 33 Stocks Health Care MSCI Health Care
5 Stocks France MSCI France 34 Stocks Consumer Goods MSCI Consumer Staples
6 Stocks Switzerland MSCI Switzerland 35 Stocks Industrial MSCI Industrials
7 Stocks Italy MSCI Italy 36 Stocks Utilities MSCI Utilities
8 Stocks Scandinavia MSCI Nordic Countries 37 Stocks Media MSCI Media
9 Stocks UK MSCI UK 38 Stocks Biotech MSCI Pharmaceuticals & Biotech
10 Stocks Denmark MSCI Denmark 39 Stocks Real Estate MSCI Real Estate
13 Stocks Sweden MSCI Sweden 40 Money Market EUR CGBI WMNI 1MTH Euro debt
14 Stocks Turkey MSCI Turkey 41 Money Market GBP CGBI WMNI UK 1MTH Euro debt
15 Stocks Finland MSCI Finland 42 Money Market USD CGBI WMNI US 1MTH Euro debt
16 Stocks Russia MSCI Russia 43 Money Market CAD CGBI WMNI CN 1MTH Euro debt
17 Stocks North America MSCI North America 44 Money Market CHF CGBI WMNI SW 1MTH Euro debt
18 Stocks Australia MSCI Australia 45 Money market AUD CGBI WMNI AU 1MTH Euro debt
21 Stocks Emerging Markets MSCI EM 46 Bonds global (EUR) CGBI WGBI WORLD 10 MKT ALL MATS
22 Stocks Latin America MSCI EM Latin America 47 Bonds USD CGBI USBIG Gvt-spons 
23 Stocks Greater China MSCI Golden Dragon 48 Bonds CHF SW Total all
24 Stocks Singapore MSCI Singapore 49 Bonds GBP UK Total all
25 Stocks Thailand MSCI Thailand 50 Bonds AUD AU Total all
26 Stocks Korea MSCI Korea 51 Bonds JPY JP Total all
27 Stocks India MSCI India 52 Bonds DKK DK Total all
28 Stocks Brazil MSCI Brazil 53 Bonds CAD CN Total all
29 Stocks Information Technology MSCI Information Technology 56 Bonds Asia CGBI ESBI 10 years
20 Stocks Japan MSCI Japan
MSCI Netherlands
12 Stocks Austria MSCI Austria
SD Total all
55 Bonds NOK NW Total all Stock Markets by Industry
Money Markets by Geography
Bond Markets by Geography
54 Bonds SEK
19 Stocks Asia/ Pacific MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan
11 Stocks Netherlands
Having determined the Alpha performance for all mutual funds in any given week, we 
categorize the funds by their deciles using their peer-group specific past Alpha performance. 
Hence, in any given week and for every peer group the decile 1 contains the mutual funds 99
with  the  poorest  Alpha performance  and  decile  10  contains  the  mutual  funds  with  the 
strongest Alpha performance. This means that we create a basis on that we can compare the 
mutual funds according to their relative performance demonstrated by the decile they join. 
Please note that it is not feasible to compare the performance measure of the mutual funds of 
different peer groups and different times directly with each other (for example the Alpha
measures are always subject to different Betas). This is the reason why we use the decile 
approach.  Finally,  the  performance information  is  combined  with  the  transaction  data 
containing all funds purchased by private investors.
Table 3: Definition of Initial Charge Groups
In this table the definitions and proportions of the three initial charge groups are displayed.
Initial Charge Group Name Definition Proportion
1 No Initial Charges Initial Charges = 0% 33%
2 Reduced Initial Charges 0% < Initial Charges < 5% 38%
3 Full Initial Charges Initial Charges ≥ 5% 29%
In  order  to  measure individual private  investors’  ability  to  make  smart  mutual  fund 
purchasing decisions and therefore to measure investment sophistication, we construct a 
Smartness measure taking the Alpha decile as well as initial charges into account4 (compare
Niebling  (2010b)). First,  we  classify  all  mutual  funds  into  three  different  categories  with 
respect to their initial charges, namely (i) mutual funds with no initial charges, (ii) mutual 
funds with reduced initial charges (initial charges larger than zero and smaller than 5%) and 
(iii) mutual funds with full initial charges (initial charges of 5% and larger) (compare table 
3). Subsequently, we define a new variable “Smartness” assuming that smart investors (i) 
purchase the mutual funds with the highest historical Alpha performance and (ii) purchase 
the  mutual  funds  with  the  lowest  initial  charge  within  the  group  of  all  funds  with  the 
highest historical Alpha performance:
Smartness = 3 x Alpha-decile – Initial-charge-group + 1 (2)
“Smartness” is a natural number between 1 and 30 and it holds that the larger the value of 
“Smartness”, the smarter the investment decision according to our definition. Note that the 
historical Alpha has a stronger influence on the value of “Smartness” than the initial charge. 
Once “locked-in” into an Alpha decile it is not possible to change the decile by purchasing a 
fund with a low initial charge. In order to illustrate the intention behind the “Smartness” 
variable,  some  examples  for  the  calculation  of  the  variable  are  given  in  table  4.
                                                  
4 Please note that operating expenses are already factored into the Alpha measure.100
Table 4: Examples for variable “Smartness”
Table 4 displays some examples for the variable “Smartness”. The larger the variable “Smartness” is,
the smarter appears the investment decision.
Alpha Deciles Initial Charge Group Smartness
10 1 30
10 3 28
9 1 27
1 3 1
As we want to measure the quality of an investors’ mutual fund investment decision and not 
consider single transactions, which could be lucky draws, we calculate investors’ averages
for our analyses.
In  order to  address  research  question  1,  i.e.  to  identify  investor  groups  which  seek  for 
financial  advice,  we  conduct  a  multiple  regression  model  with  the  variable “Advice” as 
depending variable. As the variable “Advice” is a dummy variable indicating whether an 
investor  receives  financial  advice, we  use  a  Probit-Regression  model.  According  to 
Hackethal,  Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2008), we  consider  several  investor  characteristics  as 
depending variables. Additionally, we include the investor-average purchased Alpha decile 
and the Smartness measure in order to measure investment sophistication. We also control 
for a couple of fund characteristics. We use the regression model:
       i i i i i i i TradeFreq TradeVol DepVal LN Mar Age Gen Adv ) (
i i i i i i i TB TNA LN IC PM Risk Len        ) (
(3)
where Advi is a dummy variable indicating whether an investor receives financial advice, 
Geni is a dummy variable indicating if the investor i is male, Agei is the age of investor i,
Mari is a dummy variable indicating if the investor i is married, LN(DepVal)i is the natural 
logarithm of the average deposit value of investor i, TradeVoli is the average fund trade
volume of investor i, TradeFreqi is the trading frequency of investor i5, Leni is the length of 
the relationship of investor i with the bank, Riski is the self-reported risk class6 of investor i, 
PMi is the investor-average of a given performance measure7 of investor i, ICi is the investor-
average  initial  charge  of  investor  i,  LN(TNA)i is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  investor-
                                                  
5 Measured on a scale from 1 (low trading frequency) to 5 (high trading frequency)
6 On a scale from 1 (low risk) to 6 (high risk)
7 In this regression we use Jensen’s Alpha (defined in (1)) and the variable Smartness (defined in (2)) 
as performance measures.101
average  fund  volume8 of  investor  i,  TBi is  the  investor-average  of  a  dummy  variable 
indicating whether a fund belongs to one of the top mutual fund families and i is the error 
term.
In order to answer the central question of this paper, namely whether financial advice helps 
investors to come to better investment decisions, we perform a second regression model 
with the investor’s average of the purchased Alpha decile and the average Smartness value 
of an investor, respectively, as depending variable. As both the purchased Alpha decile and 
the Smartness are censored variables (from 1 to 10 for the Alpha decile and from 1 to 30 for 
Smartness,  respectively),  we  use  a  Tobit-Regression  model.  Depending  variable  is  the 
dummy  variable  indicating  if  an  investor  receives  financial  advice.  We  also  control  for 
several  investor  characteristics  and  for  a  couple  of  fund  characteristics.  We  use  the 
regression model
       i i i i i i i TradeVol DepVal LN Mar Age Gen Adv PM ) (
i i i i i i i TB TNA LN IC Risk Len TradeFreq        ) (
(4)
where PMi is the investor-average of a given performance measure9 of investor i, Advi is the 
dummy  variable  indicating  if  the  investor  i  receives  financial  advice,  Geni is  a  dummy 
variable indicating if the investor i is male, Agei is the age of investor i, Mari is a dummy 
variable indicating if the investor i is married, LN(DepVal)i is the natural logarithm of the 
average deposit value of investor i, TradeVoli is the average fund trade volume of investor i, 
TradeFreqi is the trading frequency of investor i10, Leni is the length of the relationship of 
investor i with the bank, Riski is the self-reported risk class11 of investor i, ICi is the investor-
average  initial  charge  of  investor  i,  LN(TNA)i is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  investor-
average  fund  volume12 of  investor  i,  TBi is  the  investor-average  of  a  dummy  variable 
indicating whether a fund belongs to one of the top mutual fund families and i is the error 
term.
                                                  
8 Measured in Total Net Assets (TNA)
9 In this regression we use Jensen’s Alpha (defined in (1)) and the variable Smartness (defined in (3)) 
as performance measures.
10 Measured on a scale from 1 (low trading frequency) to 5 (high trading frequency)
11 On a scale from 1 (low risk) to 6 (high risk)
12 Measured in Total Net Assets (TNA)102
In order to account for potential endogeneity issues that may arise due to self-selection into 
financial advice (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), we use two different approaches, 
namely (i) the propensity approach and (ii) an event study.
Using the  propensity  matching we  are  able  to  determine  (almost)  identical  “statistical 
twins”. As a consequence of the similarity of the pairs, the potential effect of a self-selection 
bias is reduced to a minimum. For every advised investor we determine a statistical twin 
based  on  the  variables  Age,  Marital Status,  Gender,  Riskclass,  Average  Deposit  Value, 
Average Cash, Average Mutual Fund Trade Volume and Length of Customer Relationship. 
Afterwards we compare the investment behavior of the advised investor with his statistical 
twin. This method is discussed in-depth by Titus and Marvin (2007) and has already been 
used in finance research (see Drucker and Puri (2005)).
As the online brokerage house from which we obtained our data set introduced the service
of financial advice during the year 2004, we are able to study differences in the investment 
behavior of private investors before and after they receive financial advice. For that reason 
we  consider  two  time  periods,  namely  the  time  from  January  2003  to  June 2004  (before 
introduction of advice) and the time from January 2005 to June 2007 (after introduction of 
advice). In this event study we analyze the investment decisions of identical investors and 
thus results cannot be biased by factors others than the advice itself.
In  existing  literature  on  financial  advice  a  third  methodology  for  avoiding  endogeneity 
issues is sometimes used, the so called “Two-Stage-Least-Square regression” (compare e.g. 
Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008)). In a first step, this regression technique estimates 
the probability of seeking financial advice by regional data (such as population, average 
income, participation on elections, etc.). In a second step, it uses this probability of seeking of 
financial advice by regressing it on the respective depending variables. However, regional 
data from the destatis file13 is available only for a grid of ~500 German regions which is,
from our point of view, not detailed enough in order to derive reasonable findings. For that 
reason, conducting  an  event  study  seems  to  be  superior  to  the  two-stage  least  square 
procedure and we therefore decide not to use the Two-Stage-Least-Square regression.
                                                  
13 The destatis file contains a set of stuctural data on ~500 German regions and is provided by the 
German Federal Statistic Office.103
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Identification of investors seeking for financial advice
If we a-priori think about which investors may seek for financial advice, we will expect that 
these investors are younger, less experienced and less wealthy, as financial advisors can 
offer  them  guidance  in  order to improve  portfolio  performance  and  avoid  investment 
mistakes.  On  the  contrary,  Hackethal, Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2008) find  that  financial 
advisors are rather matched with older, more experienced and wealthier investors. They 
argue that these investors can benefit from advisors’ services by “saving valuable time and/or 
by improving returns on sizeable investments”. In this subsection we investigate which of these 
two cases apply for our data set and therefore address research question 1.
As described in section 4, we perform a probit-regression model analyzing several factors 
potentially affecting investors’ use of a financial advisor. First of all, we include basic socio-
demographic variables, such as Gender, Age and Marital Status. As usually Gender and 
Marital  Status  are  dummy  variables indicating whether  the  investor  is male  or married. 
Additionally, we include two variables measuring investors’ wealth, namely Log of Average 
Deposit  Value  and  Average  Trade  Volume  as  Vissing-Jorgensen  (2003) argues  that 
irrationality disappears with wealth. We surely can expect that investment experience is 
affecting  investors’  probability  of  seeking  for  financial  advice  (compare  e.g.  Feng  and 
Seasholes (2005) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). On the other hand, Barber and Odean 
(2000) show  that  excessive  trading  yields  to  overconfidence.  We  include  two  variables 
measuring  investment  experience  besides  investors’  age, namely  Trading Frequency  and 
Length of Customer Relationship.14 Both variables are measured on a scale from 1 to 5, in 
which 1 indicates the lowest value. In order to map investors readiness to assume risk to our 
model we include the variable Riskclass which is self-reported by the investor when opening 
an account on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 6 (high risk).
Besides studying the affects of investor characteristics on the use of financial advice, we are 
also interested in the question whether investor sophistication has a positive or a negative 
effect on investors’ probability to ask for financial advice. For that reason we include the 
variables  Investor  Averages  Alpha  Decile  and  Investor  Average  Smartness  (defined  in 
equation (2)) into the regression model. Niebling (2010b) proves that these measures are ex-
                                                  
14 Please note that we have no multi-collinearity issues in our regression analyses as all variance 
inflation factors are reasonable small.104
ante proxies for overall investment success and hence for investment sophistication. Note 
that we conduct the regression models in the period from January 2003 to June 2004, which 
is the time before the online broker has introduced the offer of advice. Therefore, our results 
are not biased by effects resulting already from the advisory itself.
Table 5: Impact of investor characteristics on investors’ probability to seek for financial advice
Table 5 presents results for research question 1. Regression coefficients from regression of investor 
characteristics  on  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  an  investor  asks  for financial  advice are 
displayed. Moreover, some investor-average fund characteristics are included as control variables. 
Dummy  variables  indicate  if  an  investor  is  classified  as  male  or  married  by  the  bank’s  data 
warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) 
to  6  (high).  Average  Deposit  Value  and  Average  Trade  Volume  are  proxies  for  wealth,  whereas 
Trading Frequency and Length of Customer Relationship are proxies for trading experience. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The analyzed time period is January 2003 – June 2004.
Reg 01 (Probit) Reg 02 (Probit) Reg 03 (Probit) Reg 04 (Probit)
Depending Variable Advice (Dummy) Advice (Dummy) Advice (Dummy) Advice (Dummy)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.0414 -0.0441 -0.0425 -0.0453
(0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402)
Age 0.0107*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0112***
(0.00136) (0.00136) (0.00136) (0.00137)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 0.102*** 0.0999*** 0.101*** 0.0985***
(0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0330)
Log of Average Deposit Value 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.145***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Average Trade Volume 3.31e-06** 4.19e-06*** 3.64e-06** 4.41e-06***
(1.50e-06) (1.45e-06) (1.49e-06) (1.45e-06)
Trading Frequency -0.0898*** -0.0916*** -0.0934*** -0.0928***
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Length of Customer Relationship 0.0575*** 0.0579*** 0.0570*** 0.0574***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Riskclass -0.0659*** -0.0638*** -0.0642*** -0.0633***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Investor Average Alpha Decile 0.0157
(0.0101)
Investor Average Smartness -0.00280
(0.00282)
Top 20 Alpha (Dummy) -0.129**
(0.0560)
Top 20 Smartness (Dummy) -0.0979**
(0.0417)
Investor Average Initial Charge -0.0351*** -0.0268***
(0.0107) (0.0102)
Log of Investor Average Volume (TNA) 0.0753*** 0.0713*** 0.0664*** 0.0653***
(0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0111)
Investor Average KAG-Top-Brand -0.398*** -0.381*** -0.418*** -0.403***
(0.0441) (0.0430) (0.0440) (0.0441)
Constant -4.086*** -3.998*** -3.816*** -3.903***
(0.295) (0.291) (0.298) (0.293)
Observations 10529 10529 10529 10529
Pseudo R-squared 0.0593 0.0583 0.0696 0.0588
Results of these analyses are given in table 5. In all four regressions Age, Marital status, 
Logarithm  of  Average  Deposit  Value,  Average  Trade  Volume  and  Length  of  Customer 
Relationship have a positive and statistically significant influence on investors’ probability 105
to seek for financial advice, whereas the variables Trading Frequency and Riskclass have a 
negative and statistically significant influence. Gender does not seem to affect the variable 
Advice as it is not statistically significant. These results indicate that investors who ask for 
financial  advice  are  older,  more  likely  to  be  married,  more  experienced,  wealthier,  less 
overconfident and more risk averse than investors who do not ask for advice. Therefore, we 
can confirm the results of Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008) and reject the hypothesis 
that advisors help mainly younger and inexperienced investors to improve their investment 
decisions.
Let  us now  turn  to  the  impact  of  investment  sophistication  on  investors’  probability  to 
employ  a  financial  advisor  and  therefore  go  beyond  existing research  on  this  topic.  In 
regression  model  1  and  2 we  include  the  variables  Investor  Average  Alpha  Decile  and 
Investor Average Smartness respectively. However, both variables do not seem to have any 
influence on investors’ probability to seek for financial advice as both coefficients are not 
statistically significant. In order to generate a deeper insight into this issue we perform two 
additional regression models (regression 3 and 4) in which we include dummy variables 
indicating  whether  an  investor  purchases  on  average  mutual  funds  in  the  top  20%  of 
historical performance (regression 3) or has an average Smartness value of more than 24
(regression  4).  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  investors  who  indeed  use  historical 
performance as their decision criterion purchase on average mutual funds in the top 20% of 
historical performance (For a detailed discussion of this approach the reader is referred to
Niebling (2010b)). Interestingly, both dummy variables are statistically significant and have 
a  negative  effect  on  investors’  probability  to  ask  for  financial  advice.  This  implies that 
unsophisticated investors are more likely to ask advisor for help in investment decisions 
than sophisticated investors are. Apparently, unsophisticated investors recognize that they 
have  a  need  for financial  advisory  and  therefore  employ  a  financial  advisor  once  it  is 
provided by the bank.
In the light of these findings, the second research question becomes even more important: 
Can financial advisors indeed help these unsophisticated investors to come to better future 
investment  decisions  and  to  overcome  behavioral  biases?  Do  financial  advisors help 
investors  to  increase  their  level  of  investment  sophistication or  do  they  use  other  sales 
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5.2 Financial Advice and Investor Sophistication
We  now  turn  to  our  second research  question,  namely  whether  financial  advisors  help 
clients  to  make better  investment decisions. A-priori, we  would  expect that  advisors 
themselves are sophisticated and therefore indeed help clients to improve their investment 
success  to  such  an  extent  that  the  clients are  more  likely  to  purchase  mutual  funds  by 
chasing historical performance. Moreover, as these advisors are paid on a commission basis,
we would also expect that they tend to sell mutual funds with higher initial charges, which 
reduces the value of the variable Smartness. Therefore, the question is which of these two 
effects  – the  improvement  of  the Alpha decile  or  the  increase  of  initial  charges  – is  the 
dominating one.
5.2.1 Evidence from Descriptive Analyses
In  order  to  approach these questions, we  first employ  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the 
investor  characteristics  already  discussed  in  subsection  5.1. Additionally,  we  discuss 
descriptive numbers of the investor averages of the purchased Alpha Decile and the variable 
Smartness respectively. Finally, we analyze descriptive numbers of investor averages of the 
fund  characteristics  Initial  Charges,  Annual  Charges,  Volume  (measured  in  Total  Net 
Assets)  and Top-Brand  Indicator, a  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a  mutual  fund 
belongs to a top-brand fund family.
Results of this descriptive analysis are given in table 615. Note that the analyzed time period 
is January 2005 to June 2007, as financial advice has been introduced by the bank during the 
year 200416. 
Analyzing the results for the investor characteristics, we state that advised investors are 
more likely to be female, older, more likely to be married and assess themselves as more risk 
averse than non-advised investors. Moreover, advised investors seems to be wealthier as 
they have a higher average deposit value, a higher average cash value and trade on average 
a higher volume. Additionally, they seem to be more experienced as they have a longer 
relationship  with  the  bank.  All  these  results  are  statistically  significant,  but  are  not 
surprising given the findings from subsection 5.1 on the identification of investors seeking 
for financial advice.
                                                  
15 These results and all following results are robust as several robustness checks reveal. An overview 
over all conducted robustness checks is given in section 6.
16 For this reason results in table 6 differ slightly from the descriptive numbers presented in section 3 
as in table 1 we considered the whole available time period from January 1999 to July 2007107
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of advised investors vs. non-advised investors
Table 6 displays first, descriptive results for research question 2. In particular, descriptive statistics of the investor data for the subset of advised investors 
versus the subset of non-advised investors are presented. Dummy variables indicate if an investor is classified as married, as an advised investor or as a 
heavy trader by the bank’s data warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Number of 
Portfolio Positions and Share of International Equity are proxies for diversification. Additional investor averages of the purchased Alpha decile and the 
variable Smartness which are both ex-ante proxies for investors’ sophistication are calculated. Top20 Alpha Dummy and Top 20 Smartness Dummy indicate 
whether an investor purchases, on average, mutual funds in the top 20% of historical Alpha performance or with a Smartness value of more than 24 
respectively. Finally, investor averages of some fund characteristics are displayed. The analyzed time period is January 2005 to June 2007.
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. p-Value
Investor-average Alpha Decile 34,964        6.88            1.82            29,200        6.84            1.88            5,764          7.09            1.45            0.000
Top20 Alpha Dummy 34,964        14.04% 34.74% 29,200        14.73% 35.44% 5,764          10.53% 30.70% 0.000
Investor-average Smartness 31,041        19.38          5.81            25,656        19.29          5.99            5,385          19.83          4.87            0.000
Top20 Smartness Dummy 34,964        31.96% 46.63% 29,200        33.39% 47.16% 5,764          24.72% 43.14% 0.000
Investor-average Initial Charge 31,041        4.10% 1.36% 25,656        4.11% 1.40% 5,385          4.08% 1.15% 0.112
Investor-average Annual Charge 34,294        1.36% 0.33% 28,569        1.37% 0.34% 5,725          1.33% 0.28% 0.000
Investor-average Volume (TNA, in M€) 34,403        3,184          3,920          28,671        3,187          3,993          5,732          3,170          3,533          0.765
Investor-average Top Brand Indicator 34,791        29.23% 33.13% 29,030        30.08% 34.19% 5,761          24.94% 26.70% 0.000
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) 34,838        83.81% 36.84% 29,090        84.81% 35.90% 5,748          78.78% 40.89% 0.000
Age 34,839        45.69          12.20          29,091        45.16          11.90          5,748          48.38          13.32          0.000
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) 20,309        60.15% 48.96% 16,396        59.19% 49.15% 3,913          64.20% 47.95% 0.000
Riskclass 34,756        4.52            1.28            29,024        4.57            1.29            5,732          4.26            1.20            0.000
Deposit Value 34,963        55,151        139,785      29,199        50,655        143,104      5,764          77,926        119,017      0.000
Cash Value 34,964        33,893        82,085        29,200        31,618        69,046        5,764          45,420        128,703      0.000
Mutual Funds Trade Volume 34,964        4,521          16,959        29,200        4,223          17,319        5,764          6,030          14,913        0.000
Lenght of Customer Rel. (years) 34,964        7.91            3.17            29,200        7.80            3.07            5,764          8.50            3.56            0.000
Number of Trades 34,964        75.26          427.46        29,200        83.84          464.37        5,764          31.80          117.06        0.000
Heavy Trader (Dummy) 34,964        25.14% 43.38% 29,200        30.00% 45.83% 5,764          0.54% 7.31% 0.000
Number of Portfolio Positions 25,332        11.90          11.30          21,750        11.81          11.52          3,582          12.47          9.86            0.001
Share of International Equity 24,887        49.71% 28.46% 21,351        49.54% 28.61% 3,536          50.70% 27.51% 0.024
Advised Investor Non-Advised Investor All Investors108
When examining the variables Number of Trades and the Heavy Trader Dummy, we realize 
that advised investors dramatically trade less (30% of non-advised clients are classified as 
heavy  traders  by  the  banks’  data  warehouse,  whereas  this  is  the  case  for  only  0.5%  of 
advised  clients).  Following  the  line  of  argumentation  of  Barber  and  Odean  (2000) who 
associate excessive trading with overconfidence, we can conclude that advised investors are 
less overconfident than their non-advised counterpars. Furthermore, advised investors have 
slightly more portfolio positions and a higher share of international equity. As both numbers 
are proxies for portfolio diversification (compare Bernatzi and Thaler (2001) and Bluethgen, 
Gintschel, Hackethal and Mueller (2007) respectively), we conclude that financial advisors 
may help their clients to diversify their portfolios and therefore to overcome this behavioral 
bias. These results are in line with the findings of Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008).
Let us now turn to potential differences in investor sophistication between advised and non-
advised customers displayed in table 6. We find that advised customers purchase mutual 
funds in an Alpha decile that is on average 0.23 higher and have a Smartness value that is on 
average 0.54 higher than non-advised investors. Hence, it seems as if advisors help their 
clients  to  purchase  mutual  funds  by  chasing  historical  performance.  However,  when 
considering the Top 20 dummy variables, we get a different picture. For advised investors 
the proportion of mutual funds in the top 20% of historical performance is smaller than for 
non-advised investors. Results are similar for the Top 20 Smartness Dummy. Given these 
simple  descriptive  analyses,  this  implies  that  advisors  apparently  help  their  clients  to 
purchase  higher  Alpha deciles  but  that  they  do not  help  them  to  purchase  the  best 
performing mutual funds.
Finally, advised investors purchase mutual funds with lower annual charges and fund that
are more likely belong to a top-brand fund family. Differences in initial charges and fund 
volume are not statistically significant in this descriptive analysis.
Summarizing results of these descriptive statistics, we find that financial advisors do not 
seem to help their clients to improve their investment sophistication, but they may help to 
overcome the behavioral bias of missing portfolio diversification. Moreover, we could not 
find that advisors tend to sell mutual funds with higher initial charges. We will shed more
light on these questions by performing a multivariate analysis in the next subsection.109
5.2.2 Evidence from Multiple Regressions
We now try to sharpen the results regarding research question 2 by performing a regression 
model regressing the Advice dummy variable on the Investor Average Alpha Decile and the 
Investor Average Smartness as well as on further potential purchase criteria. We also control 
for investor characteristics and for investor averages of fund characteristics in the model. 
Table 7 presents the respective results.
Before we study the influence of financial advice on the investment sophistication, let us 
briefly  consider the effects of the investor characteristics on the Investor Average Alpha 
Decile and the Investor Average Smartness (regressions 05 and 06). Age and Average Trade 
Volume have a positive and statistically significant influence on the Investor Average Alpha 
Decile and the Investor Average Smartness respectively, whereas Trading Frequency and 
Length of Customer Relationship affect the depending variables negatively. Therefore, we 
can  conclude  that  smart  behaving  and  historical  performance  chasing  (and  hence  more 
sophisticated)  investors  are  older,  more  experienced,  wealthier  and  less  overconfident17. 
These results are in line with the findings of Niebling (2010b).
Let us now turn to the specific point of interest of this paper, namely the question whether 
and how financial advice effects the investor sophistication and other potential purchase 
criteria. First of all, consider regression 05 that uses the Investor Average Alpha Decile as 
depending  variable. The  coefficient  of  the  Advice  dummy  variable  is  positive  and 
statistically significant at the 1%-level. Consequently, financial advice affects the average 
purchased Alpha decile positively indicating that advisors indeed seem to help their clients 
to purchase mutual funds in a higher Alpha decile. However, when considering regression 
06 which uses the Investor Average Smartness as depending variable, the effect of financial 
advice  is  no  longer  statistically  significant.  Hence,  the  positive  influence  of  the  advice 
disappears once also the costs of the advice are taken into account. Results change when 
looking at regression 07 and regression 08 where we use the Top20 Alpha Dummy and the 
Top20  Smartness  Dummy  respectively  as  depending  variable.  In  both  cases  the  Advice 
Dummy affects the respective Top20 Dummy negatively and statistically significantly.
                                                  
17 Excessive  trading  is  a  proxy  for  overconfidence,  compare  Barber,  B.M.,  and  T.  Odean,  2000, 
"Trading  is  hazardous  to  your  wealth:  The  common  stock  investment  performance  of  individual 
investors", Journal of Finance 55, 773-806.110
Table 7: Impact of financial advice on mutual fund purchasing criteria used by private investors
Table 7 shows results for research question 2. Regression coefficients from regressions of a dummy variable that indicates whether an investor receives 
financial advice on investor averages of potential mutual fund purchasing criteria are presented. Moreover, investor characteristics and investor averages of 
fund characteristics are included as control variables. Dummy variables indicate if an investor is classified as male or married by the bank’s data warehouse. 
Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Average Deposit Value and Average Trade Volume are 
proxies for wealth, whereas Trading Frequency and Length of Customer Relationship are proxies for trading experience. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The analyzed time period is January 2005 – June 2007.
Reg 05 (Tobit) Reg 06 (Tobit) Reg 07 (Probit) Reg 08 (Probit) Reg 09 Reg 10 Reg 11 (Probit)
Depending Variable Inv-avg Alpha Decile Inv-avg Smartness Top20 Alpha Dummy Top20 Smartn. Dummy Inv-avg Init. Charge Inv-avg Volume Inv-avg Top-brand
Advice (Dummy) 0.0872*** -0.126 -0.109*** -0.211*** -0.204*** 0.205*** 0.154***
(0.0308) (0.104) (0.0368) (0.0293) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0273)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.0272 -0.0497 -0.0159 -0.0226 0.0552** -0.0684*** 0.0372
(0.0307) (0.103) (0.0348) (0.0282) (0.0244) (0.0255) (0.0265)
Age 0.0106*** 0.0293*** 0.00629*** 0.00406*** -0.00247*** -0.00818*** -0.00480***
(0.00102) (0.00345) (0.00112) (0.000950) (0.000864) (0.000885) (0.000880)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) -0.0138 -0.0309 -0.0466 -0.0215 0.0151 0.0453** 0.0150
(0.0263) (0.0885) (0.0299) (0.0238) (0.0206) (0.0219) (0.0229)
Log of Average Deposit Value 0.00831 -0.0302 -0.0542*** -0.0510*** 0.00307 0.0305*** 0.0675***
(0.0102) (0.0344) (0.0111) (0.00932) (0.00948) (0.00948) (0.00869)
Average Trade Volume 4.79e-06*** 9.09e-06*** 4.77e-06*** 3.15e-06* -6.60e-06** -3.41e-06 -4.71e-06***
(8.87e-07) (2.99e-06) (6.49e-07) (1.64e-06) (2.83e-06) (2.83e-06) (6.19e-07)
Trading Frequency -0.0892*** -0.260*** -0.0709*** -0.0529*** 0.00236 0.0325*** 0.0803***
(0.00993) (0.0335) (0.0114) (0.00925) (0.00814) (0.00834) (0.00868)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.0275*** -0.134*** 0.00802 -0.00150 -0.0230*** -0.0279*** -0.0424***
(0.00817) (0.0275) (0.00912) (0.00752) (0.00659) (0.00682) (0.00702)
Riskclass 0.0140 0.0217 0.0144 -0.00628 -0.0170** -0.0697*** -0.0382***
(0.00947) (0.0319) (0.0107) (0.00870) (0.00762) (0.00803) (0.00820)
  Investor AverageAlpha Decile 0.137*** -0.111*** -0.0841***
(0.00797) (0.00891) (0.00654)
Investor Average Initial Charge 0.216*** 0.178*** 0.103*** 0.0632***
(0.00945) (0.0125) (0.00997) (0.00767)
Log of Investor Average Volume (TNA) -0.169*** -0.219*** -0.362*** -0.236*** 0.0924*** -0.200***
(0.00904) (0.0302) (0.00996) (0.00818) (0.00927) (0.00909)
Investor Average KAG-Top-Brand -1.231*** -4.563*** -0.535*** -0.941*** -0.997*** -0.492***
(0.0395) (0.127) (0.0454) (0.0402) (0.0395) (0.0436)
Constant 9.677*** 25.52*** 6.151*** 5.074*** 1.727*** 22.04*** 0.227
(0.234) (0.780) (0.254) (0.211) (0.247) (0.133) (0.203)
Observations 17619 17619 17619 17619 17619 17619 17619
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0381 0.0145 0.1605 0.0857 0.127 0.051 0.0588111
Therefore, we confirm the results obtained by the descriptive analyses, namely that financial 
advisors may help their clients to purchase, on average, better performing mutual funds, but 
fail  to  sell  their  clients  mutual  funds  belonging  to  the  top  performing  funds  regarding 
historical performance. They therefore fail to increase clients’ investment sophistication.
Additionally, we perform three more regressions using the Investor Average Initial Charges 
(regression 09), the Investor Average Volume (regression 10) and the Investor Average Top-
Brand  Indicator  (regression  11)  as  depending  variables.  As  the  Advice  Dummy  has  a 
negative and statistically significant influence on the Investor Average Initial Charges, we 
conclude that advisors apparently sell their clients mutual funds with lower initial charges.
This surprising finding is contradictory to our a-priori hypothesis that advisors are tempted 
to sell mutual funds with higher costs as they themselves benefit from these front-end loads 
by their commission model. Moreover, it turns out that financial advisors sell mutual funds 
which have a higher fund volume and are more likely to belong to a top-brand fund family 
as  the  Advice  Dummy  has  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  in  both 
regressions 10 and 11.
Summarizing  the  results  regarding  the  second  research  question  so  far, we  state  that 
financial advisors seem to use fund volume and funds’ brand as major sales arguments and 
therefore make the same investment mistakes private investors obtain (compare Niebling 
(2010a)) when making mutual fund purchase decisions: Advisors do not recommend mutual 
funds by chasing historical performance to their clients and therefore they fail to improve 
their  clients’  investment  sophistication. At  least,  financial  advisors  use  initial  charges  as 
additional sales argument and hence help their clients to save money.
However, we used our whole data set in order to derive these findings. Thus, it could be 
that  we  have  possible  endogeneity  issues  within  our  analyses.  For  this  reason  we  will 
perform two checks of endogeneity in the remaining subsections of section 5 in order to 
figure out whether our results still hold or change once checked for possible endogeneity.
5.2.3 Check for possible endogeneity I: Propensity approach
Potential endogeneity issues may arise due to clients’ self-selection into financial advice.
Therefore, we address the question whether the results we obtained so far are due to the 
advisors themselves or due to the clients they attract.
First of all, we conduct a propensity matching of the advised investors. For every investor 
who receives financial advice, the propensity algorithm seeks for a non-advised peer to such 112
an extent that the advised investor and his peer have approximately the same age, gender,
marital status, riskclass, wealth18 and length of relationship with the bank. Consequently, we 
avoid that results are biased by other factors than the financial advice itself.
Considering the descriptive statistics which are presented in table 8, we find that advised 
investors tend to purchase mutual funds rather by chasing historical performance compared 
to their non-advised peers. An advised investor purchases a mutual fund in an average 
Alpha decile of 7.06, whereas the average Alpha decile of the mutual funds purchased by a 
non-advised investor purchases is 6.91. The difference is statistically significant.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics Propensity Approach
Table 8 displays additional results for research question 2. Descriptive statistics of the investor data 
for the subset of advised investors versus their non-advised peers are presented. For identifying the 
non-advised peers a propensity matching using the variables Gender, Age, Marital Status, Riskclass, 
Wealth and Length of Customer Relationship is conducted. Investor averages of the purchased Alpha
decile and the variable Smartness which are both ex-ante proxies for investors’ sophistication are 
reported.  Top20  Alpha  Dummy  and  Top  20  Smartness  Dummy  indicate  whether  an  investor 
purchases  on  average mutual  funds  in  the  top  20%  of  historical  Alpha performance  or  with  a 
Smartness value of more than 24 respectively. Finally, investor averages of some fund characteristics 
are displayed. The analyzed time period is January 2005 to June 2007.
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. p-Value
Investor-average Alpha Decile 3,557        6.91          1.75          3,557        7.06          1.37          0.000
Top20 Alpha Dummy 3,557        12.57% 33.15% 3,557        8.83% 28.37% 0.000
Investor-average Smartness 3,557        19.46        5.79          3,557        19.70        4.77          0.058
Top20 Smartness Dummy 3,557        23.70% 42.53% 3,557        18.11% 38.51% 0.000
Investor-average Initial Charge 3,557        4.10% 13.78% 3,557        3.99% 1.19% 0.001
Investor-average Annual Charge 3,547        1.34% 0.34% 3,551        1.31% 0.29% 0.000
Investor-average Volume (TNA, in M€) 3,557        3,099        3,524        3,557        3,060        3,198        0.627
Investor-average Top Brand Indicator 3,557        33.25% 33.54% 3,557        26.30% 26.28% 0.000
Non-Advised Investor Advised Investor
However, when analyzing the Top 20 dummy results, we find that advised clients purchase
less mutual funds belonging to the top 20% of historical Alpha (8.83%) performance than
non-advised clients do (12.57%). Analyzing the Smartness value we get a similar picture. On 
the one hand, advised investors purchase on average mutual funds with a higher Smartness
value  than  their non-advised  counterparts  (19.70  versus  19.46).  On  the  other hand,  they 
purchase less mutual funds belonging to the top 20% of Smartness value than non-advised 
investors  do  (18.11%  versus  23.70%).  Moreover,  on  average advised  investors  seem  to 
purchase mutual funds with lower costs (initial charges as well as annual charges) and that 
less likely belong to a top-brand fund family than their non-advised peers. 
                                                  
18 Measured by average deposit value, average cash and average mutual fund trade volume113
Table 9: Impact of financial advice on mutual fund purchasing criteria used by private investors using propensity algorithm
Table 9 shows additional results for research question 2. Regression coefficients from regression of a dummy variable that indicates whether an investor 
receives financial advice on investor averages of potential mutual fund purchasing criteria are presented. Moreover, investor characteristics and investor 
averages of fund characteristics are included as control variables. For identifying the non-advised peers a propensity matching using the variables Gender, 
Age, Marital Status, Riskclass, Wealth and Length of Customer Relationship is conducted. Dummy variables indicate if an investor is classified as male or 
married by the bank’s data warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 (high). Average Deposit 
Value  and  Average  Trade  Volume  are  proxies  for  wealth,  whereas  Trading  Frequency  and  Length  of  Customer  Relationship  are  proxies  for trading 
experience. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The analyzed time period is 
January 2005 – June 2007.
Reg 12 (Tobit) Reg 13 (Tobit) Reg 14 (Probit) Reg 15 (Probit) Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 (Probit)
Depending Variable Inv-avg Alpha Decile Inv-avg Smartness Top20 Alpha Dummy Top20 Smartn. Dummy Inv-avg Init Charge Inv-avg Volume Inv-avg Top-brand
Advice (Dummy) 0.0998*** -0.0594 -0.126*** -0.206*** -0.208*** 0.211*** 0.136***
(0.0366) (0.125) (0.0450) (0.0357) (0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0338)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) -0.0532 -0.226 0.0278 -0.0354 0.0686** -0.0525 -0.0150
(0.0427) (0.146) (0.0518) (0.0413) (0.0346) (0.0357) (0.0394)
Age 0.0117*** 0.0271*** 0.00542*** 0.00115 -0.00434*** -0.00816*** -0.00336***
(0.00141) (0.00479) (0.00163) (0.00137) (0.00113) (0.00121) (0.00129)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) -0.0273 0.0188 -0.0774 -0.0199 -0.0108 0.0156 0.0136
(0.0399) (0.136) (0.0482) (0.0384) (0.0317) (0.0329) (0.0369)
Log of Average Deposit Value 0.0138 -0.0196 -0.0668*** -0.0681*** -0.0102 0.0293* 0.106***
(0.0150) (0.0512) (0.0172) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0151) (0.0134)
Average Trade Volume 7.03e-06*** 1.22e-05** 9.76e-06*** 6.45e-06*** -8.56e-06*** -6.83e-06* -1.05e-05***
(1.73e-06) (5.91e-06) (1.51e-06) (2.39e-06) (2.08e-06) (3.91e-06) (1.38e-06)
Trading Frequency -0.0869*** -0.242*** -0.0811*** -0.0510*** -0.000489 0.0327*** 0.0777***
(0.0151) (0.0514) (0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0141)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.0123 -0.144*** 0.0248* -0.00134 -0.0452*** -0.0303*** -0.0567***
(0.0113) (0.0384) (0.0133) (0.0110) (0.00897) (0.00956) (0.0103)
Riskclass 0.0191 0.0697 0.0114 0.00479 -0.000787 -0.0520*** -0.00583
(0.0141) (0.0481) (0.0170) (0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0129)
  Investor AverageAlpha Decile 0.164*** -0.111*** -0.0655***
(0.0131) (0.0150) (0.0109)
Investor Average Initial Charge 0.253*** 0.229*** 0.0738*** 0.0529***
(0.0146) (0.0211) (0.0159) (0.0127)
Log of Investor Average Volume (TNA) -0.172*** -0.217*** -0.356*** -0.229*** 0.0688*** -0.220***
(0.0144) (0.0486) (0.0165) (0.0137) (0.0153) (0.0148)
Investor Average KAG-Top-Brand -1.032*** -3.823*** -0.387*** -0.813*** -0.993*** -0.545***
(0.0630) (0.206) (0.0745) (0.0669) (0.0660) (0.0716)
Constant 9.358*** 25.08*** 5.898*** 5.154*** 2.306*** 22.14*** -0.0963
(0.365) (1.224) (0.412) (0.345) (0.411) (0.208) (0.329)
Observations 7114 7114 7114 7114 7114 7114 7114
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.039 0.011 0.1619 0.073 0.134 0.059 0.066114
Solely regarding fund volume, no statistically significant difference is observable. Therefore, 
these descriptive statistics confirm pretty much the results of the descriptive statistics in 
subsection 5.1.
In a next step, we repeat the multiple regression analyses studying the effect of the Advice 
dummy on potential mutual fund purchasing criteria from subsection 5.2 with our dataset 
consisting of advised investors and their non-advised peers. Again, investor characteristics 
and  investor  averages  of  mutual  fund  characteristics  are  included  as  additional  control 
variables. Results are presented in table 9. The Advice dummy in Regression 12 which uses 
the  Investor  Average  Alpha  decile as  depending  variable  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant  at  the  1%-level. This  supports  the  findings  from  section  5.2 that  clients  who 
receive financial advice purchase on average mutual funds in a higher Alpha decile than 
their  non-advised  peers.  However,  when  regressing  on  the  Investor  Average  Smartness 
(compare  Regression  13)  the  regression  coefficient  of  the  Advice Dummy  is  no  longer 
statistically significant. Moreover, the Advice dummy affects both Top 20 dummy variables 
of  the  purchased  Alpha decile  (Regression  14)  and  the  Smartness value  (Regression  15) 
negatively and statistically significantly. Apparently, advised investors purchase less mutual 
funds belonging to the top 20% of historical performance and Smartness respectively than 
their non-advised counterparts. These results imply that financial advisors do not help their 
clients  to  chase  historical  performance.  They  rather  reduce  the  investor  sophistication  of 
their clients.
However,  advisors  at  least  help  their  clients to  reduce  the  costs of  the  mutual  fund 
investments as indicated by the negative coefficient of the Advice Dummy when regressed 
on  the  Investor  Average  Initial  Charges  (Regression  16).  Moreover,  advised  investors 
purchase on average mutual funds with a higher fund volume (compare Regression 17) that 
likely belong to a top-brand fund family (Regression 18).
Summarizing results of the analyses when using propensity matching, we confirm results 
obtained in subsections 5.1 and 5.2: Financial advisors do not help their clients to improve 
their investment sophistication. Advisors use fund volume, the fact that the fund belongs to 
a top-brand fund family and reduced initial charges as sales arguments.
5.2.4 Check for possible endogeneity II: Event study
In the final part of our analyses we perform a second check for potential endogeneity issues 
in the data set. We now analyze the investment behavior of identical investors before and 115
after they receive financial advice. For that reason, we restrict the data set to investors who 
purchased mutual  funds  in  the  time period  from  January  2003  to June  2004  (before  the 
introduction of advice by the bank) and in the time period from January 2005 to June 2007 
(after  introduction  of  advice  by  the  bank) and  have received  advice  in  the  second  time 
period. It is obvious that by using this methodology, there cannot be factors other than the 
advice itself effecting changes in the investment behavior of these investors. Let us again 
first  consider  basic  descriptive  statistics  which  are  presented  in  table  10. Analogous to 
former results, investors purchase, on average, mutual funds with higher Alpha deciles and 
higher Smartness values in the time after the introduction of financial advice compared to 
the time before the introduction.
Table 10: Descriptive statistics Event Study
Table 10 displays additional results for research question 2. Descriptive statistics of the investor data 
for the subset of advised investors are presented. These investors are analyzed in two time periods: 
Before the introduction of financial advice by the bank (January 2003 to June 2004) and after the
introduction of financial advice (January 2005 to June 2007). Investor averages of the purchased Alpha
decile and the variable Smartness which are both ex-ante proxies for investors’ sophistication are 
reported.  Top20  Alpha  Dummy  and  Top  20  Smartness  Dummy  indicate  whether  an  investor 
purchases  on  average mutual  funds  in  the  top  20%  of  historical  Alpha performance  or  with  a 
Smartness value of more than 24 respectively. Finally, investor averages of some fund characteristics 
are displayed.
p-Value
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
Investor-average Alpha Decile 2,899          6.84            1.65            2,899          6.96            1.37            0.002
Top20 Alpha 2,899          9.62% 29.50% 2,899          7.31% 26.04% 0.002
Investor-average Smartness 2,679          19.06          5.59            2,769          19.61          4.68            0.000
Top20 Smartness 2,899          25.25% 43.45% 2,899          20.70% 40.52% 0.000
Investor-average Initial Charge 2,679          3.91% 1.44% 2,769          4.08% 1.11% 0.000
Investor-average Annual Charge 2,889          1.27% 0.31% 2,889          1.34% 0.26% 0.000
Investor-average Volume (TNA, in M€) 2,836          2,931          2,862          2,890          3,480          3,633          0.000
Investor-average Top Brand Indicator 2,898          36.49% 33.83% 2,897          27.24% 26.71% 0.000
Before Intro. of Advice After Intro. of Advice
However,  once  the  clients  received  financial  advice,  they  purchase  less  mutual  funds 
belonging to the top 20% of historical Alpha performance and Smartness value respectively 
compared to the time in which they did not receive advice. Moreover, average costs (initial 
charges  as  well  as  annual  charges)  are  slightly  higher  after  the  introduction  of  advice. 
Furthermore, after  receiving  financial  advice  investors purchase, on  average, funds  with 
higher fund volume but that less likely belong to a top-brand fund family.
Finally, we again study the impact of the Advice Dummy variable on the Investor Average 
Alpha Decile, the Investor Average Smartness measure as well as on the other potential 
mutual fund purchase criteria. Results of these regression analyses are given in table 11.116
Table 11: Impact of financial advice on mutual fund purchasing criteria used by private investors using an Event Stidy
Table 11 shows additional results for research question 2. Regression coefficients from regression of a dummy variable that indicates whether an investor 
receives financial advice on investor averages of potential mutual fund purchasing criteria are presented. The investors are analyzed in two time periods: 
Before introduction of financial advice by the bank (January 2003 to June 2004) and after introduction of financial advice (January 2005 to June 2007).
Moreover, investor characteristics and investor averages of fund characteristics are included as control variables. Dummy variables indicate if an investor is 
classified as male or married by the bank’s data warehouse. Riskclass is reported by the investors themselves when opening an account from 1 (low) to 6 
(high). Average Deposit Value and Average Trade Volume are proxies for wealth, whereas Trading Frequency and Length of Customer Relationship are 
proxies for trading experience. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Reg 19 (Tobit) Reg 20 (Tobit) Reg 21 (Probit) Reg 22 (Probit) Reg 23 Reg 24 Reg 25 (Probit)
Depending Variable Inv-avg Alpha Decile Inv-avg Smartness Top20 Alpha Dummy Top20 Smartn. Dummy Inv-avg Init Charge Inv-avg Volume Inv-avg Top-brand
Advice (Dummy) -0.0264 -0.100 -0.0616 -0.181*** -0.0357 0.222*** 0.157***
(0.0470) (0.173) (0.0807) (0.0581) (0.0439) (0.0417) (0.0545)
Gender (Dummy; 1 = male) 0.0334 0.118 0.0208 -0.0251 -0.00704 -0.0190 -0.00727
(0.0609) (0.224) (0.106) (0.0754) (0.0571) (0.0549) (0.0705)
Age 0.0123*** 0.0368*** 0.00632* 0.00793*** -0.00396** -0.00639*** -0.00190
(0.00203) (0.00748) (0.00329) (0.00242) (0.00196) (0.00197) (0.00235)
Marital Status (Dummy; 1 = married) -0.0176 -0.129 0.103 0.0344 -0.00140 0.166*** 0.0188
(0.0521) (0.192) (0.0906) (0.0643) (0.0482) (0.0472) (0.0610)
Log of Average Deposit Value -0.00228 -0.0799 -0.0552* -0.0437** 0.00131 0.0229 0.0714***
(0.0190) (0.0699) (0.0300) (0.0220) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0211)
Average Trade Volume 2.61e-05*** 4.71e-05*** 2.51e-05*** 1.83e-05*** -2.98e-05*** -2.20e-05*** -2.08e-05***
(4.12e-06) (1.51e-05) (5.06e-06) (5.03e-06) (6.67e-06) (5.14e-06) (4.36e-06)
Trading Frequency -0.0547*** -0.304*** -0.0979*** -0.0488* -0.0241 -0.0299* 0.150***
(0.0211) (0.0777) (0.0365) (0.0257) (0.0200) (0.0179) (0.0248)
Length of Customer Relationship -0.0208 -0.0628 0.00761 -0.00706 -0.00842 -0.0350** -0.0269
(0.0171) (0.0629) (0.0286) (0.0211) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0195)
Riskclass 0.0369* 0.133* 0.0512 0.0254 -0.0235 -0.0302 -0.0301
(0.0204) (0.0750) (0.0349) (0.0254) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0238)
  Investor AverageAlpha Decile 0.287*** -0.108*** -0.0325
(0.0216) (0.0239) (0.0199)
Investor Average Initial Charge 0.334*** 0.203*** 0.123*** 0.157***
(0.0185) (0.0367) (0.0223) (0.0221)
Log of Investor Average Volume (TNA) -0.146*** -0.110 -0.461*** -0.249*** 0.134*** -0.209***
(0.0202) (0.0738) (0.0310) (0.0247) (0.0259) (0.0244)
Investor Average KAG-Top-Brand -0.588*** -2.937*** -0.271** -1.268*** -0.725*** 0.0950 -2.284***
(0.0809) (0.290) (0.137) (0.126) (0.0954) (0.0921)
Constant 8.287*** 22.13*** 7.520*** 4.841*** -0.137 21.84***
(0.500) (1.827) (0.762) (0.598) (0.658) (0.273) (0.565)
Observations 3124 3124 3124 3124 3124 3124 3124
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0524 0.0102 0.2317 0.123 0.167 0.069 0.0817117
Apparently, financial  advice  does  not  affect  the  average  purchased  Alpha decile  as  the 
coefficient of the Advice Dummy in Regression 19 is not statistically significant. This implies 
that we cannot find differences in the ability to purchase mutual funds by chasing historical 
performance of the analyzed investors before and after they received financial advice. When 
considering  the  Investor  Average  Smartness,  results  remain  qualitatively  unchanged 
(compare  Regression  20).  Again  the  respective  regression  coefficient  is  not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, in this event study even the Top20 Alpha Dummy variable is not 
affected statistically significantly by the Advice dummy (compare Regression 21). However, 
at  least  the  Top  20  Smartness  Dummy  (Regression  22)  is  influenced  negatively  and 
statistically significantly by the Advice Dummy.
Thus, investors purchase less mutual funds which have, on average, a Smartness value of 
more than 24 once they received financial advice compared to the time they did not have a 
financial advisor and made their investment decisions by themselves. Therefore, our former 
results are confirmed so far that financial advisors do not help their clients to make better 
investment decisions. On the contrary, investors lose parts of their investment sophistication 
after receiving financial advice19.
In this event study, even the effect that advised clients purchase on average mutual funds 
with  lower  initial  charges  is  not  observable, as  the  regression  coefficient  of  the  Advice 
Dummy in Regression 23 is not statistically significant at all common levels. The effect on 
the  fund  volume and  the  Top-Brand  Dummy  is  the  same  as  in  the  previous  analyses 
(compare  Regression  24  and  Regression  25  respectively):  Investors  purchase  on  average
mutual funds with a higher fund volume which belong more likely to a top-brand fund 
family once they receive financial advice.
All in all, with these analyses we find evidence that the results are not biased by potential 
endogeneity issues. The observed effects of financial advice on private investors’ investment 
sophistication  are  solely  due  to  the  advisors  themselves  and  not  due  to  other  factors 
affecting  the  investment  behavior. Indeed,  financial  advisors  do  not help  their  clients to 
enhance their level of investment sophistication. They rather use fund volume and funds’ 
brand as sales arguments.
                                                  
19 Please  note  once  again,  that  both  the  ability  to  chase  historical  performance when  purchasing 
mutual funds and the Smartness measure are ex-ante proxies for investment sophistication.118
6 Robustness
In this paper we derive findings on the investment behavior and investment sophistication 
of  private  investors  who  receive financial  advice  which  are  counterintuitive  and 
contradictory to our a-priori hypotheses. We also show that these results still hold when 
performing a propensity matching and an event study respectively and therefore account for 
potential  endogeneity  issues.  In  order  to  get  even  more  confidence  on  our  results, we 
perform several additional robustness checks which are described in this section.
First  of  all,  we  exclude  all  investors  who have purchased  only  one  mutual  fund  in  the 
analyzed time periods from the data set. After recalculating the descriptive statistics as well 
as the regression models, it turns out that results remain qualitatively unchanged. Financial 
advisors still do not help their clients to purchase mutual funds belonging to the top 20% of 
historical performance. They still recommend mutual funds which are larger and are more 
likely to belong to a top-brand fund family.
After not taking very infrequent traders into account, we investigate whether investors who 
are very frequent traders bias the result. In the data set a variable is included indicating 
whether  an  investor  is  classified  as  “Heavy  Trader”  by  the  banks’  data  warehouse. 
Excluding all these heavy traders from the data set and repeating the analyses yields to 
qualitatively unchanged results for all research questions.
When we have constructed the data base we excluded all transactions which are part of 
mutual  fund  saving  plans  mainly  due  to  two  reasons:  On  the  one  hand,  saving  plan 
investors cannot choose from the whole available fund universe, and on the other hand, 
these investors make their investment decision only once in advance and then the funds are 
purchased automatically by the bank (compare section 3). However, we repeat all analyses 
with a data set including these saving plan transactions for robustness reasons. Again, all 
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Moreover,  when  performing  regressions  on  a  dummy variable  (i.e.  regressions  on  the 
Advice Dummy in section 5.1 and regressions on the Top20 Alpha Dummy and the Top20 
Smartness  Dummy  in  section  5.2.)  we  always  use a probit  regression  model.  When 
calculating the same regression with a logit regression model, we do not obtain qualitative 
changes in the results. In addition, the propensity matching algorithm in section 5.2.3 uses a
probit estimation technique. Again, when performing the propensity matching with a logit 
estimation results remain qualitatively unchanged. 119
Finally, multi-collinearity does not seem to be a problem in our regression models as all 
variance-inflation-factors are reasonably small.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the strand of empirical literature on the role of financial advice 
within the financial retail industry. In particular, we extend the recent paper of Bergstresser, 
Chalmers and Tufano (2009). We use a dataset of a German online brokerage house that 
allows us to analyze the investment behavior on an investor- and transaction-specific level. 
Therefore,  we  can  identify  on  single  investor  level  which  particular  investors  receive 
financial  advice  and  which  investors  do  not.  Additionally,  we  are  able  to  compare  the 
behavior of investors in the time before and after they mandated a financial advisor.
All  existing  studies  on  the  role  of  financial  advice  of  which  the  authors  are  aware  (e.g. 
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009); Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008)) use ex-
post portfolio returns in order to measure the quality of advice. In contrast, we use the 
degree to which investors chase historical performance when purchasing mutual funds in 
order  to  measure  financial  advisors’  ability  to  improve  their  clients’  investment 
sophistication in  this  paper. Niebling  (2010b) proves that  smart  mutual  fund  decision 
making  is  an  ex-ante  measure  for  overall  investment  success  and  hence  for  superior 
investment  sophistication.  The  advantage  of  this  ex-ante  measure  compared  to  ex-post 
portfolio returns is that it does not have the problem of being potentially affected by random 
stock market movements.
We focus on two major research questions. First, we address the question which particular 
investors seek for financial advice. We find that investors who receive financial advice are 
older, more likely to be married, more experienced, wealthier, less overconfident and more 
risk  averse.  Additionally,  we  study  the  impact  of  investment  sophistication  on  the 
probability to seek for financial advice. While the investor average purchased Alpha decile 
and the investor average Smartness value do not influence the probability to ask for advice, 
the Top20 Alpha dummy and the Top20 Smartness dummy, indicating whether an investor 
purchases on average mutual funds in the top 20% of historical Alpha performance or has an 
average  Smartness value  of  more  than  24, affects  the  Advice  dummy  negatively  and 
statistically  significantly.  Apparently,  unsophisticated  investors  are  more  likely  to  seek 
financial advice than sophisticated investors are.120
Second, we turn to the question whether financial advisors help these clients to come to 
better investment decisions and hence increase clients’ level of investment sophistication.
We provide evidence that although advised investors purchase on average mutual funds in 
a  higher  Alpha decile,  they  purchase  less  funds  belonging  to  the  top  20%  of  historical 
performance  and  to  the  top  20%  of  the  Smartness value  respectively.  Consequently,  we 
conclude  that  advisors  do  not  help  their  clients  to  increase  their  individual  investment 
sophistication. Results still hold when checked for potential endogeneity issues. Hence, the 
fact that advisors do not recommend mutual funds that belong to the top 20% of historical 
performance is indeed due to the advisors themselves and not due to other factors affecting 
the investment behavior.
Moreover, we  show  that advice positively affects  the  investor  average  purchased  fund 
volume and the investor average Top-brand Indicator. Hence, it seems as if advisors are 
more likely to recommend larger and well-known funds and are less likely to recommend
funds which outperformed in the past. At least, advisors help their clients to save money to 
that  extent  that  they  recommend  mutual  funds  with  lower  initial  charges.  Apparently, 
financial  advisors  use  fund  volume,  the  fact  that  the  fund  belongs  to  a  top-brand  fund 
family and reduced initial charges as sales arguments. These results also hold once checked 
for potential endogeneity. In their paper Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2008) conclude 
that financial advisors are like babysitters, as they offer a service that parents themselves 
could do better, but observed achievement of children with babysitters is usually better than 
the achievement of children without babysitters. With our results we can even go one step 
further: Financial advisors base investment recommendations on the same criteria private 
investors  themselves  seem  to  use (compare  Niebling  (2010a)).  They  recommend  mutual 
funds which have higher fund volume and belong more likely to a top-brand fund family 
instead of looking at the funds’ historical performance, which is proven to be a rational 
purchase criterion. 
What do these results mean in practice? Apparently, financial advisors support their clients 
to that  extent  that  they  relieve  them  of  the  information  gathering  and  fund  choosing 
processes, but they do not choose better funds. A common explanation is that advisors are 
pushed  to  these  poor  investment  recommendations  by  a  misleading  incentive  model. 
However,  we  show  that  advisors  recommend  mutual  funds  which  have  lower  initial 
charges. Therefore, the major problem seems to be that advisors sell mutual funds to their 
clients of which they believe clients would also purchase when left alone. Advisors are much 121
more salesmen than advisors! Hence, political decision makers are urged to think about 
possibilities to enhance the sophistication of advisors and make it rewarding for financial 
advisors to sell the best funds.
There is much potential for future work regarding the role of advice in the financial retail 
industry.  We  have  found  some  evidence  that  even  if  advisors do  not  increase  overall
investment sophistication they may help clients to better diversify their portfolios. Hence, it 
would be interesting to study the effect of financial advice on various known behavioral 
biases comprehensively. Additionally, someone could consider the role of fund marketing. 
Given our results, it seems as if not only the private investors themselves but rather the 
financial advisors are missleaded to purchase poorer performing funds by marketing.
Finally, future work could study the question whether the specific incentive model of the 
advisors influences the quality of the advice, i.e. whether advisors who do not work on a 
commission  basis  but  get  basic  fees  perform  better  in  increasing  clients’  investment 
sophistication.122
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